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1. Introduction 
 
The recent financial crisis and recession have revived debates about the role of monetary 
policy. An understanding of how monetary policy works is crucial for successful policy-
making in terms of whether monetary policy has the potential to stimulate and/or stabilize the 
economy. For decades, these debates have inspired a lot of thoughts. There seems to be a wide 
agreement that monetary policy influences inflation, but not all economists agree that 
monetary policy affects real economic activities. Essentially, there are three main schools of 
views.  
 
The first school is Keynesian economics, arguing that monetary policy does not only affect 
inflation but also systematically affects investment, production, employment and real incomes 
(at least in the short run).1 The non-neutrality of monetary policy arises from market frictions, 
imperfect information, nominal rigidities or asynchronized price- and wage-setting behaviour, 
or even different norms2 of decision-makers.3 Some Keynesians (though not all) argue that 
economic developments are path dependent4 and thus, the demand shocks through monetary 
policy can lead to long-lasting effects on economic activities (see, e.g.,  Akerlof 2007; Ball 
2009; Mankiw 2001). Despite this divergence in terms of short-run or long-run non-neutrality, 
all Keynesian economists believe that the short-run real effects matter. They argue that 
demand disturbances are the main source of economic fluctuations and activist demand 
management via monetary policy is strongly supported (see, e.g., de Long and Summers 1988; 
Romer and Romer 1989).  
 
The second school is the monetarist argument that monetary policy affects the economy in the 
short run, but with uncertain lags and uncertain magnitudes. In the long run, it affects nominal 
variables only and inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon. Monetary policy is 
nevertheless important because inflation is costly and monetary policy determines the inflation 
                                                 
1 The new development of the Keynesian school is known as New Keynesian economics, which emphasizes the 
provision of microeconomic foundations for traditional Keynesian macroeconomic models. As the main 
predictions about monetary policy of these two kin schools are essentially the same, I will not particularly 
distinguish between them in this thesis. 
2Akerlof  (2007) defines norms as how decision-makers think they and others should or should not behave.  
3 For surveys, see Blanchard (1990), Orphanides and Solow (1990) and Benjamin Friedman (1990).  
4 The theoretical foundations include inter alia the hysteresis theory and the endogenous growth theory (Aghion 
and Howitt 1998; Blanchard and Summers 1986). 
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rate, as argued by Milton Friedman (1968). Thus, the overriding objective of monetary policy 
should be price stability. This is the main contribution that monetary policy can provide. 
Monetary policy should be long-run oriented. Erratic monetary policy should be avoided. A 
rule of a fixed monetary growth rate is proposed by Milton Friedman (1968) – for example, 3 
to 5 percent per year.  
 
The third school is new classical economics, arguing for rational expectations and full-
employment equilibrium. New classical economists believe that only unexpected monetary 
policy shocks have an impact on economic activities, while systematic monetary policy 
actions are expected by economic agents and thus have no effect on the economy (see, e.g., 
Lucas 1972, 1973, 1996; Sargent 1976). However, since policies cannot systematically fool all 
the people, monetary policy eventually merely plays a minor role in influencing economic 
developments. In the world of perfect markets, or the world with information imperfections 
but with rational expectations, monetary policy is simply neutral. Changes in the money stock 
induce proportional changes in prices only. Demand management with monetary policy is not 
desirable as these policy disturbances may amplify the economic fluctuations. Rather, supply-
side policies (for example, fiscal reforms to mitigate tax distortions) should be given more 
attention (see Lucas 2003).  
 
The Keynesian school differs from the other two in fundamentals. To Keynesians, the perfect 
market hypothesis does not hold: there are markets distortions, nominal rigidities and sluggish 
demand. Therefore, activist demand policy (for example, monetary policy) should be pursued 
to stimulate demand and impair distortions. In contrast, new classical and monetarist 
economists believe in the power of the “invisible hand”. Economic fluctuations are mainly 
driven by the supply side. Unemployment is largely structural (for example, due to a mismatch 
between job vacancies and the unemployed in skills, location, etc).5 Activist demand policy is 
not wanted as it neither has an impact on the supply side nor on structural unemployment. 
Rather, monetary policy should more or less follow a fixed rule such that its unnecessary 
disturbances to the economy can be minimized. Once again, such debates are reflected in the 
current arguments among economists of different schools on how economies get out of the 
                                                 
5 See, for example, Daly et al. (2012). 
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Great Recession and how high unemployment in the US can be reduced (for example, Paul 
Krugman against John Taylor).6 
 
Possibly, we can test the views of different schools by checking their rationales. According to 
the Keynesian view, changes in nominal aggregate demand affect real output because of 
nominal wage and price rigidities, which might arise due to costs of price adjustment. More in 
particular, when inflation is high, the benefits from changing prices tend to exceed the 
adjustment costs such that prices are adjusted more often. As a result, nominal demand shocks 
induce faster and larger movements in prices and the fluctuations in the real economy are 
smaller. It follows that a higher trend inflation (measured, for example, by the average 
inflation rate) leads to a steeper short-run Phillips curve (i.e., the tradeoff between inflation 
and unemployment is smaller). That the average inflation rate affects the slope of the Phillips 
curve is the specific prediction of Keynesian theories based on nominal rigidities.  
 
The new classical alternative explanation for the Phillips curve is the Lucas imperfect 
information model (1972, 1973). The short-run tradeoff between inflation and real output is 
observable only when firms misinterpret a change in the price level as a movement in relative 
prices and thereby adjust their production. The producers’ expectations depend on the relative 
volatility of an individual price to the aggregate price level. The more volatile is the aggregate 
price level, the less likely it is that an observed price change is idiosyncratic. It follows that the 
more volatile is nominal aggregate demand, where the price level is nested, the less often a 
misperception occurs at the firm level. It implies that the curve relating real output to 
unanticipated inflation should be steeper for countries with highly variable nominal aggregate 
demand.  
 
A large variation in trend inflation and nominal aggregate variability across countries thus 
provides a rationale for cross-country comparisons. Lucas (1973) tests his imperfect 
information hypothesis with data from 18 countries and finds supportive evidence: increased 
nominal aggregate variability is associated with a diminishing output-inflation tradeoff. Ball, 
Mankiw and Romer (BMR) (1988) provide empirical evidence based on a 43-country sample 
                                                 
6 This debate shapes the way of thinking of policy-makers, which is reflected in this year’s central banker 
meeting in Jackson Hole. One of the focuses at the meeting was how to disentangle the cyclical components from 
the structural ones of the US current high unemployment (Lazear and Spletzer 2012).  
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and confirm Lucas observation. However, their interpretation of this finding is different from 
that of Lucas: the uncertainty, arising from high nominal aggregate variability, increases 
nominal flexibility and thus reduces the real effects of nominal disturbances. They provide 
further evidence for the nominal rigidity hypothesis: they find that the cross-country 
differences in the output-inflation tradeoff are well explained by trend inflation even when 
nominal aggregate variability is controlled.  
 
Flowering BMR (1988), a bundle of studies have emerged that examine the Keynesian theory 
on the output-inflation tradeoff, but vary in the estimation approaches applied. I summarize 
and evaluate these approaches in Chapter three “Nominal Rigidity and the Output-Inflation 
Tradeoff”. By doing so, I provide further evidence to see whether the Keynesian nominal 
rigidity hypothesis on the output-inflation tradeoff withstands new evidence. All my tests, 
using cross-country data and time series, discriminate between the two theoretical frameworks 
by disentangling the effects on the steepness of the Phillips curve that are attributable to the 
variance in nominal growth from those that can be attributed to the level of steady inflation. 
Consistent with BMR, my results from both cross-country and over-time analyses confirm the 
Keynesian theory that nominal rigidity is an important determinant of the output-inflation 
tradeoff. When inflation is higher, prices are less sticky; changes in nominal demand are 
transmitted more to fluctuations in prices; aggregate demand policy is thus less effective and 
the output-inflation tradeoff is smaller. 
 
The cross-country comparison based on the extended sample constitutes evidence that the 
Keynesian theory is still relevant today. In higher-inflation countries, the output-inflation 
tradeoff that policy-makers face is smaller. However, in each individual country, the output-
inflation tradeoff is not constant over time as the state of the economy changes and thus, the 
degree of nominal rigidity varies over time. Policy-makers should thus take a dynamic view 
towards the tradeoff.  
 
The key prediction of the Keynesian school is that monetary policy is not neutral. Indeed, it is 
a well-established fact that in advanced economies, monetary policy is found to have a 
significant impact on output (at least in the short run), thanks to numerous contributions 
(Chapter two gives a detailed literature review). However, very few studies have addressed 
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this monetary non-neutrality issue for the case of China, and reported somewhat mixed 
findings (see, e.g., Dickinson and Liu 2007; Sun, Ford, and Dickinson 2010). On the other 
hand, it is not obvious that the conclusion drawn for advanced economies can simply be 
extended to the case of China, given the substantial differences between China and those 
economies in their central banking strategies and practices. The central bank of China, the 
People’s Bank of China (PBC), is known to use several unconventional measures, including 
inter alia credit controls, to achieve various tasks. Furthermore, given under-developed 
financial markets and the fact that firms in China depend heavily on bank loans for external 
financing, the main effective monetary propagation mechanisms could differ from those in 
advanced economies. Hence, it is necessary to conduct an independent study to examine the 
effectiveness of Chinese monetary policy. 
 
In Chapter four, “Does Monetary Policy Matter in China? A Narrative Approach”, I apply 
the narrative approach to the case of China. I read the documents of the PBC to obtain 
additional information about policy makers’ intentions behind each policy movement. This 
narrative approach tackles two problems: the policy measurement problem and the 
identification problem. The first arises because the PBC applies multiple instruments, different 
from the standard one-instrument operating procedure that advanced economies adopt.7 Under 
this operating procedure, all its frequently-used policy instruments contain information about 
its policy (see, e.g., Chen, Chen, and Gerlach 2011; He and Pauwels 2008; Shu and Ng 2010; 
Xiong 2011). It is thus impossible to represent the behavior of all PBC instrument variables 
with a single instrument, such as those conventional measures (the short-term interest rate or 
the money stock) that are widely used to measure monetary policy of other central banks. 
Using them will lead to odd estimates of the effects of monetary policy in China.  
 
The second classical identification problem arises as the central bank also reacts to the state of 
the economy and the causal direction of the observed interaction between central bank actions 
and real activity needs to be identified. Changes in policy instruments reflect the influences 
more than monetary policy. For example, changes in the required reserve ratio and monetary 
                                                 
7 That is, use open market operations with short-term money market rates as the operational target.  
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aggregates in China are strongly influenced by many non-monetary factors, including the trade 
balance, foreign exchange purchases and the subsequent sterilization interventions.8  
 
Chapter four contributes to the literature with a careful examination of Chinese monetary 
policy by focusing on how and with what effects monetary policy is conducted in China. It 
hence gives outside observers some insights into the functioning of Chinese monetary policy.  
 
Based on two sources of the PBC’s documents for the period 2000-2011, I identify three 
exogenous monetary shocks as those movements that are driven by inflationary pressure. 
These shocks are uncorrelated with the current and future developments on the real side of the 
economy. Their impact on the economy should lead to an unbiased estimate of the effects of 
monetary policy. Estimates using these shocks indicate that monetary policy in China has 
strong and long-lasting effects on output. Following a monetary contraction, the maximum 
drop of output is found after 15 months: the level of output is about 6 percent lower than it 
would otherwise have been. This slowdown is perennial with the negative impact remaining at 
a substantial level even after five years. All these findings are robust to variations in the 
control variables and the specification. 
 
My results confirm the narrative-approach findings based on the US data (see Romer and 
Romer 1989, 2004). However, the effects of Chinese monetary policy (with the use of various 
unconventional measures) are quicker and more persistent than those estimated for the US. For 
example, compared to Romer and Romer (2004), lags in the industrial production effects are 
smaller in China (with two months versus five months); the maximum depressing impact on 
output occurs earlier in China (with 15 months after the shock versus 24 months). This 
slowdown is more perennial in China: after five years, the effect on output is still substantially 
negative.  
 
Different from Milton Friedman’s proposal that unconventional direct instruments (for 
example, credit controls) should be abandoned because they lead to large distortions 
(Friedman 1960), the PBC still uses various direct instruments, partly due to institutional 
                                                 
8 Sterilization refers to actions taken by the central bank to neutralize the impact of foreign exchange operations 
on domestic money supply. The PBC currently sterilizes the money supply through two instruments – open 
market operations by issuing central bank bills and increasing the required reserve ratio.   
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constraints. However, Chapter four, based on the study of the Chinese case, finds that 
monetary policy using combined indirect and unconventional direct policy instruments has 
strong and long-lasting effects on the real economy. This finding lends strong support to the 
current discussions on the effects of unconventional monetary measures that central banks 
around the world started to use after the outbreak of the financial crisis.  
 
Given their different policy implications, competing schools of thoughts in macroeconomics 
have had strong influences on monetary policy adopted by different central banks. As 
expressed by Keynes, “the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are 
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the 
world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from 
any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist” (Keynes 1936: 
383).  
 
In Germany, the monetarist school has played an important role in shaping its monetary policy. 
For example, Otmar Issing, the former member of the board of the Deutsche Bundesbank and 
of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (ECB), believes that: “other than by 
maintaining price stability and thereby reaping its benefits in terms of economic performance, 
there is no tradeoff at longer horizons between inflation, on the one hand, and economic 
growth or employment, on the other hand, that can be exploited by monetary policy makers” 
(Issing 2000: 4). This led to a broad consensus in Germany that the only appropriate objective 
of monetary policy was the maintenance of price stability. Thus, it is argued that monetary 
policy has nothing to do with the euro-sclerosis and the persistent high European 
unemployment rate in the last three decades (prior to the 2007 crisis).  
 
However, de Grauwe and Polan (2005) test the monetarist claim that inflation is always and 
everywhere a monetary phenomenon and do not find the supportive evidence. They use panel 
data consisting of 160 countries over 30 years. They find that a positive long-run relationship 
between inflation and money growth is explained by the presence of high-inflation countries 
in the sample. In most of the low-inflation countries, there is no strong link between inflation 
and money growth. The effects of monetary policy do not end with the nominal magnitudes 
only. 
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Furthermore, the unemployment trend in Europe is hardly consistent with one specific rate of 
structural unemployment (or in Friedman’s words, the “natural rate of unemployment”) since 
unemployment rose with every recession and remained at levels substantially above the pre-
recession rates. Neither could severe supply shocks per se explain the rising European 
unemployment for the period after 1980. Rather, this period is known as the Great Moderation 
for the US economy with the low unemployment rate and stable inflation, partly due to the 
relative absence of supply shocks.  
 
Surprisingly, little attention was given to macroeconomic institutions although the institutional 
setup regarding monetary policy is very different across the Atlantic. The Deutsche 
Bundesbank differed from the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in its principles and practices. 
Rather than the dominance of price stability that was adopted by the Bundesbank (and later by 
the ECB), the Fed has a “dual mandate” and is required to use monetary policy to achieve 
price stability, but also “to promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, and stable 
prices.” For the Bundesbank (and the ECB), price stability became the priority and other 
considerations should only be pursued conditional on the achievement of price stability.  
 
These different doctrines are reflected in their policies. With a minor weight on growth, 
monetary policy of the Bundesbank might have been biased towards inflation fighting per se. 
A growing economy might already have triggered the fear of the Bank for inflation and shifted 
to contractionary policy. Indeed, in Chapter five, “Monetary Policy and European 
Unemployment” (co-authored with Ronald Schettkat), we find that the monetary policy of the 
Bundesbank is asymmetrical in the sense that the Bank did not actively fight against 
recessions, but that it dampened the recovery periods. Less constraint on growth would have 
kept German unemployment at lower levels. The interaction of negative external shocks and 
tight monetary policies may have been the major – although probably not the only – cause of 
unemployment in Europe remaining at ever higher levels after each recession.  
 
This thesis examines rationales behind different economic schools and their policy application 
in a systematic way. Chapter two, “Literature Review”, summarizes what we have known 
about monetary policy and, particularly, highlights problems faced by researchers in 
estimating the effects of monetary policy. Chapter three, “Nominal Rigidity and the Output-
9 
 
Inflation Tradeoff”, takes a deep look into the rationales for two different schools – the new 
classical economics and the Keynesian economics. Chapter four, “Does Monetary Policy 
Matter in China? A Narrative Approach”, continues with the Chinese case and tests 
whether the prediction of the Keynesian non-neutrality of monetary policy holds there as well. 
Chapter five, “Monetary Policy and European Unemployment”, checks the policy 
implications of the monetarist school. We evaluate the impact of monetary policy in line with 
the monetarist doctrines on European unemployment. 
10 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I review studies that have contributed to the understanding of how monetary 
policy influences output by following the evolution of methods that these studies have applied. 
The review begins with studies focusing on the money-income relationship in a simple 
regression, followed by the estimates based on a simultaneous-equation system. Throughout 
the review, I particularly highlight two problems in estimating the effects of monetary policy: 
the problem of how to measure monetary policy and the identification problem.   
 
2.1 Money and Income: From Milton Friedman to the VAR Studies in the 1980s 
 
The empirical study of the money-income relationship can be traced back to Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963). In that study, they checked timing patterns of changes in the money growth 
rate in the US, and compared those to the reported peaks and troughs of the business cycles. 
They found that changes in the money growth rate led fluctuations in the business cycle, 
though those leads were varying over time. Thus, their conclusion was the short-run non-
neutrality of monetary policy. Another empirical contribution in this line is made by Andersen 
and Jordan (1968) of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. They regressed changes in GNP 
on contemporary and three lagged values of changes in money stocks, and found that changes 
in money stock have significant impacts on output. Afterwards, this money-output regression 
became known as the St. Louis equation and has been widely applied by economists in the 
estimation of the effects of monetary policy.  
 
Yet, the result based on this single equation provides information about the correlation 
between variables, but nothing about the direction of causation. Causation can run in both 
directions. The observed interaction of money and output could reflect the policy reaction to 
the state of the economy, or the effects of monetary policy on output, or very likely, the 
mixture of both. Hence, we need to identify the causal direction.  
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In 1980, Christopher Sims (1980b) proposed a new econometric methodology, vector 
autoregression (VAR),  to solve this identification problem.1 VAR is a kind of extension of the 
St. Louis equation through including several simultaneous equations in a system. We can thus 
run regressions of the variables of interest on their own lagged terms, and the lagged and 
contemporaneous terms of the other variables in the system. The reaction of monetary policy 
to the state of the economy is (implicitly) modelled in the equation for the policy indicator (for 
example, the money stock). Then, in an identified VAR model, the unexplained part of 
changes in the money stock (the error term or the so-called structural innovations in the VAR 
literature) is interpreted as exogenous policy shocks. The estimates of the impact of these 
structural innovations on output give the effects of monetary policy on the real economy.  
 
Thus, in a standard VAR model, at least two equations are included: one is designed to 
identify the effects of monetary policy on output – represented by the equation with output 
regressed against a policy indicator; and other captures the reaction of policy to the state of the 
economy – represented by the equation with changes in the money stock depending on the 
output. With the regression results, it is possible to generate an impulse response analysis that 
traces out dynamic impacts of policy changes on the variables of interest.  
 
However, special efforts have to be made to identify the policy shocks. In a VAR model, the 
true relationship between macroeconomic variables includes the contemporary interaction of 
those variables (structural equations in the VAR literature). That is, a vector of the current 
terms of these variables, Xt, appears on both sides of the equations. To run multi-regressions 
simultaneously, we need to transform equations to a reduced form: with Xt appearing only on 
the left-hand side of equations. However, the error terms of these regressions are different 
from structural errors and hard to interpret with economic meanings. Therefore, it is necessary 
to restore structural equations and derive structural errors that we can interpret, for example, as 
policy shocks. Uniquely identifying structural equations from the estimated reduced-form 
equations is a key issue and requires some additional structural restrictions on the system. 
Quite often used identification restrictions include recursive ordering, orthogonalization of 
contemporaneous errors, or the introduction of some neutrality constraints, either in terms of 
                                                 
1 Sims won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2011, largely due to this contribution. 
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the short run or the long run.2  This kind of VAR is known as structural VAR (SVAR), as 
structural assumptions are made to identify policy shocks.  
 
The VAR methodology was soon widely applied by monetary economists. In Bernanke’s 
words, “identified VAR methods are currently the best available means of measuring effects 
of monetary policy changes on the economy” (Bernanke 1996: 73). Over the past three 
decades, large amounts of literature using VAR have emerged. The application of VAR 
methodology first appeared in the studies continuing to explore the money-income 
relationship in the 1980s. The conclusions concerning the predictability of money on income 
made by those studies are not robust and not consistent over time, in contrast to Friedman and 
Schwartz’ (1963) claims that there exists a steady relationship between money and income. 
Table 2.1 shows four selected studies, which shed some light on the debates in monetary 
economics during that period. 
 
Table 2.1: Selected studies on the money-income relationship, using VAR 
 
  Study Period Sample Variables Conclusions 
1 Sims (1980a) 
Interwar  1920-41; 
Postwar 1948-78 Rs, M1, P, IP 
With the interest rate added into the model, the 
predictability of M1 vanishes. The interest rate turns 
out to explain more of the variation in output, 
accounting for about 30 percent in the Postwar period.
2 
Eichenbaum 
and Singleton 
(1986) 1949 -1983 
( 1)MΔ , ( )IPΔ , π , Rr  The monetary growth rate does not contribute to predict output growth.  
3 
Stock and 
Watson (1989) 1959 – 1985 IP, M1, P, Rs 
M1 does not Granger-cause IP growth, but the 
deviation of money growth from a linear time trend 
does.   
4 Spencer (1989) 1948-1978 M1, IP, P, Rs 
The VAR estimates are not robust, but sensitive to the 
relative ordering of the variables, the detrending 
methods, the lags selection, and the data frequency. 
 
  Notes: M1 stands for the monetary aggregate M1; P for consumer price level index; π  for inflation calculated based on CPI; 
IR for residential investment; Rs for three-month Treasury bill rate; Rr for real interest rate. All variables are in logarithm, 
with the exception of various interest rates and the inflation rate. ( )xΔ  indicates that variable x is in first difference. 
  Source: Authors’ summary based on the studies listed.  
 
These studies use a monetary aggregate, M13, to measure monetary policy and examine the 
effects of changes in M1 on industrial production for the US economy. Despite this similarity, 
                                                 
2 For more, see Kennedy (2003) and Lütkepohl (2005). 
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they come to different conclusions. Sims (1980a) examines the forecast error variance 
decomposition of the VAR model at the time horizon of four years after a policy shock. In the 
first specification of the VAR model with M1, IP and price level, Sims shows that although 
money helps predict real income for both the interwar and the postwar period in the US, the 
predictability of money for the latter period is only half of that for the former period. When the 
short-term nominal interest rate is added to the VAR system, money ceases to predict real 
income. Based on this finding, Sims concludes that monetary policy does not explain post-war 
business cycles.  
 
Eichenbaum and Singleton (1986) build their VAR model using postwar US data. They find 
that money growth does not help predict output growth and interpret this as the evidence for 
neutrality of monetary policy. Stock and Watson (1989) argue that this finding is sensitive to 
the detrending4 methods applied to the data. They apply a different detrending method – 
introducing a linear time trend to money growth – and find that money growth itself does not 
explain the variations of output, but the deviation of money growth from its time trend is 
useful for forecasting real growth in industrial production. Spencer (1989) extends this 
argument. He confirms Stock and Watson’s finding. Moreover, he demonstrates that the VAR 
estimation results are not robust to the model specification: they vary with changes in the 
relative ordering of the policy and the macroeconomic variable, the lag length and the data 
frequency.5 
 
The development of the literature on monetary policy in the 1980s showed that it was possible 
to use  the VAR to trace out what happened in the “black box”6 after changes in monetary 
policy. Yet, the estimate results based on VAR models are somehow mixed. Despite the 
sensitiveness to the model specification, in general they indicate less effectiveness (or even 
neutrality) of monetary policy in the postwar US.    
                                                                                                                                                         
3 For the US data, M1 is the sum of currency held by public and demand deposits. This narrow money stock is 
more likely under the control of the central bank and is hence used as the indicator of monetary policy.   
4 Detrending refers to the process of transforming non-stationary time series into stationary ones. Different 
methods can be used, e.g., take first differences, which is widely used; introduce a time trend, either linear or 
time-varying; or, use some filtering techniques, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the Kalman filter. 
5 Further evidence can be found in de Grauwe and Costa Storti (2004), where they conduct a meta-analysis with a 
sample of 43 studies using VAR. They find that the use of different identification assumptions helps explain a 
large variation in the estimated effects of monetary policies on output in those studies.  
6 “Black box” was used by Bernanke and Gertler (1995) to refer to the propagation process of how monetary 
policy affects the economy.  
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2.2 Is the Money Stock a Good Measure of Monetary Policy?  
 
The interpretation of those VAR estimates in the 1980s reflects the strong influence of 
monetarism on the economics profession at that time: the money stock was believed to be the 
good single indicator of monetary policy and the absence of the money-income relationship 
simply implied the neutrality of monetary policy. However, McCallum (1983) argues that the 
breaking-down of a money-income relationship says nothing about the neutrality of monetary 
policy. Rather, he pointed out that this result was due to the use of improper measures of 
monetary policy with monetary aggregates.  
 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997, 1998b) argue that the 
measurement of monetary policy is regime dependent – the indicator for monetary policy 
should be carefully studied in the framework of central banks’ operating procedures. In the 
United States, the Fed’s operating procedure experienced large changes after the War. During 
most of the postwar period, the Fed is better described as a federal-funds-rate targeter. That is, 
the Fed sets an implementing target for the federal funds rate (i.e., the overnight market price 
for the reserves), and then through open market operations keeps the target rate prevailing in 
the reserves market. In doing so, the Fed accommodates the fluctuations in money demand 
induced by income changes, which makes the money supply endogenous. A change in the 
money stock hence reflects factors more than policy changes. The endogenous nature of the 
money supply no longer makes the money stock a good policy indictor.  
 
Changes in the operating procedures, which have also been seen in many other advanced 
economies, thus require economists to find another indicator to measure monetary policy. 
Studies turn to the short-term nominal interest rate and examine its potential for a policy 
indicator. Bernanke and Blinder (1992: 901) demonstrate that the federal funds rate is 
“extremely informative” and “sensitively records shocks to the supply of bank reserves”. It 
stands well for the policy stance. Thus, they propose the federal funds rate as the policy 
indicator for the Fed. Extending this argument to Germany, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) argue 
that, analogous to the US case, policy instrument rates – the Lombard rate and the call rate 
(that is, the money market rate in Germany, analogous to the federal funds rate in the US) – 
performed as the optimal indicator of German monetary policy. Following these findings, it 
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has been a standard practice to measure monetary policy of those central banks in advanced 
economies with the short-term interest rate. Studies thus focus on the linkage from changes in 
the short-term interest rate to real GDP and put less or no emphasis on monetary aggregates, as 
in McCallum’s (2001) words “monetary policy analysis in models without money”. 
 
2.3 Non-Neutrality of Monetary Policy Revisited 
 
Numerous studies have surged in the 1990s, modeling the interaction between changes in the 
short-term interest rate and economic developments with the VAR approach. The conclusions 
made in those studies are quite consistent across countries: shocks to monetary policy induce 
strong real effects, while price effects are sluggish and small (see, e.g., Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Waston 1997; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999; de Grauwe and Storti 2008).7 The 
maximum impact on output is found about two years after a monetary policy shock. 
 
Figures 2.1-2.3 represent the findings from four studies,8 among many others. As shown in 
Figure 2.1, the impulse responses of real output to a contractionary policy shock, estimated by 
Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996) and Bernanke and Mihov (1997), are quite similar for two 
countries – the US and Germany. After about six to eight months, real output drops 
substantially and stays at the lower level over the reported time horizon (four years). 
Compared to real output, the unemployment rate, as reported by Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
and displayed in Figure 2.2, needs a longer period of time to respond to a policy shock. Then, 
following a minor drop, it rises quickly and constantly, and peaks after about two years.9 
Figure 2.3 shows the impulse response of real GDP to an expansionary monetary policy shock, 
reported by Bernanke and Mihov (1998a).  Symmetric to the impulse response of output to a 
contractionary policy shock, real GDP rises quickly and constantly after an initial small 
decline, and reaches the peak in about two years. Afterwards, it decreases slowly and stays at a 
higher level.  
 
                                                 
7 In particular, de Grauwe and Costa Storti (2008) draw their conclusion from a meta-analysis with a sample of 
86 published studies using VAR to estimate the effects of monetary policies on output.  
8 To make the graph easier to read, I represent the spot estimates without confidence intervals.  
9 Though not shown in their graph, Bernanke and Blinder (1992: 919) point out that unemployment does not 
remain permanently high. Instead, it declines back to zero. 
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Figure 2.1: Responses of output to a rise of the interest rate, US and Germany 
 
               
Figure 2.2: Response of the unemployment rate to a rise of the federal funds rate, US 
 
               
 
Figure 2.3: Response of real GDP to a decrease of the federal funds rate, US 
 
                
 
  Notes: Figure 2.1 shows responses of output to a contractionary policy shock at the horizon of 48 months in two countries – 
the US and Germany. The policy shock is measured as a one-standard-deviation increase of the federal funds rate (in the US) 
or the call rate (in Germany).  Figure 2.2 shows the response of unemployment rate to a one-standard-deviation increase of the 
federal funds rate in the US at the horizon of 24 months. Figure 2.3 shows the response of real GDP to a one-standard-
deviation drop of the federal funds rate at the ten-year horizon .  
  Source: Data based on studies from Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996), Bernanke and Mihov (1997, 
1998a).  
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2.4 Some Puzzles in the VAR Studies and an Alternative Approach 
 
To identify the effects of monetary policy from policy reaction to the economy, we need to 
disentangle exogenous policy movements from passive policy reactions. The VAR approach 
attempts to model the reaction function of the central bank so as to proxy for exogenous 
monetary shocks with the structural innovations (see, e.g., Rudebusch 1998). However, an 
incorrectly specified VAR model would fail in identifying exogenous monetary policy shocks 
and lead to puzzling results, which contradict the theoretical predictions. A well-known 
example is that some VAR models estimate that prices rise with a monetary tightening. This is 
known as the price puzzle (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999; Sims 1992).  
 
This puzzle arises because the expected inflation is not included that the central bank has had 
in mind when setting the policy (see, e.g., Bernanke, Boivin, and Eliasz 2005; Sims 1992). 
The forward-looking central banker decides on a policy shift to tightening, given an increase 
in the inflation expectations. When the policy action is not strong enough to sufficiently 
reduce inflation, the co-movement of a policy tightening and a rise in prices is observed. The 
solution to this problem is to include a variable that captures the central bank’s inflation 
expectation – the common practice in the literature is to follow Sims (1992) and include a 
commodity price index – or include many information variables to possibly closely present the 
information set that the central banker has had at the decision-making, as modeled in a 
FAVAR (factor-augmented VAR) model.  
 
However, even in the most sophisticated model (like FAVAR), it is impossible to proxy for all 
information that policymakers have had, particularly their numerical forecasts of future 
economic developments. In general, if any omitted variable is a determinant of both output 
and the policy reaction function, omitting it means that it appears in the error terms of both 
equations for output and the policy reaction function. Then, using the (structural) error term of 
the latter equation to measure exogenous monetary policy shocks will lead to biased estimates 
of the effects of monetary policy on output given the correlation of shocks with the error term 
in the output equation.10 In particular, this omitted-variable bias could be a serious problem in 
                                                 
10 Section 4.3 in this thesis presents a simple framework, showing the omitted-variable bias in the estimates.    
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the estimates of the effects of monetary policy with VAR models for emerging countries like 
China, where the availability of the data is an important issue.   
 
An alternative approach, the narrative approach, can be used to solve the identification 
problem. This approach was pioneered by Friedman and Schwartz in their Monetary History 
of the United States (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) and has been applied by Romer and 
Romer in a series of studies (Romer and Romer 1989, 2004).11 It “involves using the historical 
record, such as the descriptions of the process and reasoning that led to decisions by the 
monetary authority and accounts of the sources of monetary disturbances” (Romer and Romer 
1989: 122). This information discloses the central bank’s intentions for each policy movement. 
Some of these intentions are neither linked directly to output nor indirectly to those factors 
that are likely to affect output growth. In this way, we can single out those policy movements 
that are exogenous to the current and future economic developments in the real side. A 
regression using these exogenous policy shocks will yield an unbiased estimate of the impact 
of monetary policy on output. Indeed, compared to what obtained using conventional 
indicators, Romer and Romer (2004) estimate quicker and stronger effects of monetary policy 
on output using their narrative-based exogenous monetary shocks.  
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
Thanks to numerical contributions, today we have a deeper understanding of monetary policy 
compared to half a century ago. It can be summed up into several findings. First, in advanced 
economies, the policy interest rate, rather than the money stock, reflects changes in monetary 
policy well. More specifically, the measurement of monetary policy is regime dependent and a 
policy indicator should be carefully studied in the framework of central banks’ operating 
procedures. Second, the proper measurement of monetary policy is essential for accurate 
estimates of the policy effect. The neutrality conclusions drawn from the studies in the 1980s 
that purely focus on the money-income relationship are biased due to the imprecise 
measurement of monetary policy. Third, monetary policy affects real economic activities and 
the maximum impact is found about two years after a policy shock. This finding is consistent 
                                                 
11 The narrative approach has also been applied in studies on the effects of fiscal policy (see, e.g., Alesina, Favero, 
and Giavazzi 2012; Ramey 2011; Ramey and Shapiro 1998; Romer and Romer 2010). 
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with the evidence obtained for several industrial countries. Fourth, the accuracy of VAR 
estimates of the effects of monetary policy crucially depends on the validity of identified 
exogenous policy shocks. A misspecified VAR model could lead to an omitted-variable bias in 
its estimates. Alternatively, one can use the narrative approach to disentangle exogenous 
policy shocks from passive policy reactions based on the information inferred from the central 
bank’s historical documents. A regression using exogenous policy shocks yields unbiased 
estimates of the effects of monetary policy on output.  
 
Despite huge advances in methodology, two inherent problems – the choice of a good policy 
indicator and the identification problem – are still likely to impair the accuracy of the 
estimates of the effects of monetary policy on output. These two problems will be further 
elaborated in Chapter four, when the effectiveness of Chinese monetary policy is considered. 
To solve these problems, I will use the narrative approach to identify exogenous policy 
movements and use them to estimate the effects of monetary policy on output.  
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3. Nominal Rigidity and the Output-Inflation Tradeoff1 
 
One of the key arguments of the Keynesian economics is that demand policy have an impact 
on real output and employment (at least in the short run). This non-neutrality arises because 
nominal prices (and wages) do not instantly adjust after changes in the nominal aggregate 
demand. Nominal rigidities play an important role in the propagation of nominal disturbances 
to real economic activities.   
 
In a seminal paper elaborating the New Keynesian macroeconomics, Ball, Mankiw and Romer 
(1988) (BMR) argue that the degree of nominal rigidity, arising from costly price adjustment 
(“menu costs” in their model) and staggered price setting, is not fixed, but depends on trend 
inflation.2 Following the New Keynesian approach, they (BMR) model nominal rigidity as an 
outcome of firms’ optimization decisions. After observing a change in the nominal aggregate 
demand, firms would not alter prices if the benefits from price adjustment are smaller than the 
associated costs. However, when inflation is high, to keep prices unchanged is becoming more 
costly and firms tend to adjust prices more frequently so that prices are less rigid. 
Consequently, nominal disturbances (originated from demand policy, for example) lead to 
quicker and larger movements in prices in high-inflation countries and smaller fluctuations in 
the real economy. Therefore, the slope of the Phillips curve, measuring the tradeoff between 
real output and inflation, is smaller. Hence, there exists a negative relationship between trend 
inflation and real effects of demand policy. 
 
Along with this New Keynesian argument, there exists an alternative new classical view about 
the short-run output-inflation tradeoff. In two papers, Lucas (1972, 1973) models the 
formation of expectation given imperfect information. The short-run tradeoff between real 
output and inflation is observable only when firms misinterpret a change in the price level as a 
movement in relative prices and thereby adjust their production. When observing a price 
                                                 
1I would like to thank Katrin Heinrichs, Jan Klingelhöfer, Ronald Schettkat and the seminar (conference) 
participants at the Schumpeter School of Business and Economics, the DIW Macroeconometric Workshop 2009, 
the 2011 meeting of the Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES) and the 26th Annual Congress of 
European Economic Association (EEA), 2011 Oslo for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are my 
own. 
2 This argument differs from the traditional Keynesian economics, which emphasizes rigidities in nominal wages 
and assumes that these rigidities are exogenous.  
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change of their own product, the producer does not know whether it is an idiosyncratic shock 
or an aggregate shock. And the producer’s expectations depend on the relative volatility of an 
individual price to the aggregate price level. The more volatile is the aggregate price level, the 
less likely it is that an observed price change is idiosyncratic. It follows that the more volatile 
is nominal aggregate demand, where the price level is nested, the less often this misperception 
occurs. In his 1973’s paper, Lucas (1973) tests this hypothesis with data from 18 countries and 
finds supportive evidence that increased nominal aggregate variability is associated with a 
deteriorating output-inflation tradeoff. 3 Thus, in countries with more volatile nominal GDP, 
demand policy is less effective on real output.   
 
BMR (1988) provide empirical evidence based on a 43-country sample and confirm this 
observation. However, their interpretation of this finding is different from that of Lucas: more 
variable nominal demand implies higher uncertainty, which induces firms to follow a more 
flexible pricing strategy. Analogous to high trend inflation, the uncertainty (arising from high 
nominal aggregate variability) increases nominal flexibility, which results in diminishing 
effectiveness of demand policy. BMR provide further evidence for the nominal rigidity 
hypothesis: they find that the cross-country differences in the output-inflation tradeoff are well 
explained by trend inflation even when nominal aggregate variability is controlled. 
 
As both the new classical and the New Keynesian theories are consistent with this finding, 
they cannot be distinguished by testing the hypothesis whether such an inverse relation exists 
between the tradeoff and the nominal aggregate variability (see Ball, Mankiw and Romer 1988; 
Akerlof, Rose and Yellen 1988). Instead, the predicted role of trend inflation for a smaller 
tradeoff can be used to validate the New Keynesian theory. By contrast, the new classical 
imperfect-information model argues that the expectation does not depend on average inflation 
and thus predicts no relationship between trend inflation and the output-inflation tradeoff. 
Therefore, in this chapter I test the New Keynesian theory on nominal rigidity by investigating 
whether trend inflation has impact on the size of real effects of demand policy.  
 
                                                 
3 A few studies use extended samples and provide supportive evidence for Lucas’s hypothesis (see, e.g., Alberro 
1981; Jung 1985; Ram 1984), while some other do not (see, e.g., Froyen and Waud 1980; Katsimbris 1990, 1990). 
Besides the cross-country evidence, Kandil and Woods (1995) examine cross-industry data and do not find 
support for the imperfect-information model.   
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In this chapter, I extend  the BMR (1988) analysis and many subsequent studies, e.g., Defina 
(1991), Katsimbris and Miller (1996) and Khan (2004), to test whether the New Keynesian 
economic nominal rigidity hypothesis on the output-inflation tradeoff withstands new 
evidence.  In so doing, I summarize and evaluate four estimation approaches that have been 
used by those studies.4  
 
The first approach is the baseline two-stage cross-country comparison, applied by BMR 
(1988). With this approach, the tradeoff for each country is estimated at the first stage and the 
cross-country variations in those tradeoffs are explained at the second stage. The New 
Keynesian hypothesis implies that demand policy is less effective in countries with high trend 
inflation, where prices are less rigid. A large variation in trend inflation across countries thus 
provides a rationale for cross-country comparisons. 
 
Different from the base-line approach, the other three approaches allow the tradeoff to vary 
over time. The New Keynesian hypothesis implies that the output-inflation tradeoff in a 
country is not stable if trend inflation in this country changes over time. It is thus expected to 
have a smaller tradeoff during the period when inflation remains high. I consider this 
implication in my analysis. Approach two is the two-stage cross-country panel comparison. At 
the first stage, the time-varying tradeoffs are estimated for each country with the rolling 
regression, as done in Katsimbris and Miller (1996). At the second stage, those estimates are 
pooled together to create a cross-country panel dataset, which contains both cross-country and 
over-time variations in the tradeoffs. These variations are then explained. Approach three is 
the two-stage inter-temporal comparison. It continues to use those time-varying tradeoffs 
estimated with the rolling regression, but at the second stage focuses on the explanation of the 
over-time variations in the tradeoff in each country. Finally I follow Defina (1991) and Khan 
(2004) to examine the over-time variations in the tradeoffs in a framework of one-stage 
regression.  
 
                                                 
4 De Grauwe and Costa Storti (2004) take another approach by using a meta-analysis based on 43 studies. They 
find that the large variation in these studies on the estimated effects of monetary policy can be explained by 
inflation. “In a low-inflation environment monetary policies are quite effective in influencing output, both in the 
short run and in the long run. These effects tend to disappear when inflation increases” (de Grauwe and Costa 
Storti 2004: 21). 
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The synthetic evaluation of all these estimation approaches is new in the literature and by 
doing so, this chapter provides a comprehensive corroboration for the existing evidence 
offered by other researchers. Methodologically, I find that the one-stage approach is preferred 
for analyzing the over-time changes in the tradeoff as it can avoid potential efficiency loss 
arising from two-stage estimation. Qualitatively, my results provide support for the New 
Keynesian theory on the output-inflation tradeoff. I extend BMR’s analysis to the current great 
moderation period and find that nominal rigidity continues to explain both cross-country and 
over-time differences in the output-inflation tradeoff.  
 
This chapter is extended as follows. In Section 1, I review the existing studies on nominal 
rigidity, both theoretically and empirically. Section 2 shortly describes the data. Section 3 
offers a baseline cross-country analysis of differences in the output-inflation tradeoff. Section 
4 presents an analysis based on pooled cross-country and over-time variations in the tradeoff. 
Section 5 checks the BMR’s hypothesis with a country-by-country time-series comparison. 
Section 6 investigates the intra-country time variation of the tradeoff with one-stage 
regressions. Section 7 then concludes. 
 
3.1 Literature Review on Nominal Rigidity 
 
3.1.1 Why Are Wages or Prices Sticky? 
 
Nominal rigidity is crucial for understanding short-run economic fluctuations. Incomplete 
adjustment of prices implies that changes in aggregate demand are transmitted to output and 
employment. Nominal rigidity is the cornerstone for the Keynesian economists to explain the 
non-neutrality of aggregate demand policy (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005; 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1999; Mankiw and Romer 1995; Roberts 1995). However, nominal 
rigidity was assumed ad hoc in the traditional Keynesian macroeconomic model. Only in 
response to the Keynesian economic theoretical crisis of the 1970s, studies emerged that 
provided solid microeconomic foundations of nominal rigidities (see Mankiw and Romer 
1995).5  
 
                                                 
5 For a good review on those studies, see Blanchard (1990). 
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Two lines are adopted to offer a micro-foundation of nominal rigidities. The first line focuses 
on price adjustment costs. It is argued that nominal rigidity can arise from costly price 
adjustment. Such adjustment costs can be as trivial as menu costs (see Mankiw 1985). At the 
micro-level, firms face physical costs or restrictions of changing a nominal price, which 
prevent firms from adjusting prices frequently.6   
 
Surprisingly, these trivial menu costs can cause large business cycles (see Akerlof and Yellen 
1985; Mankiw 1985). For an individual firm, the resulting profit loss is small as long as the 
deviation of the predetermined price from the profit-maximizing price is small. In this case, 
the private incentives to adjust prices are small, and these firms do not change prices 
continuously. Despite these small private costs, price rigidity can impose large costs on the 
economy in the presence of aggregate-demand externalities (see Blanchard and Kiyotaki 
1987). That is, “rigidity in one firm’s price contributes to rigidity to the price level, which 
causes fluctuations in real aggregate demand and thus harms all firms” (Ball, Mankiw, and 
Romer 1988: 15). 
 
The second line focuses on rigidity in the price level due to the wage- and price-setting 
behaviors. It is observed that in fact not all prices or wages are free to change every period. 
Much efforts are made to model asynchronized wage or price changes due to long-term, multi-
period or staggered contracts (see, e.g., Blanchard 1982; Calvo 1983; Fischer 1977; Fuhrer 
and Moore 1995; Taylor 1979, 1980). This asynchronized timing of price changes by different 
firms leads to gradual adjustment of the price level after nominal disturbances. It implies that 
at the presence of staggering pricing, nominal disturbances can have large and long-lasting 
effects on output and employment even if there are no rigidities in individual prices.   
 
Following these two lines, a series of studies have provided nominal rigidity with rich micro-
foundations and laid solid theoretical foundation for the New Keynesian Phillips curve.7  
                                                 
6 The term menu cost may be misleading, as Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) point out, “because the physical 
costs of printing menus and catalogs may not be the most important barriers to flexibility. Perhaps more 
important is the lost convenience of fixing prices in nominal terms – the cost of learning to think in real terms and 
of computing the nominal price changes corresponding to desired real price changes” (Ball, Mankiw and Romer 
1988: 18). 
7 Besides the theoretical contributions on why prices are sticky, some economists try to answer this question 
directly. For example, Blinder (1994), based on surveying firms on their price adjustment decisions, finds that 
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“Menu costs cause prices to adjust infrequently. For a given frequency of individual 
adjustment, staggering slows the adjustment of the price level. Large aggregate rigidities can 
thus be explained by a combination of staggering and nominal frictions: the former magnifies 
the rigidities arising from the latter” (Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 1988: 12). Due to nominal 
rigidity arising from adjustment costs or staggered contracts, prices do not adjust fully to 
compensate shifts in nominal demand, and as a result changes in nominal demand have real 
effect.  
 
It is also agreed that nominal rigidity by itself is not sufficient in accounting for the non-
neutrality of aggregate demand shocks. Many studies focus on explaining the real effects of 
changes in nominal demand through combining nominal rigidity with real rigidity arising from 
efficiency wages, customer markets, implicit contracts, insider-outsider relationships, etc; or 
through combining nominal rigidities with information imperfections. In this way, nominal 
rigidities are further magnified and non-neutralities of demand policy increase greatly (see, 
e.g., Akerlof and Yellen 1986, 1988; Ball and Romer 1990; Mankiw and Reis 2002; Smets 
and Wouters 2007; Yellen 1984). 
 
3.1.2 How Rigid Are Prices? 
 
The literature on the price stickiness can be traced back to studies using sectoral data on some 
specific products or markets – for example, scanner data on grocery products, newsstand 
prices of American magazines, catalog prices, and food products.8 These studies examine how 
frequently sectoral prices change, and have showed the existence of price rigidities and the 
degree of rigidities varied across sectors.   
 
Thanks to the openness of CPI and PPI micro-data to researchers in various countries, the last 
decade has seen an explosion of research on micro price-setting behavior based on large-scale 
data sets of individual prices. Baharad and Eden (2004) examine the Israeli CPI data set during 
1991-1992 and find that on average 24 percent of stores changed their prices in each month, 
which implied an average price duration of about 4 months. Baumgartner et al. (2005) find 
                                                                                                                                                         
prices are indeed sticky and the reasons for that, however, are divergent across firms. It suggests that “price 
stickiness is a macroeconomic phenomenon without a single microeconomic explanation” (Mankiw 2006: 543).  
8 Dhyne et al. (2006) and Baumgartner et al. (2005) both give a good overview of this literature.  
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that prices are quite sticky by examining Austrian CPI data set and estimate the weighted 
average price duration between 10 to 14 months. Vilmunen and Laakkonen (2004) provide 
micro-level evidence from CPI on frequency of price changes in Finland and their estimate of 
average duration of consumer price spells ranges from 6 to 9 months. Bils and Klenow (2004), 
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) use CPI research data set 
provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and obtain different conclusions on the patterns of 
price changes in the United States. Bils and Klenow (2004) find that the median duration of 
prices is 4.3 months, while Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) 
exclude temporary price changes due to sales and find that the median duration for regular 
prices is 7.2 months and between 8 and 11 months, respectively.9 A series of studies look into 
the frequency of price changes in the Euro Area, including, e.g., Álvarez et al. (2006), 
Angeloni et al. (2006) and Dhyne et al (2006),  find that prices in the euro area are sticky with 
the average price duration close to one year.10  
 
A summary of those studies reveals that although price stickiness is common in many 
countries, the magnitude of price stickiness varies. Reviews contributed by Álvarez (2008) and 
Klenow and Malin (2010) provide good surveys of the recent micro-evidence found in various 
studies, which are represented in Table 3.1.11  The listed studies investigate the monthly 
average frequency of price changes in various countries during the given periods. The 
variation of this frequency is huge across countries. The highest monthly frequency of price 
changes is found in Sierra Leone during the period from the end of 1999 to the early 2003, 
amounting to 51.5. That implies that on average, half of all prices change in each month. This 
frequency is more than five times higher than the minimum average frequency of price change 
                                                 
9 As indicated in these three papers, the calculation of the median duration of prices is very sensitive to how the 
sales in the data are treated. For more discussion of this issue, see Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008), Nakamura and 
Steinsson (2008), Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov (2009), Maćkowiak and Smets (2009) and Klenow and Malin 
(2010), among others. 
An alternative way to deal with this problem is suggested by Eichenbaum, Jaimovich, and Rebelo (2011), in 
which they focus on reference prices – the most often quoted prices – and find that the duration of reference 
prices is about one year, and the nominal rigidities take form of inertia in reference prices. 
10 Some interpret the micro evidence (especially, the Bils and Klenow’s (2004) findings) as a challenge of New 
Keynesian macroeconomic models, where prices are assumed to reset once per year (see, e.g., Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005). However, studies argue that despite less rigidity of prices at the micro level, 
prices are stickier at the macro level, due to price asynchronization, real rigidities, information imperfections, and 
asymmetric responses of disaggregated prices to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks (see, e.g., Ball and Romer 
1990; Blanchard 1982; Boivin, Giannoni, and Mihov 2009; Mackowiak and Smets 2009). 
11 Klenow and Malin (2010) present a modified version of this table, in which three additional studies are 
included.  
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found in Italy during the period from 1996 to 2003. In general, prices are stickier in Euro Area 
countries. On the other hand, prices change much more often in Latin American countries, as 
in Brazil, Chile and Mexico.  
 
To check whether the frequency of price changes depends positively on the average rate of 
inflation, I match the average inflation rate that those countries experienced during the given 
period with the price change frequency, as presented in Table 3.1. A close examination of the 
last two columns suggests that there is a positive relation between the average inflation rate 
and the monthly frequency of price changes – the correlation coefficient of these two is 0.35. 
That is, price changes are state-dependent – in high-inflation environments, consumer prices 
tend to change more often (see, e.g., Cecchetti 1986; Dias, Marques, and Santos Silva 2007; 
Kashyap 1995; Maćkowiak and Smets 2009; Taylor 1999). 
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Table 3.1: Monthly average frequency of consumer price changes and average inflation 
(annualized) (both in %), various countries, selected period 
  
 
 
  Source: Monthly average frequency of consumer price changes is taken from Álvarez (2008: 10), while average 
inflation is author’s calculations based on the data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database. 
  
Country Paper Sample period
Average frequency 
of price changes Mean inflation    
Austria Baumgartner et al. (2005) 1996:1 - 2003:12 15.1 1.44
Belgium Aucremanne and Dhyne (2004) 1989:1 - 2001:1 16.9 2.18
Brazil Gouvea (2007) 1996:1 - 2006:12 37.0 7.80
Canada Harchanoui et al. (2008) 1995:1 - 2006:12 28.1 2.04
Chile Medina et al. (2007) 1999:1 - 2005:7 46.1 2.88
Denmark Hansen and Hansen (2006) 1997:1 - 2005:12 17.3 2.09
Euro Area Dhyne et al. (2006) 1996:1 - 2001:1 15.1 1.58
Finland Vilmunen and Laakkonen (2005) 1997:1 - 2003:12 16.5 1.83
France Baudry et al. (2007) 1994:7 - 2003:2 18.9 1.51
Germany Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2006) 1998:2 - 2004:1 11.3 1.15
Hungary Gábriel and Reiff (2008) 2001:12 - 2007:6 15.1 5.34
Israel Baharad and Eden (2004) 1991:1 - 1992:12 24.5 15.50
Italy Veronese et al. (2006) 1996:1 - 2003:12 10.0 2.48
Japan Saita et al. (2006) 1999:1- 2003:12 23.1 -0.59
Luxembourg Lünnemann and Mathä (2005) 1999:1 - 2004:12 17.0 2.20
Mexico Gagnon (2006) 1994:1 - 2004:12 22.6 14.51
Netherlands Jonker et al. (2004) 1998:11 - 2003:4 16.5 3.11
Norway Wulfsberg and Ballangrud (2008) 1975:1 - 2004:12 25.4 4.73
Portugal Dias et al. (2004) 1992:1 - 2001:1 22.2 3.97
Sierra Leone Kovanen (2006) 1999:11 - 2003:4 51.5 7.93
Solvakia Coricelli and Horváth (2006) 1997:1 - 2001:12 34.0 8.50
South Africa Creamer and Rankin (2007) 2001:12 - 2006:2 16.0 5.03
Spain Álvarez and Hernando (2006) 1993:1 - 2001:12 15.0 3.31
United States Bils and Klenow (2004) 1995:1 - 1997:12 26.1 2.69
United States Klenow and Kryvtsov (2005) 1988:2 - 2003:12 23.3 3.06
United States Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) 1998:1 - 2005:12 21.1 2.48
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3.2 Data and Sample Description 
 
I follow the BMR criterion to include possibly many large, industrialized and free market 
economies (Ball, Mankiw and Romer 1988: 34). All together, 37 countries are included12 and 
the sample period is extended to 2007.13 All the data – nominal and real GDP, and GDP 
deflator – are annual, from IMF International Financial Statistics. The earliest available data 
start with 1948; the time series for some countries are shorter due to the unavailability of the 
data.  
 
The sample countries are listed in Table 3.2 with the sample period for each country for which 
data are available. The table then presents the descriptive statistics of real growth, inflation, 
and nominal growth. The macroeconomic performance shows a large variation across 
countries. Southern American countries experienced high inflation – Colombia had an average 
annual inflation of 18 percent, Mexico 17 percent, Venezuela 16 percent. On the other hand, 
the newly industrialized country, Singapore showed a combination of fast real growth and low 
inflation: over nearly five decades, its average real growth rate was 7.6 percent with a low 
inflation rate of 2.6 percent.  
  
                                                 
12 Compared to BMR (1988), I dropped off 6 countries from the sample of 43 countries: 2 African countries 
(Nicaragua and Zaire) with discontinuous data due to wars, 4 Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, 
Brazil and Peru) that experienced hyperinflation around 1990.  
13 The sample does not include the current financial and macroeconomic crisis years. During the current crisis, 
financial-market disruptions appear to be central, which challenges the existing macroeconomic analysis and 
models (see Romer 2011). Exclusion of the crisis years avoids a big structural break at the end of the sample 
period.  
30 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics on inflation and output, 37 countries, selected periods  
  
    
    Notes: All data are annual. Growth rates are computed as differences in logarithms with the log of real output as y and the 
log of nominal output as x; the log of the price level is p = x – y. The criterion for selecting sample countries follows BMR 
(1988). 
Source: Author’s calculations with data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.  
country
Sample 
period Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation Mean
Standard 
deviation
Australia 1959-2007 0.042 0.047 0.051 0.040 0.093 0.047
Austria 1964-2007 0.031 0.022 0.034 0.027 0.066 0.032
Belgium 1953-2007 0.035 0.025 0.029 0.019 0.065 0.030
Canada 1948-2007 0.037 0.023 0.040 0.031 0.077 0.038
Colombia 1968-2007 0.041 0.023 0.175 0.076 0.214 0.077
Costa Riga 1960-2007 0.048 0.033 0.132 0.116 0.178 0.099
Denmark 1966-2007 0.021 0.020 0.053 0.035 0.076 0.038
Dominican Republic 1962-2007 0.050 0.046 0.114 0.138 0.165 0.127
Ecuador 1965-2007 0.043 0.046 0.044 0.124 0.087 0.141
El Salvador 1951-2006 0.038 0.043 0.054 0.075 0.092 0.071
Finland 1960-2007 0.033 0.028 0.056 0.041 0.090 0.052
France 1950-2007 0.034 0.019 0.050 0.040 0.084 0.044
Germany 1960-2007 0.028 0.024 0.031 0.023 0.061 0.040
Greece 1948-2007 0.044 0.039 0.095 0.068 0.139 0.062
Guatemala 1951-2007 0.039 0.024 0.067 0.080 0.105 0.079
Iceland 1960-2007 0.042 0.037 0.163 0.137 0.203 0.141
Iran 1966-2007 0.041 0.088 0.170 0.110 0.208 0.115
Ireland 1948-2007 0.043 0.027 0.060 0.048 0.103 0.053
Israel 1968-2007 0.054 0.094 0.282 0.379 0.331 0.360
Italy 1970-2007 0.023 0.018 0.080 0.057 0.107 0.069
Jamaica 1960-2007 0.019 0.035 0.141 0.116 0.159 0.109
Japan 1955-2007 0.046 0.039 0.033 0.043 0.079 0.063
Mexico 1948-2007 0.047 0.033 0.170 0.185 0.217 0.171
Netherlands 1956-2007 0.031 0.022 0.040 0.028 0.072 0.041
Norway 1966-2007 0.034 0.016 0.057 0.044 0.088 0.050
Panama 1950-2007 0.049 0.041 0.027 0.043 0.076 0.058
Philippines 1958-2005 0.039 0.031 0.092 0.068 0.129 0.058
Portugal 1977-2007 0.026 0.022 0.106 0.080 0.137 0.086
Singapore 1960-2007 0.076 0.039 0.026 0.037 0.101 0.062
South Africa 1950-2007 0.034 0.023 0.082 0.052 0.117 0.045
Spain 1954-2007 0.040 0.041 0.075 0.055 0.118 0.049
Sweden 1950-2007 0.028 0.018 0.052 0.039 0.080 0.037
Switzerland 1948-2007 0.026 0.027 0.030 0.025 0.056 0.036
Tunisia 1961-2007 0.050 0.035 0.056 0.040 0.105 0.054
United Kingdom 1948-2007 0.025 0.017 0.056 0.044 0.081 0.039
United States 1948-2007 0.033 0.023 0.034 0.022 0.067 0.028
Venezuela 1957-2007 0.035 0.051 0.164 0.173 0.199 0.163
Across-country values
Mean 0.038 0.034 0.082 0.075 0.120 0.077
Standard deviation 0.011 0.017 0.058 0.067 0.059 0.061
Real growth Inflation Nominal growth
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3.3 International Evidence (1): Two-Stage Cross-Country Results  
 
BMR (1988) found that the output-inflation tradeoffs varied across countries for the sample 
period from 1948 to 1986. Since the publication of their paper (1988), major industrialized 
countries experienced a period of low fluctuation of real output and at the same time a 
relatively low inflation rate, which is referred as the great moderation in the literature. It might 
lead to changes in some empirical macroeconomic relationships. The natural question 
following this is whether such a tradeoff relation still exists and if so, what kind of changes 
this tradeoff illustrates. This section tries to clarify these questions by replicating Lucas (1973) 
and BMR (1988) empirical tests with the sample period extended to 2007.  
 
3.3.1 Estimating the Short-Run Output-Inflation Tradeoff 
 
I follow Lucas (1973) and BMR (1988) to estimate the short-run output-inflation tradeoff by 
running the regression for each of these 37 countries:  
                            , 1it i i it i i t i iy con x y Timeτ θ γ ε−= + Δ + + + , for i = 1, 2, …, 41                      (3.1) 
where y is real GDP in log; xΔ is the first difference of the log nominal GDP; Timeγ measures 
the time trend; subscript i is a country index; subscripts t and t-1 are time indices. The residual, 
iε , reflects all the neglected factors that could affect output, including supply shocks. This 
residual will be discussed in the following section, when supply shocks are addressed. xΔ
measures the percentage change in nominal GDP. It is used as a proxy for a nominal 
disturbance. A monetary or fiscal expansion, such as an increase in the money supply or an 
increase in government purchases, is reflected in an increase in nominal GDP.  
 
Equation 3.1 implies that output movements arise from two components – a long-run time 
trend and some short-run fluctuations due to aggregate demand disturbances, with the former 
approximated with Timeγ and the latter with xτΔ . This chapter focuses on the short-run 
fluctuations of the real output. The coefficient, τ , is of our interest as it captures the short-run 
effects of nominal disturbance on the real output. A change in aggregate demand can be 
transmitted to the real output, or to prices, or affect both. The larger τ is, the larger is the effect 
of a change in demand on the real economy. It results in a smaller 1-τ , the proportion of a 
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change in demand that is passed into prices. On the other hand, a smaller τ corresponds to the 
situation that a nominal disturbance has more effects on prices. If τ = 1, a change in nominal 
demand affects the real economy by one to one; while τ = 0, a change in demand affects the 
price level only. For 0 1τ< < , the effects of a change in demand fall partly on the real output 
and partly on the price level. The coefficient, τ , measures the output-inflation tradeoff, a kind 
of variant of the slope of Phillips curve.  
 
Table 3.3 reports the estimated values of the tradeoff parameters, τ , and its estimated standard 
errors for the full sample period and two subsample periods with 1985 as a cutoff. The second 
subsample corresponds to the great-moderation period and with this split, it is possible to have 
a close look at the estimates of the tradeoff for the great-moderation period.  
 
The estimated short-run tradeoff varies a lot across countries. For the full sample, the standard 
variation of τ for the 37 countries is 0.25, which is close to its mean value. The estimated 
tradeoff is significant and large in many countries, such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, 
the United States, etc., ranging from 0.44 for to 0.74. However, in many other countries, the 
estimated tradeoff is small and close to zero. It indicates that the effect of demand policy on 
the real economy varies substantially across countries.   
 
The last four columns present the estimated tradeoffs for two periods – the pre-great-
moderation period and the great-moderation period – together with their estimated standard 
errors. A quick comparison of the estimation results suggests that the estimated tradeoff 
changes over time as well. On average, the estimated value of τ for the great-moderation 
period is 0.4, higher than 0.32, the one estimated with the earlier data. Some countries exhibit 
a substantial increase of the output-inflation tradeoff for the post-1985 period. For example, 
the tradeoff for the United Kingdom increases considerably – from -0.02 (point estimate, 
insignificant) to 0.91, close to 1. The tradeoff for the United States increases from 0.68 to 0.82 
for the great-moderation period. However, the tradeoff in some other countries declines. 
Across countries, the correlation between τ estimated with the earlier data and τ estimated 
with the later data is relatively low, about 0.4. It implies that over time there are changes of the 
tradeoff. The time variation of the tradeoff will be discussed further in Section 3.5.  
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Table 3.3: Estimates of the output-inflation tradeoff, 37 countries, selected periods 
    
 
    
Note: Regression results based on Equation 3.1. The output-inflation tradeoff, τ , is the estimated coefficient of 
itxΔ . *, ** 
and *** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimates based on the data from IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
country
Sample 
period
Tradeoff 
parameter, τ
Standard 
error
Tradeoff 
parameter, τ
Standard 
error
Tradeoff 
parameter, τ
Standard 
error
Australia 1959-2007 0.547* 0.056 0.659* 0.087 0.425* 0.068
Austria 1964-2007 0.651* 0.100 0.725* 0.104 0.487** 0.244
Belgium 1953-2007 0.737* 0.075 0.631* 0.129 0.327** 0.133
Canada 1948-2007 0.438* 0.062 0.396* 0.085 0.701* 0.074
Colombia 1968-2007 0.141* 0.053 0.19*** 0.128 0.192** 0.082
Costa Riga 1960-2007 -0.119** 0.050 -0.246* 0.095 0.006 0.067
Denmark 1966-2007 0.495* 0.113 0.642* 0.227 0.629* 0.136
Dominican Republic 1962-2007 -0.021 0.056 0.387* 0.118 -0.138* 0.048
Ecuador 1965-2007 0.161* 0.041 0.304* 0.088 0.1** 0.051
El Salvador 1951-2006 0.152*** 0.086 0.406* 0.090 -0.110 0.225
Finland 1960-2007 0.522* 0.061 0.48* 0.109 0.691* 0.056
France 1950-2007 0.039 0.069 -0.033 0.086 0.548* 0.135
Germany 1960-2007 0.649* 0.066 0.552* 0.104 0.776* 0.074
Greece 1948-2007 0.138*** 0.077 0.279* 0.103 0.165*** 0.102
Guatemala 1951-2007 0.07*** 0.043 0.31* 0.078 -0.023 0.030
Iceland 1960-2007 0.209* 0.046 0.204** 0.089 0.463* 0.059
Iran 1966-2007 0.359* 0.107 0.408* 0.155 0.229** 0.102
Ireland 1948-2007 0.161* 0.059 0.24* 0.073 0.638* 0.070
Israel 1968-2007 0.031 0.045 -0.192 0.201 0.179*** 0.104
Italy 1970-2007 0.202* 0.067 0.403* 0.069 0.421* 0.149
Jamaica 1960-2007 0.027 0.048 0.082 0.149 0.048 0.039
Japan 1955-2007 0.481* 0.116 0.644* 0.180 0.742* 0.078
Mexico 1948-2007 -0.053*** 0.027 -0.09*** 0.051 -0.043 0.035
Netherlands 1956-2007 0.538* 0.047 0.599* 0.055 0.682* 0.091
Norway 1966-2007 0.103*** 0.056 0.135 0.110 0.086 0.082
Panama 1950-2007 0.531* 0.065 0.328* 0.105 0.738* 0.077
Philippines 1958-2005 -0.023 0.090 -0.029 0.095 0.364** 0.170
Portugal 1977-2007 0.058 0.113 0.046 0.106
Singapore 1960-2007 0.524* 0.048 0.542* 0.073 0.573* 0.059
South Africa 1950-2007 0.155*** 0.082 0.241* 0.085 0.618* 0.146
Spain 1954-2007 0.288*** 0.156 0.201 0.228 0.674* 0.102
Sweden 1950-2007 0.083 0.078 0.011 0.095 0.571* 0.120
Switzerland 1948-2007 0.696* 0.066 0.714* 0.091 0.68* 0.050
Tunisia 1961-2007 0.534* 0.065 0.476* 0.101 0.609* 0.097
United Kingdom 1948-2007 -0.004 0.066 -0.024 0.104 0.911* 0.142
United States 1948-2007 0.605* 0.067 0.685* 0.090 0.818* 0.147
Venezuela 1957-2007 0.036 0.055 0.096*** 0.063 0.019 0.095
Across-country values
Mean 0.274 0.070 0.315 0.108 0.401 0.098
Standard deviation 0.254 0.026 0.270 0.043 0.305 0.049
Full sample Data through 1985 Data after 1985
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3.3.2 Determinants of the Tradeoff: Cross-Country Results 
 
The new classical and New Keynesian economists both agree that the short-run output-
inflation tradeoff varies across countries. The controversy exists in how to explain these cross-
country differences. The new classical economics claims that it is due to imperfect information, 
while the New Keynesian economists argue that the true cause is nominal rigidity. While both 
schools predict a negative relationship between the volatility of nominal demand and the 
effects of demand policy, the test of this relationship cannot distinguish two arguments. 
However, two theories differ in the predicting role of trend inflation for the tradeoff. It is 
hence possible to distinguish them by testing whether there is a reverse relationship between 
the trend inflation and the tradeoff.   
 
Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 show a scatter plot of the output-inflation tradeoff estimated for the 
full sample against the two candidate determinants – trend inflation and aggregate variability, 
respectively. Aggregate variability is measured with the standard deviation of nominal GDP 
growth and trend inflation with an average inflation rate. Figure 3.1 suggests that there is a 
negative relationship between the tradeoff and trend inflation. The tradeoff appears to be 
significant and large in countries with low inflation rates while in those countries with high 
inflation rates, the tradeoff is small. Figure 3.2 indicates that a negative nonlinear relationship 
exists between the tradeoff and the standard deviation of nominal GDP growth as well. 
Meanwhile, the negative relationship between the tradeoff and these two explanatory variables 
both appear to be nonlinear: the negative impact of trend inflation (or aggregate variability) on 
the tradeoff fades away with a rising value of trend inflation (or aggregate variability). 
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Figure 3.1: The output-inflation tradeoff and average inflation 
 
                
 
    Source: The output-inflation tradeoff, τ, is from Table 3.3. Average inflation is from Table 3.2.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: The output-inflation tradeoff and standard deviation of nominal growth 
 
               
 
    Source: The output-inflation tradeoff, τ, is from Table 3.3. Standard deviation of nominal GDP growth is from Table 3.2.  
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One way to capture the nonlinearity is to include the terms of squared explanatory variables, 
as BMR (1988) specified 2 21 2 1 2i i i xi xicon eτ α π α π β σ β σ= + + + + + . However, with this 
quadratic functional form the relationship between the tradeoff and trend inflation can be 
ambiguous. As Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988: 71) pointed out, when BMK estimate this 
quadratic equation for only OECD countries (without Iceland), the relationship between τ  and 
π changes to be positive at a 7.2 percent inflation rate, which is close to the midpoint of 
inflation for the sample. Yet, the theory suggests an unambiguous negative relation between 
the tradeoff and trend inflation. The quadratic functional form is thus not optimal in describing 
a negative monotonic relationship between τ  and π .  
 
In this chapter, I use an alternative nonlinear specification. A simple nonlinear form consistent 
with an unambiguous relationship between the tradeoff and explanatory variables would be:                          
                                             / /i i xic uτ α π β σ= + + + ,                                                      (3.2) 
where τ is estimated tradeoff obtained from the regression of Equation 3.1; i is a country index; 
π is average inflation rate over the sample period and xσ is the standard deviation of nominal 
GDP growth rate over the sample period. The key feature of the functional form in Equation 
3.2 is that the nonlinear negative relation is modeled by including the inverse term of two 
explanatory variables. If the theory is right, the estimated α and β should be positive. In this 
way, the relationship between τ and π is monotonically negative and so is the relationship 
between τ  and xσ . This negative impact dies away when trend inflation (or/and aggregate 
variability) is getting bigger. 
 
Table 3.4 presents the regression results based on three variants.14 The estimated coefficients, 
'sα and 'sβ , are all positive, as the theory predicts. The regression result based on the general 
specification, listed in column 4.3, suggests that trend inflation is a significant determinant of 
the output-inflation tradeoff, while aggregate variability is not when both explanatory 
variables are included.  
 
                                                 
14 BMR’s quadratic functional form is tested with the data as well and the results are consistent with the BMR’s 
findings (Ball, Mankiw and Romer 1988).   
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Table 3.4: Determinants of the tradeoff, 37 countries, selected periods 
 
    
 
Note: The dependent variable is the output-inflation tradeoff, iτ (estimated in Table 3.3) based on the data for the full 
sample period. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * and ** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 
percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. 
    Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
However, aggregate variability turns to be a statistically significant determinant of the tradeoff 
when trend inflation is left out of the regression. This might be due to the fact that the two 
explanatory variables are highly correlated with the correlation coefficient of 0.75. With such 
a high correlation, omitting either of these two variables from the regression could lead to a 
biased estimate.15 The theory suggests that both variables could explain the cross-country 
variations in the tradeoff. Thus, the specification with both of them included is preferred. The 
regression result presented in column 4.3 suggests that trend inflation matters after accounting 
for aggregate variability, which provides strong evidence for the New Keynesian nominal 
rigidity hypothesis.16  
 
The baseline cross-country comparison results show that the New Keynesian nominal rigidity 
hypothesis is robust with the extended sample and an alternative nonlinear specification. The 
                                                 
15 A high correlation coefficient of variables, 1/π  and 1/ xσ , implies that they move together. Thus it is possible 
that the results in column 4.1 with 1/ xσ  omitted arise not because 1/π directly affects the tradeoff, but because it 
co-moves with the 1/ xσ , a true determinant of τ . The same caveat exists with the results in column 4.2.  
16 Note that the goodness-of-fit has not been improved much when the inverse of aggregate variability is included 
in the regression, compared with the regression with only the inverse of trend inflation included. The F-test of the 
hypothesis that the inverse of aggregate variability does not enter the regression when the inverse of trend 
inflation is included also indicates that aggregate variability does not determine τ in the case of F(1, 38) = 1.85. 
Independent variable 4.1 4.2 4.3
Constant -0.08 -0.06 -0.1**
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Inverse of mean inflation 0.02* 0.016*
(0.002) (0.003)
Inverse of standard deviation 0.02* 0.005
of nominal GDP growth (0.003) (0.004)
Summary statistic
Adj. R -squared 0.645 0.46 0.653
Standard error 0.153 0.187 0.151
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inverse relationship between trend inflation and effectiveness of demand policy persists in the 
low-inflation great-moderation period.  
 
3.3.3 Robustness Test: Supply Shocks 
 
The key assumption of Equation 3.1 is that xΔ reflects only aggregate demand changes. Short-
run output movements are mainly due to demand changes, while supply shocks are 
incorporated into the residual of Equation 3.1 as some left-out variable. One can argue, 
however, that supply shocks – for example, oil price shocks – are correlated with changes in 
nominal GDP. If it were the case, the estimates of the tradeoff, iτ , could be biased.  
 
A simple approach to avoid this bias is to add the omitted variable by including the supply 
shocks in Equation 3.1. Oil price shocks are major negative supply shocks in consideration. 
Altogether, there are five oil price shocks over the sample period – 1973, 1978, 1980, 1990 
and 2002 (see Hamilton 2011). I discard these five years from the sample, which is equivalent 
to introducing an oil price shock dummy variable. Equation 3.1 is re-estimated. The regression 
results are similar to the ones obtained above. The correlation between the 'sτ estimated with 
and without the oil price shock years is 0.97. And the regression of the tradeoff estimated 
without oil price shock years on explanatory variables leads to the following result:   
0.1 0.018 / 0.005 /i i xi uτ π σ= − + + +  
                                                       (0.05) (0.003)       (0.04) 
2R = 0.69; standard error = 0.17 
 
This result is very similar to that presented in Table 3.4: the coefficient on the inverse of trend 
inflation is statistically significant and quantitatively slightly larger; the coefficient on the 
inverse of aggregate variability is insignificant and small. It suggests that the omission of 
supply shocks in the baseline cross-country analysis does not cause severe bias in the 
estimates of the tradeoff.  
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3.4 International Evidence (2): Two-Stage Cross-Country Panel Results17  
 
The nominal rigidity theory argues that a higher average inflation rate (or more volatile 
aggregate demand) increases nominal flexibility and as a consequence changes in demand are 
largely transmitted to price changes and leave real variables little changed. In other words, a 
higher trend inflation is associated with a lower value of the output-inflation tradeoff. In the 
preceding part it is recognized that the output-inflation tradeoff varies across countries due to 
the persistent inflation differentials among those countries. Yet, trend inflation and aggregate 
variability are assumed to be constant for each country throughout the sample period; 
consequently, the output-inflation tradeoff for each country, iτ , is treated to be constant over 
time for each country.  
 
However, it is more likely that trend inflation and aggregate variability are not constant over 
time in most countries. The descriptive statistics on inflation in Table 3.2 suggests that this is 
the case. Inflation in many high-inflation countries is very volatile – the standard deviation of 
inflation is as high as 0.19 in Mexico, for example. In other low-inflation countries, a simple 
plot of inflation suggests high fluctuation of inflation over the past six decades within 
individual countries as well. For example, Figure 3.3 presents a movement of the annual 
inflation rate in the United States from 1948 to 2007. The inflation rate in the US is far from 
constant, showing several trends over time; it is high in the 1970s – with the average rate of 
6.6 percent – compared to that in the 1960s and 1990s.  
                                                 
17 For example, Katsimbris and Miller (1996) apply this approach.     
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Figure 3.3: Inflation in the United States, 1948-2007 
            
               
    Note: Inflation is computed as a percentage change of annual GDP deflator.  
    Source: Author’s calculations with data from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics. 
   
If trend inflation and aggregate variability are not constant over time in most countries, the 
optimal frequency to adjust prices should also change over time within individual countries. 
We should thus expect the tradeoff to change over time as well. Table 3.3 shows that with a 
simple split of the whole period into two, in many countries the tradeoff estimated with the 
earlier data appears to be different from the one estimated with the later data. A Wald-test 
suggests that in about 30 percent of countries18, the null hypothesis that there is no change 
between these two 'sτ  estimated with the earlier and later data can be rejected at the 5 percent 
significance level.19  
 
3.4.1 Estimating the Output-Inflation Tradeoff with Rolling Regressions 
 
A simple split of the sample period into two sheds lights on the fact that the tradeoff changes 
over time as well. Hence I relax the assumption that τ is constant over the six decades and re-
estimate the first-stage regression. To estimate τ for each country, Equation 3.1 is estimated 
for each country using a rolling regression with a rolling window of 15 years.20 That is, 
                                                 
18  They are Costa Riga, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Panama, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
19 This null hypothesis is rejected at the 10 percent significance level in 40 percent of countries. 
20 The rolling window is specified as 15 years to ensure the sufficient degrees of freedom for each regression.  
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rich in observations – here, altogether 1444 observations – and thus ensures a large gain in 
degrees of freedom and would in principle result in more precise estimates. For the second-
stage regression, trend inflation is now approximated by a fifteen-year average inflation rate 
for each rolling period; and aggregate variability is approximated by the standard deviation of 
the nominal growth for the same rolling fifteen-year periods.  
 
Table 3.5 presents the regression results of cross-country time series of the tradeoff on the 
inverses of average inflation and standard deviation of nominal GDP growth. Both 
explanatory variables appear to be statistically significant in the general specification as listed 
in column 5.3. And the inverse of aggregate variability turns out to be a substantively 
important determinant, compared to the cross-country regression results presented in Table 3.4. 
Like high inflation, uncertainty leads to less nominal rigidity and thus nominal disturbances 
have less effect on the real economy. 
 
Table 3.5: Determinants of the tradeoff, panel data, 37 countries, selected periods 
   
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the pooled estimates of output-inflation tradeoff, itτ , which is estimated by running rolling 
regressions based on Equation 3.1 with a rolling window of 15 years. The regression is based on the pooled dataset. Numbers 
in parentheses are standard errors. * indicates that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent level. 
    Source: Author’s calculations. 
  
Independent variable 5.1 5.2 5.3
Constant 0.34* 0.07* 0.07*
(0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
Inverse of mean inflation 0.0007* 0.0003*
(0.0001) (0.00009)
Inverse of standard deviation 0.01* 0.01*
of nominal GDP growth (0.0003) (0.0003)
Summary statistic
Adj. R -squared 0.023 0.390 0.394
Standard error 0.328 0.259 0.258
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3.4.3 Robustness Test: Cross-Country Heterogeneity 
 
In the regression using the pooled dataset, I treat the cross-country variation in τ and intra-
country over-time variation in τ indiscriminately. However, such a regression is based on the 
strong assumption of the absence of cross-country heterogeneity. In reality, it is more likely 
that heterogeneity exists among countries. For example, countries are different in institutional 
frameworks, such as the laws governing labor market flexibility, trade union strength, etc., 
which, like trend inflation, have impacts on the extent of wage and price rigidity and 
consequently the output-inflation tradeoff. These differences in institutions might lead to 
country-specific levels of the tradeoff. If it were true, we would expect different intercepts for 
different countries and thus the assumption that the regression has a single common constant 
for all countries was improper. 
 
Besides, these differences in institutions might affect the sensitivity of the tradeoff to two 
focal explanatory variables – trend inflation and aggregate variability – as well. If it were the 
case, the assumption in the pooled model that the slope coefficients, α and β , are equal across 
countries would not be suitable, either.  
 
To check the pooling restriction that all countries share a common intercept, the pooled 
regression is amended to include separate dummy variables for forty-one countries (the 
constant is thus dropped out). Those country dummies capture individual country-fixed effects. 
Table 3.6 presents the regression results of slope coefficients, α and β , and country dummies. 
Most of the country-fixed effects are statistically significant. The F-test for the restriction that 
all country dummies are equal to each other yields an F(40, 1401) = 26.65. This pooling 
restriction is thus rejected at the 99 percent level.  
 
If only country-fixed effects mattered, i.e., those institutional differences affected only the 
level of the output-inflation tradeoff and had no effects on the sensitivity of the tradeoff to the 
two explanatory variables, the estimation results with the correction of country-fixed effects, 
presented in Table 3.6, would be sufficient for a conclusion. Yet, as pointed out above, very 
likely those country-specific institutions affect the sensitivity of the tradeoff to trend inflation 
and aggregate variability as well.     
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To check it, I amend the pooled regression again by including interactions between forty-one 
country dummies and each of the explanatory variables – * iDummyα and * iDummyβ  – 
while a common constant is assumed. The pooling restriction of the equalities of slope 
coefficients across country is rejected at the 99 percent level with an F(80, 1361) = 12.6.   
 
Due to the presence of the cross-country heterogeneity, both pooling restrictions are rejected. 
It suggests that it is improper to pool the cross-country and over-time changes in the tradeoffs 
together. An alternative approach is to focus on the over-time changes in the tradeoff within 
each individual country, which will be done in the ensuing two sections. 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of the tradeoff with fixed effects, panel data, 37 countries, 
selected periods 
 
     
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the pooled estimates of output-inflation tradeoff, itτ  (see note of Table 3.5). The 
regression is run with Equation 3.2 and the constant is replaced with a set of 37 country dummies. Numbers in the third 
column are standard errors. *, ** and *** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 
percent levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
Country-specific effects Coefficient Standard Error
Australia 0.2* 0.037
Austria 0.46* 0.043
Belgium 0.15* 0.037
Canada 0.41* 0.033
Colombia 0.07*** 0.040
Costa Riga -0.16* 0.035
Denmark 0.46* 0.043
Dominican Republic -0.06*** 0.036
Ecuador 0.1* 0.037
El Salvador 0.14* 0.032
Finland 0.44* 0.036
France 0.13* 0.036
Germany 0.54* 0.038
Greece 0.18* 0.031
Guatemala 0.05 0.032
Iceland 0.13* 0.035
Iran 0.38* 0.038
Ireland 0.24* 0.031
Israel 0.1* 0.04
Italy 0.23* 0.043
Jamaica -0.015 0.035
Japan 0.43* 0.036
Mexico -0.067** 0.03
Netherlands 0.43* 0.037
Norway -0.016 0.04
Panama 0.35* 0.032
Philippines -0.058*** 0.035
Portugal 0.12** 0.05
Singapore 0.41* 0.035
South Africa 0.24* 0.033
Spain 0.23* 0.034
Sweden 0.17* 0.035
Switzerland 0.45* 0.033
Tunisia 0.38* 0.037
United Kingdom 0.22* 0.036
United States 0.66* 0.037
Venezuela -0.023 0.033
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3.5 International Evidence (3): Two-Stage Country-by-Country Time-Series Results 
 
In this section and the one following, I relax the assumption made in the cross-country 
analysis that countries are homogenous in other factors that affect the extent of nominal 
rigidity and examine the over-time changes in the tradeoff within each individual country. In 
so doing, I offer a disaggregate analysis by answering the same question how the output-
inflation tradeoff is determined in a country-by-country inter-temporal framework. 21 The 
regression in such a framework has the advantage of correcting fixed country effects. If the 
New Keynesian theory holds true, evidence that trend inflation matters should arise in a 
significant fraction of countries.   
 
The estimates of tτ obtained from the rolling regressions in the preceding part consist of time 
series of the tradeoff for each country, displaying over-time changes in the tradeoff in these 
countries. They will be used in this part.  
 
The determinants of the tradeoff: Country-by-country time-series results. For each country, 
Equation 3.2 is regressed with a series of over-time changes in the tradeoff as a regressand 
over a constant and inverses of average inflation and standard deviation of nominal GDP 
growth. These regressions test New Keynesian theory by examining intra-country time 
variations of the tradeoff country by country.  
 
Table 3.7 presents the regression results of two slope coefficients for each country, together 
with their estimation standard errors and the adjusted-R-squared.22 The results suggest that in 
about 40 percent of the countries under study, there exists a nonlinear significant negative 
relationship between the tradeoff and average inflation. And in about another 40 percent of the 
countries, aggregate variability is significant in explaining the over-time changes in the 
tradeoff. In those countries, aggregate demand policy is less effective on output during the 
periods with high inflation or/and high uncertainty.  
 
                                                 
21 This inter-temporal framework is applied in several studies as well (see, e.g., Defina 1991; Froyen and Waud 
1980; Khan 2004). 
22 The estimation results of the constant in each regression are not reported as it is not of our interest. 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of over-time variations in the tradeoff, 37 countries, selected 
periods, two-step procedure 
 
   
 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the estimates of output-inflation tradeoff, 't sτ , obtained from rolling regressions (see 
note of Table 3.5). The regression is run for each country: 
,/ /t t x tc uτ α π β σ= + + + , with only slope coefficients 
reported in the table.  * and ** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, 
respectively. 
    Source: Author’s calculations. 
country Observations
Inverse of 
mean inflation
Standard 
error
Inverse of standard deviation 
of nominal GDP growth
Standard 
error Adj. R -squared
Australia 34 0.0066 0.003 -0.006** 0.002 0.18
Austria 29 -0.00001 0.002 0.0002 0.002 -0.08
Belgium 40 -0.007* 0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.44
Canada 45 0.006* 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.16
Colombia 25 0.09* 0.008 0.007* 0.001 0.86
Costa Riga 33 -0.0004 0.007 0.041* 0.006 0.68
Denmark 27 -0.005 0.005 0.003 0.006 -0.03
Dominican Republic 31 0.045* 0.004 -0.005 0.005 0.83
Ecuador 28 -0.0007* 0.000 0.1* 0.013 0.72
El Salvador 41 -0.0004 0.000 0.016** 0.007 0.27
Finland 33 0.0037* 0.001 -0.01* 0.003 0.38
France 43 0.009* 0.004 0.001 0.003 0.34
Germany 33 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.004
Greece 45 0.003 0.003 0.008** 0.004 0.08
Guatemala 42 0.00007 0.000 0.016* 0.002 0.80
Iceland 33 0.033* 0.011 -0.012 0.012 0.49
Iran 27 0.22* 0.091 0.002 0.034 0.22
Ireland 45 0.015* 0.005 0.015 0.007 0.62
Israel 25 0.009 0.011 0.034* 0.010 0.84
Italy 23 -0.008 0.012 0.008 0.007 0.13
Jamaica 33 -0.05* 0.014 0.026* 0.007 0.29
Japan 38 0.00013 0.000 0.01* 0.003 0.22
Mexico 45 0.05* 0.007 -0.02* 0.006 0.79
Netherlands 37 -0.007 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.06
Norway 27 0.001 0.001 0.011* 0.002 0.55
Panama 43 0.002* 0.000 -0.007** 0.003 0.37
Philippines 33 0.048* 0.017 0.015* 0.003 0.77
Portugal 16 0.022 0.011 0.001 0.009 0.72
Singapore 33 0.002* 0.001 -0.019* 0.007 0.47
South Africa 43 -0.003 0.002 0.009* 0.002 0.27
Spain 39 0.010 0.014 0.016** 0.008 0.35
Sweden 43 0.004** 0.002 -0.001 0.002 0.11
Switzerland 45 0.0005 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.05
Tunisia 32 0.005 0.008 0.014582 0.004 0.68
United Kingdom 45 0.05* 0.012 -0.007** 0.003 0.38
United States 45 -0.004 0.002 0.004* 0.001 0.20
Venezuela 36 -0.004 0.004 0.036** 0.014 0.78
Across-country values
Mean 0.014 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.43
Standard deviation 0.040 0.015 0.021 0.006 0.302
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Yet in some countries, the estimated effects of average inflation and aggregate variability on 
the tradeoff are positive, not negative as predicted by theory. In most of those countries with 
wrong-sign coefficients, these coefficients are not statistically significant. But there are a few 
exceptions with significant wrong-sign coefficients. This is puzzling and will be addressed in 
the next section. 
 
3.6 International Evidence (4): One-Stage Country-by-Country Time-Series Results 
 
Till now, all the analyses in the preceding parts are done in a two-stage procedure. At the first 
stage, the output-inflation tradeoff, iτ , was estimated by running regressions on Equation 3.1 
for each country. At the second stage, to explain the differences of the output-inflation tradeoff, 
iτ , obtained at the first stage across country or over time, they are regressed on two 
explanatory factors. Such a procedure was originally applied in Lucas (1973) and BMR (1988), 
and many subsequent studies (see also Alberro 1981; Froyen and Waud 1980; Jung 1985; 
Katsimbris 1990).  
 
However, as Akerlof, Rose and Yellen (1988) pointed out, this two-stage procedure might 
result in an efficiency loss as the precision with which τ is estimated in the first-stage 
procedure varies from country to country. The tradeoff, τ , is measured with errors. Especially, 
as shown in Table 3.3, some estimates of τ are statistically significant while others are not. 
However, all these tradeoffs estimated at the first stage are treated equally in the second-stage 
analysis. “The resulting heteroskedasticity in equation (3.2) leads to inefficient estimates, and 
also could lead one to conclude, for example, that (the inflation coefficient) is significant in 
equation (3.2), when in fact it is not” (Akerlof, Rose and Yellen 1988: 72).  
 
This might shed light on the possible reasons why the puzzling results were obtained in 
Section 5. There the tradeoff is estimated with the rolling regression at the first stage, which 
might endanger the accuracy of the estimates of the tradeoff as the rolling window is specified 
as 15 years and thus the degree of freedom is low. Therefore, the results reported in Section 4 
and 5 should be interpreted cautiously.   
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The determinants of the real effect of changes in aggregate demand: One-stage country-by-
country time-series result. In this part, I apply an alternative approach to answer what 
determines the real effect of changes in aggregate demand in a one-stage analysis. The 
dependency of the tradeoff on two explanatory variables is nested directly within Equation 3.1. 
In so doing, I get: 
                     , , 1( , )it i it x it it i i t i ity con f x y Timeπ σ θ γ ω−= + Δ + + + ,  for i = 1, 2, …, 41           (3.3) 
 
Most of notations are as given in Equation 3.1. The residual is measured with itω . The 
function, ,( , )it x itf π σ , specifies the relationship between the magnitude of real effects of 
nominal disturbances and two explanatory factors – trend inflation and aggregate variability. 
As shown in the preceding parts, this relationship is negative and nonlinear. Following 
Equation 3.2, the f function is thus specified as: 
                                            , ,( , ) / /it x it i i it i x itf cπ σ α π β σ= + + .                                          (3.4) 
Substituting Equation 3.4 into Equation 3.3, we get: 
                  , , 1/ /it i i it i it it i it x it i i t i ity con c x x x y Timeα π β σ θ γ ω−= + Δ + Δ + Δ + + + .              (3.5)               
 
With a one-stage regression based on Equation 3.5, we can directly derive how trend inflation 
and aggregate variability impact the size of real effects of nominal disturbances (see, e.g., 
Defina 1991; Khan 2004). The impact effects of nominal demand changes on output in 
country i are thus the first derivative of real output with respect to the nominal demand change. 
It results in the f function: ,/ / /it it i i it i x ity x c α π β σ∂ ∂Δ = + + . And the effects of the inverse of 
average inflation and nominal demand volatility on the impact effect are the cross-partials. 
                                                         
2
(1/ )
it
i
it it
y
x
απ
∂ =∂Δ ∂ ,                                                          (3.6) 
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it x it
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x
βσ
∂ =∂Δ ∂
.                                                          (3.7) 
The two coefficients, iα and iβ , measure sensitivity of the slope of Phillips curve to the 
inverse of average inflation and the inverse of aggregate demand variability, respectively. 
These coefficients to be estimated appear to be the same as those estimated in the preceding 
analysis. However, the method to be applied to estimate iα and iβ  is different; they are to be 
50 
 
estimated directly from a one-stage procedure. In this way, the loss of efficiency will be 
avoided.  
 
Another advantage of this one-stage procedure is that it allows more degrees of fluctuation of 
two explanatory variables and consequently the tradeoff. In the preceding two parts, the 
estimation using a rolling regression is an attempt to permit some variations of these two 
variables. However, the permitted degree of variations in the rolling regression is still limited 
due to the fact that a sufficient degree of freedom is required for running a regression at the 
first stage. For a rolling window of 15 years, average inflation and nominal demand volatility 
are assumed to be constant during each of these rolling 15 years. Realistically, inflation and 
nominal demand volatility have fluctuated more in most countries.23 As one-stage procedure 
applied in this part is not constrained with a degree of freedom, the period can be shortened 
during which these two explanatory variables are assumed to be constant. They are hence 
allowed to take different values each three years. In this way, average inflation and nominal 
demand volatility are computed as a three-year moving average of the current and two past 
values.24  
 
Table 3.8 presents the part of regression results based on Equation 3.5 for each of these 
countries. Only the estimates of two coefficients, iα  and iβ , are presented as they are of our 
interest and they explain how the over-time variations in the real effect of nominal 
disturbances are influenced by two explanatory factors for each sample country. Together, the 
number of observations, the estimated standard errors and the adjusted R-squared are reported 
as well.  
 
The statistics of the adjusted R-squared listed in the last column of Table 3.8 are high and 
indicate a goodness-of-fit for the regressions. The standard errors of the estimated coefficients, 
both iα  and iβ , in the one-stage framework appear to be smaller on average compared to 
those in the two-stage framework, as listed in Table 3.7. It suggests that the estimates obtained 
                                                 
23 For example, Figure 3.3 shows the movements of inflation in the United States, which suggests that inflation is 
more volatile than it was otherwise assumed in the rolling regression models. 
24 Defina (1991) uses five-year moving averages. By using three-year moving averages in this chapter, I allow 
more movement in these two explanatory variables. Another advantage is that it ensures more degrees of freedom, 
particularly for those countries with relatively short time series available. Despite this difference, I obtain 
qualitatively the same results as he did. 
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with a one-stage procedure are more accurate on average. Another comparison with Table 3.7 
reveals that one-stage estimates also result in much fewer wrong-sign coefficients.  
 
Table 3.8 suggests that in around 60 percent of the countries, a higher-inflation period is 
accompanied by less effective demand policy, while only in 17 percent of the countries, such a 
negative relationship between aggregate variability and the tradeoff is significant. These 
estimation results thus provide further support for the New Keynesian hypothesis – during a 
period of high inflation, demand policy is found to be less effective in a large fraction of 
countries. 
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Table 3.8: Determinants of over-time variations of the tradeoff, 37 countries, selected 
periods, one-stage procedure 
 
 
 
Note: The regression is run with Equation 3.5 for each country. Only the results for the coefficients of interest, α  and β , 
are reported here. * and ** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance level, 
respectively. 
    Source: Author’s calculations 
 
country Observations α
Standard 
error β
Standard 
error Adj. R -squared
Australia 46 0.0023** 0.001 0.00027 0.0002 0.999
Austria 41 -0.002 0.001 -0.00019 0.0004 0.998
Belgium 51 0.001 0.001 0.00005 0.0003 0.999
Canada 57 0.0048* 0.001 0.00117 0.0006 0.9996
Colombia 37 0.029* 0.010 0.00118 0.0006 0.998
Costa Riga 45 0.001 0.003 0.00042 0.0007 0.997
Denmark 39 0.0078* 0.003 0.00031 0.0003 0.996
Dominican Republic 43 0.0063* 0.002 0.0033 0.0031 0.995
Ecuador 40 -0.0035* 0.001 0.0011 0.0012 0.995
El Salvador 53 0.0001 0.000 -0.00035 0.0011 0.99
Finland 45 0.0003 0.000 0.00056 0.0003 0.998
France 55 0.0054* 0.002 0.00004 0.0003 0.999
Germany 45 0.001 0.000 -0.0001 0.0003 0.999
Greece 57 0.011* 0.003 0.0002 0.0003 0.998
Guatemala 54 0.0005 0.000 0.0026** 0.0011 0.999
Iceland 45 0.014** 0.006 0.0016** 0.0007 0.997
Iran 39 0.01 0.008 0.011** 0.0052 0.94
Ireland 57 0.012* 0.002 0.0007 0.0003 0.999
Israel 37 -0.0006 0.002 0.0036 0.0031 0.98
Italy 35 0.019* 0.005 0.0010 0.0007 0.997
Jamaica 45 0.02* 0.005 0.0004 0.0008 0.98
Japan 50 0.0006 0.001 0.0005 0.0003 0.998
Mexico 57 0.011* 0.004 -0.00001 0.0009 0.999
Netherlands 49 0.003* 0.001 0.0003 0.0003 0.999
Norway 39 0.002 0.001 0.0015* 0.0005 0.999
Panama 55 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.0010 0.999
Philippines 45 0.03* 0.009 -0.0005 0.0005 0.997
Portugal 28 0.019** 0.009 0.0001 0.0003 0.99
Singapore 45 0.0002 0.000 0.0013** 0.0006 0.9996
South Africa 55 0.006* 0.002 -0.0003 0.0005 0.998
Spain 51 0.01* 0.003 0.0004 0.0005 0.997
Sweden 55 0.0076* 0.002 0.0004 0.0003 0.999
Switzerland 57 0.0009 0.001 0.00078** 0.0004 0.999
Tunisia 44 0.015* 0.005 0.000005 0.0008 0.999
United Kingdom 57 0.016* 0.003 0.0002 0.0004 0.999
United States 57 0.007* 0.001 0.0003 0.0005 0.9996
Venezuela 48 0.002 0.003 -0.0007 0.0027 0.98
Across-country values
Mean 0.0015 0.0033 0.0005 0.0009 0.99
Standard deviation 0.0029 0.0033 0.0010 0.0010 0.011
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter studies the sources of the observed variation in the output-inflation tradeoff – is it 
because of nominal rigidities according to the New Keynesian theory or is it due to imperfect 
information according to the new classical theory? The distinction between these two 
competing theories on the tradeoff has important policy implications. The former suggests that 
the tradeoff arising from nominal rigidities is a fairly stable economic relationship and it thus 
can be explored by policy makers, while the latter predicts that the tradeoff due to 
misperception is not stable and policy makers can do nothing with it. The chapter conducts a 
series of tests and finds that a higher degree of nominal rigidity25 leads to a higher output-
inflation tradeoff. This relationship is not only a cross-country observation but also an over-
time observation. 
 
Given a large variety of estimation approaches applied in the literature when examining the 
New Keynesian theory on the output-inflation tradeoff, in this chapter I summarize and 
evaluate these approaches – a baseline two-stage BMR cross-country comparison, a two-stage 
analysis based on a cross-country panel dataset, a two-stage and finally one-stage country-by-
country time-series comparison. In the latter three setups, the tradeoff is allowed to change 
over time, which is more consistent with what the theory predicts as trend inflation is far from 
constant over time. To make an over-time comparison, the one-stage analysis is preferred to 
the two-stage procedure, as the latter suffers a potential efficiency loss due to a limited degree 
of freedom in the rolling regression.   
 
The cross-country comparison based on the extended sample suggests that the New Keynesian 
theory is still relevant today. In higher-inflation countries, the output-inflation tradeoff that 
policy-makers face is smaller. However, in each individual country, the output-inflation 
tradeoff is not constant over time as the state of the economy changes and thus the extent of 
nominal rigidity varies over time – higher inflation reduces nominal rigidity and thus reduces 
                                                 
25 In this chapter, I focus mainly on nominal price rigidity. Certainly, rigidities arise also from sticky wages or 
other forms of nominal frictions (see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1997; Rotemberg 1984). The species of 
rigidities are, nevertheless, relatively unimportant for the discussion of the real impacts of nominal disturbances, 
as the conclusion would not be altered so long as the degree of these rigidities is inflation-dependent. 
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the size of non-neutralities. Policy makers thus should take a dynamic view towards the 
tradeoff.  
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4. Does Monetary Policy Matter in China? A Narrative Approach1 
 
Does monetary policy matter in China? Very few studies have addressed this issue, but 
reported somewhat mixed findings (see, e.g., Dickinson and Liu 2007; Sun, Ford, and 
Dickinson 2010). On the other hand, it is a well-established fact that in advanced economies, 
monetary policy has a significant impact on output (at least in the short run), thanks to 
numerous contributions (see, e.g., Bernanke and Blinder 1992; Bernanke and Gertler 1995; 
Blanchard 1990; Friedman 1995; Romer and Romer 1989). Yet, it is unclear that we can 
simply extend this conclusion to the case of China, given the substantial differences between 
China and those economies in their central banking strategies and practices. For example, the 
central bank of China, the People’s Bank of China (PBC2), does not follow the standard one-
instrument operating procedure that advanced economies adopt. 3  Rather, it uses multiple 
instruments, including unconventional administrative measures, to achieve various tasks. 
Second, compared to many advanced economies, financial markets in China are under-
developed and that fact that firms depend still heavily on bank loans for external financing. It 
follows that the main effective monetary propagation mechanisms in China could be different 
as well. Hence, it is necessary to conduct an independent study to examine the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in China. 
 
In order to estimate the effect of monetary policy, first we should be able to measure monetary 
policy changes (i.e., to describe monetary policy in a quantitative way). The validity of this 
measure is the premise of an accurate estimate of the effects of monetary policy (see, e.g., 
Bernanke and Mihov 1998b; Romer and Romer 1989, 2004). However, the study of China’s 
monetary policy faces two measurement problems. The first is which policy instrument should 
be used as a policy indicator. The PBC’s current operating procedure suggests that all of its 
frequently-applied policy instruments contain information about its policy (see, e.g., Chen, 
                                                 
1 I thank Rüdiger Bachmann, Katrin Heinrichs, Jan Klingelhöfer, Ronald Schettkat, Paul Welfens and seminar 
participants at the University of Wuppertal and the RWTH Aachen University for their helpful comments. Any 
remaining errors are my own. 
2 In the literature, two short forms of the People’s Bank of China are used: PBoC and PBC, although the People’s 
Bank of China tags itself with PBC only. In this chapter, I follow the Bank’s routine and use PBC.  
3 That is, use open market operations with short-term money market rates as the operational target. This is the 
case in normal times. Central banks, such as the Fed and the ECB, use primarily open market operations on a 
regular basis; and other tools play only a minor role in monetary policy. Yet, in crisis times, central banks in 
advanced economies started to apply many other tools such as balance sheet tools and communication tools. 
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Chen, and Gerlach 2011; He and Pauwels 2008; Shu and Ng 2010; Xiong 2011). On the other 
hand, these instruments are different in nature and their changes are not necessarily identical 
in terms of the frequency and magnitude. None of them per se can represent the behavior of all 
others and hereby adequately reflect changes in the PBC’s policy stance.  
 
The second problem is known as the identification problem in the literature. That is, the 
causation direction of the observed interaction between monetary policy and economic 
fluctuations needs to be identified. A simple regression of output on changes in monetary 
policy is very likely to result in biased estimates of the effect of monetary policy. For example, 
if the central bank takes counter-cyclical actions and stabilizes the level of economic activity 
absolutely, “then an observer … would see (changes in the interest rate) accompanied by a 
steady level of aggregate activity. He would presumably conclude that monetary policy has no 
effects at all, which would be precisely the opposite of the truth” (Kareken and Solow 1963: 
16). By contrast, economic fluctuations in consequence of exogenous policy movements 
should reflect the impact of monetary policy, but not other influences (see Romer and Romer 
2004). Hence, it is necessary to isolate exogenous components of policy changes from 
endogenous policy responses.  
 
One approach to overcome these two challenges is the narrative approach, which was 
pioneered by Friedman and Schwartz in their Monetary History of the United States (Friedman 
and Schwartz 1963) and has been applied by Romer and Romer in a series of studies (Romer 
and Romer 1989, 2004).4 This approach relies on the reading of the central bank’s documents 
to infer additional information on policy-makers’ intentions. The policy stance is identified 
and in addition, the driving force of each policy movement is detected. Only those policy 
shifts are defined as exogenous that are not driven by current and future developments on the 
real side of economy. These shocks are exogenous with respect to the state of the real 
economy. 
 
                                                 
4 The narrative approach has also been applied in studies on the effect of fiscal policy (see, e.g., Alesina, Favero, 
and Giavazzi 2012; Ramey 2011; Ramey and Shapiro 1998; Romer and Romer 2010). 
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One study by Shu and Ng (2010) has applied the narrative approach to examine monetary 
policy of the PBC.5 They study China Monetary Policy Report, a quarterly executive report of 
monetary policy of China, and construct a time series of the PBC’s policy stance index (tight, 
neutral or ease, for example). The Shu-Ng index is useful as it can be used as a monetary 
policy indicator to solve the first measurement problem. However, the Shu-Ng index does not 
address the identification problem and their paper does not isolate exogenous shifts in policy. 
This chapter complements Shu and Ng’s study with another independent reading of the PBC’s 
historical records and singles out those policy movements that are exogenous.   
 
This chapter uses two sources of the PBC’s documents: short summaries of quarterly 
Monetary Policy Committee’s meeting and China Monetary Policy Report. Both documents 
include explicit statements of the PBC’s monetary policy stance for the next period and 
reasoning of changes in policy. Based on this information, three exogenous shocks are 
identified as episodes, in which the PBC shifted policy to contraction to rein in inflation. 
Estimates using these shocks and various robustness tests indicate that monetary policy has 
large and persistent effects on output in China.  
 
This Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides institutional backgrounds of Chinese 
monetary policy and highlights the monetary policy indicator problem. Section 2 presents a 
brief introduction to developments of financial markets in China and thus addresses the 
functioning of monetary transmission channels. Section 3 presents a simple framework, 
explaining why a policy measure with endogenous components is likely to lead to biased 
estimates. Section 4 identifies three exogenous policy shifts of the PBC through reading its 
documents. Section 5 examines the impacts of these shocks on output and inflation. Section 6 
concludes. 
 
4.1 What Measures China’s Monetary Policy 
 
Since the mid-1980s, the PBC has experienced a series of changes in its institutional 
framework and its operating procedure. Currently, it targets the broad money (M2) and uses 
                                                 
5 Xiong (2011) applies the narrative approach by reading China Monetary Policy Report as well to abstract the 
information on the PBC’s views of macroeconomic conditions. 
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multiple monetary instruments to achieve various tasks. Is it possible to measure the PBC’s 
monetary policy with the money stock or one of its policy instruments? In this section, I 
address the monetary policy indicator problem.   
 
4.1.1 Institutional Background  
 
The PBC was established on December 1st, 1948 and was the only bank in China before the 
economic reforms. It combined the functions of a central bank and commercial banks.6 In the 
1984 central bank reform, the regular commercial banking activities were separated from the 
PBC and passed to four newly established (or reorganized) state-owned commercial banks.7 
The PBC was designated exclusively as a central bank. The objectives of its monetary policy 
are defined in the People’s Bank of China Act (promulgated in 1995) as “to maintain the 
stability of the value of the currency and thereby promote economic growth”. The first 
mandate of the PBC is thus price stability. Meanwhile, the PBC has attached great importance 
to economic growth. The GDP growth target is set each year by the central government of 
China to guarantee high-level job creation so as to absorb the consistent labor surplus, either 
freed from the agricultural sector or as a result of workers being laid-off from state-owned 
enterprises. One of the major tasks of the PBC is to implement monetary policy in line with 
this growth target. Along with this mandate, the PBC is actively engaged in foreign exchange 
interventions to keep the renminbi (RMB) exchange rate within its floating range (it will be 
elaborated in the next subsection). Thus, the PBC appears to pursue monetary policy with 
multiple objectives – price stability, economic growth and exchange rate stability.  
 
Until 1997, the PBC implemented monetary policy through the credit plan. The PBC set the 
quantitative bank-specific loan quotas, which were precise lending ceilings for individual 
financial institutions,8 and provided liquidity to those banks, which then allocated credit to 
government-preferred subsectors and projects (see Montes-Negret 1995). Banks adjusted their 
                                                 
6 Such a banking system was typical for planned economies, where the central bank functioned mainly as a fiscal 
agent of the central government in fulfilling the state production plan. The function of financial intermediation 
remained limited – the investment was financed through budget and on the other hand, private savings were low.  
7 They are the Agriculture Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China Construction Bank (CCB), 
and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), often referred to as the Big Four.  
8 Such direct lending controls were used by other central banks in the post-World-War-II era as well. For 
example, from 1965 to 1971, the Bank of England employed them as the main monetary policy tool. 
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lending activities to meet the loan quotas. In this way, the PBC, together with banks, worked 
as fiscal agents to implement the credit plan and thus achieve economic goals.9   
 
However, this direct control over the lending quantity of individual banks led to a mismatch 
between credit supply and demand, hindering the efficient allocation of credits. Furthermore, 
with the new development of financing sources other than bank credits, the relationship 
between the credit plan and real GDP became less predictable (see Montes-Negret 1995). In 
1996, the PBC introduced the growth rates of monetary aggregates (M1 and M2)10 as nominal 
anchors and adopted them, together with the credit quotas, as its intermediate targets. Two 
years later, in January 1998, bank-specific credit quotas were formally abolished.11 Instead, 
the PBC started to set the target for the total bank lending and use it as one of its intermediate 
targets as well. In May 1998, the PBC resumed the open market operations. There is thus a 
consensus in the literature that the year 1998 is a turning point of the PBC’s monetary policy 
regime from direct to more indirect control (see, e.g., Cao 2001; OECD 2010; Xie 2004), 
although to some degree, direct monetary control methods still exist. This chapter focuses on 
the post-1998 monetary policy regime.  
 
4.1.2 Measuring Monetary Policy with M2? 
 
Some studies use the broad money to measure the PBC’s monetary policy, based on the 
argument that the PBC is targeting M2. Table 4.1 presents the targeted and actually realized 
growth rates of monetary aggregates M1 and M2 for the period 1998-2011.12 During this 
period, the broad money, M2, grew consistently at a double-digit rate while the growth rate of 
M1 showed a higher volatility. In 2009, the growth rates of both M1 and M2 reached a 
historically high level: 33 percent and 28 percent, respectively, when the PBC injected a huge 
amount of liquidity into the banking system as a part of stimulus programs. 
 
                                                 
9 Dickinson and Liu (2007) present an in-depth discussion on how monetary policy affects the real economy in 
China during this transition period. 
10 According to the PBC, monetary aggregates are M0 (currency in circulation), M1 (sum of M0 plus demand 
deposits) and M2 (the sum of M1 plus savings and time deposits) (see PBC’s Annual Report 2007).  
11 It does not imply, though, that the credit policy has disappeared from the PBC’s practices. Today, the PBC still 
routinely employs specific credit policy tools to control the quantity of credit and affect the structure of credit.  
12 The PBC stopped announcing a target for M1 in 2007 but continued to set targets for M2. 
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Table 4.1: Targeted and actual growth rates of monetary aggregates, 1998-2011 
 
    
Note: The actual growth rates are computed as percentage changes of the stocks of monetary aggregates at the year end.   
Source: The targeted money growth rates over the post-2000 period are the author’s compilation (based on various issues of 
China Monetary Policy Report), while those over the period of 1998-2000 are adopted from Geiger (2006). The actual money 
growth rates are the author’s calculations based on the data from Datastream.  
 
A simple comparison of the target and the realized growth rate of M2 indicates that quite often 
the PBC missed the targets – in most cases, the actual growth exceeded the targets. Can we 
simply conclude that the PBC has in those cases implemented expansionary monetary policy? 
The answer is no. For example, in 2008 and 2011, the PBC explicitly announced 
contractionary monetary policy and undertook a series of tightening measures (by raising 
interest rates and the required reserve ratio, for example) to rein in inflation. Yet, M2 grew at a 
higher-than-target growth rate in both years.   
 
Changes in the money stock thus appear to reflect not only changes in the stance of monetary 
policy, but other factors. Particularly in China, rises in the money stock could be due to the 
PBC’s foreign exchange purchases. The current managed floating exchange rate regime in 
Year Target Actual Target Actual
1998 17 11.9 16-18 14.8
1999 14 17.7 14-15 14.7
2000 15-17 15.9 14-15 12.3
2001 15-16 12.7 13-14 17.6
2002 13 18.4 13 16.9
2003 16 18.7 16 19.6
2004 17 14.1 17 14.9
2005 15 11.8 15 17.6
2006 14 17.5 16 15.7
2007 No Target 21 16 16.7
2008 No Target 9 16 17.8
2009 No Target 33.2 17 28.4
2010 No Target 20.4 17 18.9
2011 No Target 8.7 16 17.3
Descriptive Statistics
Mean 15.1 16.5 16.7 17.4
Standard deviation 1.4 6.2 1.3 3.7
M1 Growth (%) M2 Growth (%)
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China allows a daily movement up to +/- 1 percent in bilateral exchange rates.13 Under this 
regime, the PBC is thus committed to stepping in the foreign exchange market to buy or sell 
foreign currencies whenever the exchange rate hits the bound. Given the current account 
surplus and the expectation of the RMB appreciation, quite often the exchange rate hit the 
upper bound and the PBC had to buy foreign currencies. These operations result in increases 
in the money supply. To drain the resultant excess liquidity, the PBC used to take offsetting 
operations to sterilize the monetary base, though often only partially. The observed changes in 
the money stock are thus strongly influenced by the strength and magnitude of these 
interventions. An increase in the money stock cannot be interpreted as monetary easing.  
 
Money demand is another factor that drives changes in the supply of money. A rich literature 
finds that money demand is far from stable because of technological, institutional, and 
regulatory changes in the retail banking sector (see, e.g., Friedman and Kuttner 1992, 1996; 
Goldfeld and Sichel 1990). Central banks in turn accommodate changes in the demand for 
money. This endogeneity makes it impossible to use the money stock as a proper policy 
indicator. 
 
4.1.3 Measuring Monetary Policy with One Policy Instrument? 
 
Another practice in the literature is to measure monetary policy with a policy instrument.14 In 
normal times, central banks in advanced economies (for example, the Fed and the ECB) use 
primarily open market operations on a regular basis to fine-tune movements in short-term 
interest rates. Other tools play only a minor role in monetary policy.15  Thus, there is a 
consensus to measure monetary policy of the Fed and the ECB with a short-term interest rate. 
Some studies indeed follow this practice and measure the PBC’s monetary policy with a short-
term interest rate. However, there is no way to describe the PBC’s operating regime as a one-
                                                 
13 In July 2005, China announced to give up its decade-long dollar peg and switch to a managed floating 
exchange rate regime. The exchange rate is thus set “with reference to a basket of currencies”, allowing a daily 
movement up to +/- 0.3 percent in bilateral exchange rates. In May 2007, this daily band was extended to +/- 0.5 
percent, and on April 16, 2012 it was further extended to +/- 1 percent.  
14 For example, Kareken and Solow (1963: 76) suggested that “(t)o denote the policy of a particular moment, it is 
enough to give the values for that moment of the monetary authority’s instrument variables”. 
15 The 2007 financial crisis has reverted the attention of those central banks to “unconventional” monetary policy 
instruments, among which quantitative easing has been the most widely used.  
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instrument procedure. Rather, the PBC uses various policy instruments to achieve its multiple 
objectives. Among them, quantity and administrative policy measures play an important role.  
Table 4.2 summarizes policy instruments that the PBC applies, including both monetary and 
specific credit policy instruments. Monetary policy instruments are presented in the upper 
panel of the table. They are a mix of quantity and price measures, mainly including open 
market operations, changes in the required reserve ratios and interest rates.  
 
Many of these monetary policy tools do appear in the list of policy instruments in advanced 
countries. However, in normal times their central banks in practice mainly use open market 
operations per se. They seldom change the required reserve ratio and the central bank lending 
is small in quantity.  
 
By contrast, all these tools play different important roles in China. Quantity measures, open 
market operations and changes in the required reserve, are used extensively by the PBC to 
absorb the excess liquidity in the banking sector through issuing central bank bills and/or 
raising the required reserve ratio, rather than to meet the operational target of a money market 
rate (as the Fed and the ECB do). The PBC relies less on the money market interest rate to 
affect economic activities. Rather, it exerts direct influences on private saving and bank 
lending by setting the benchmark deposit rates and lending rates (of various maturities), while 
commercial banks are allowed to adjust interest rates around the benchmark within a limited 
band.16 Recently, the PBC uses the price tool less intensively. Instead, it influences economic 
activities essentially through quantity tools, by controlling the quantity of money and hence 
the supply of bank loans.   
 
                                                 
16 At the moment, the band for the lending rate is [0.9, ∞) and that for the deposit rate is (-∞, 1]. Only in 2004, the 
PBC abolished the lending-rate ceiling and the deposit-rate floor. 
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Table 4.2: Policy instruments applied by the PBC 
  
Monetary policy instruments 
Open market operations Quantity-based indirect tool, including repurchases transactions, 
outright transactionsa and the issuance of central bank billsb. 
Required reserve ratio Discretionary and more direct tool.
Interest rates 
Price-based tool, including various central bank base interest ratesc. 
The deposit rate and lending rate of commercial banks are highly 
regulated.
Specific credit policy instruments 
Specific central bank 
lending schemes 
Discretionary tool. Under certain specific eligibility requirements, the 
PBC provides special funds at a lower cost for a particular group of 
industries or regions. 
Window guidanced 
Administrative tool in a form of "moral suasion" or "indirect pressure" 
through regular meetings with commercial banks so as to influence the 
quantity and the structure of bank lending.  
      
 
Notes: a. Outright transactions include outright purchase and outright sale, by which the PBC buys/sells securities directly 
from/to the secondary market to increase/decrease base money. b. Central bank bills are short-term securities issued by the 
PBC, which were introduced in 2002 to deal with the inadequate supply problem of government bonds. Through issuing 
central bank bills, the PBC can effectively reduce the money supply. The PBC has used them extensively to offset rises in 
liquidity in the banking system as a result of the PBC’s foreign exchange purchases. Therefore, central bank bills are often 
referred as sterilization bonds. c. They include the central bank lending rate, the rediscount rate, the interest rates paid on the 
required and excess reserves. d. The Bank of Japan exercised this practice as well in the post-War era until the early 1990s.  
Source: Author’s summary.  
 
Monetary policy instruments are supplemented by specific credit policy tools, as listed in the 
lower panel of Table 4.2. The PBC believes that the development and implementation of credit 
policy is one of its important duties (see People’s Bank of China 2012). Quite often, the PBC 
launches specific central bank lending schemes, under which it provides special funds at a 
lower cost for a particular group of industries or regions, and holds regular meetings with 
commercial banks in a form of “indirect pressure” so as to window-guide “financial 
institutions to strengthen the extension of supporting loans for central government-invested 
projects” (China Monetary Policy Report 2009 QuarterIV: 16). 17  Bank loans are shifted 
toward policy-oriented sectors and regions, such as agriculture, small- and medium-sized 
enterprises, job creation, western less-developed regions, etc. Such efforts are more obvious in 
recent years in an attempt to mitigate structural imbalances in the economy of China – for 
example, unbalanced economic growth with the coexistence of overheating and under-
                                                 
17 According to Geiger (2006), window guidance has been effective in China given that the PBC can influence 
appointments of the senior personnel at commercial banks.    
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developed sectors; the rising regional disparity, mainly between coastal and interior regions; 
the soaring income inequality, especially between rural and urban residents. Through credit 
policy tools, the PBC is actively engaged in directing bank lending and affecting the structure 
of bank loans. In general, these credit tools are more direct, yet administrative and 
discretionary. Most of central banks in advanced economies abolished them in the 1970s and 
1980s.  
 
Under the current operating procedure, both monetary policy tools and credit policy tools are 
informative about the stance of monetary policy. Thus, changes in the PBC’s policy stance 
should be predicted through monitoring all policy tools (see also Chen, Chen, and Gerlach 
2011; He and Pauwels 2008; Shu and Ng 2010; Xiong 2011). However, “explicit mention of 
all instrument variables is not in all circumstances the best possible description of monetary 
policy” (Kareken and Solow 1963: 76). Moreover, these policy instruments are so different in 
nature that it is impossible to summarize them into a single indicator.  
 
Yet, if all the policy instruments move simultaneously in a comparable magnitude, it is 
nevertheless possible to use one instrument to represent the behavior of all others. Figure 4.1 
shows the development of three selected policy instruments for the post-1998 period: the 
discount rate, the benchmark lending rate and the required reserve ratio. A close examination 
of these three instruments indicates that they did not always move together. Two interest rates 
initially showed a simultaneous movement, which however impaired after 2006. Changes in 
the required reserve ratio displayed divergences from the change pattern of interest rates: the 
correlation coefficient of the reserve ratio with the benchmark lending rate is 0.24 and that 
with the discount rate is even slightly negative, -0.03. In particular, over the post-2006 period 
the PBC tended to use changes in reserve requirements more extensively, in terms of both the 
frequency and the magnitude. For example, in eighteen months throughout June 2008, the 
PBC almost doubled the required reserve ratio to 17.5 percent in 16 steps while the benchmark 
lending rate was raised only modestly by 1.2 percentage points in 6 adjustments.   
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Figure 4.1: Three selected monetary policy instruments in China: the required reserve 
ratio, the benchmark lending rate and the discount rate (in %), 1998-2011a, b 
 
        
Notes: a. Starting from September 25, 2008, the reserve ratio for the small- and medium-sized financial institutions is set 1-
2 percentage points lower than that for the big financial institutions. In the figure, the ratio for the big financial institutions is 
reported. b. The discount rate is an interest rate at which the PBC lends to commercial banks with a maturity of 20 days; the 
benchmark lending rate (with a maturity of 1 year) is an interest rates set by the PBC as a benchmark for banks to follow.   
Grey shaded areas are marked as contractionary episodes, which will be elaborated in the following section.  
Source: The minimum required reserve ratios are author’s compilation based on the “Chronology” of various issues of the 
PBC’s Annual Report. The interest rates are from IMF International Financial Statistics. 
 
 
This shift is due to concerns that a rise in interest rates would be followed by capital inflows, 
which would elicit undesired increases in appreciation pressures on the RMB. Furthermore, 
keeping the domestic interest rate above the American one implies sterilization costs for the 
PBC. After foreign exchange purchases, the PBC used to take offsetting operations by issuing 
central bank bills to sterilize the monetary base. It buys foreign assets (mostly in the form of 
US government bonds) and sells central bank bills. The sterilization costs arise when the 
returns on US government bonds is smaller than the domestic interest rates on central bank 
bills. But sterilization could result in profits as long as the differential between two bond 
yields is positive. Indeed, there had been virtually no sterilization costs until October 2007 
(see, e.g., Cappiello and Ferrucci 2008; Xie 2009). However, since November 2007 the 
domestic yields have exceeded the US bond yields18, sterilization has turned to be costly. 
These costs would be exacerbated if the appreciation of the RMB is taken into consideration. 
Eventually, the PBC has been more reluctant to use the interest rate tool.   
 
                                                 
18 The Crisis has led to increasing demand for US government bonds (safe-haven effect) and a fall of their yields. 
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On the other hand, the use of central bank bills for the sterilization purpose was “partly 
constrained by weaker purchasing willingness on the part of commercial banks” (China 
Monetary Policy Report 2006 Quarter II). In 2006, the PBC shifted to more extensive use of 
the required reserve ratio. It is direct and effective in influencing the money supply.19 
 
The current exchange rate regime predicates that as long as there are foreign exchange 
purchases, the PBC has to conduct large-scale open market operations, supplemented with 
raising reserve requirements, to sterilize the monetary base. The frequent changes in reserve 
requirements have drawn a lot of attention – they were publicly announced and newsworthy. 
Nevertheless, these changes are “not necessarily indicative of monetary easing or tightening, 
but are more related to the management of foreign exchange reserves”, as the PBC’s Governor, 
Zhou, Xiaochuan, pointed out (Caixin 2012). This suggests that a part of changes in policy 
instruments is systematic response of the PBC to the state of the economy. To isolate 
exogenous components of monetary policy changes from systematic policy responses requires 
more information on driving forces of policy movements. 
 
4.2 Financial Markets and the Functioning of Monetary Transmission Channels 
 
Since the beginning of reforms, China’s financial markets have seen huge progress. However, 
they are still under-developed and regarded as the Achilles’ heel of China’s economic 
developments (see, e.g., Dobson and Kashyap 2006; Forssback and Oxelheim 2007; Lardy 
2004, 2008; OECD 2010). At the moment, bank loans are the main source of the external 
financing in China.  
 
Figure 4.2 presents financial markets components in China at the end of 2004 and 2010, as 
compared to those in the United States. The financial depth in China (calculated with the total 
outstanding debts and equities divided by the GDP) was around half of that in the United 
States. Among the total outstanding debts and equities, bank loans in China used to account 
for 72 percent in 2004, playing a dominating role in external financing. This share declined 
below 50 percent in 2010, due to fast developments of stock markets. Yet, it was still very 
                                                 
19 It is unclear whether the PBC fully neutralizes excess liquidity through these two operations. However, a quick 
look at China’s persistently “anomalously high” (with respect to what the quantity theory predicts) M2-to-GDP 
ratio suggests that the money base is not fully sterilized.   
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high – about twice larger than that in the United States – indicating a high degree of bank 
dependency of Chinese firms. Meanwhile, bond markets saw very limited progress in China 
during this period and continued to play only a minor role in external financing. In China, the 
share of corporate bonds accounted for only 10 percent of the total external financing in 2010, 
compared to 32 percent in the United States, where direct financing through bond markets has 
been a much more important financing source.   
 
In China, firms rely on bank loans as the main source of external financing on the one hand 
and on the other hand, the PBC applies various tools to control liquidity in the banking system 
and thereby the credit supply, which implies that China’s monetary policy could have strong 
effects on the real economy via the bank lending channel and the interest rate channel. 
However, concerns about the functioning of these monetary transmission channels arise due to 
the high concentration of state-owned commercial banks20 in the banking system, which are 
blamed to make policy loans and thus be less sensitive to changes in monetary policy.  
 
Figure 4.2: Components of external financinga, China and the USA, 2004 and 2010  
                    Financial depth (% of GDP)b 
     
Notes: a. Calculated as a percentage share of each component relative to the total outstanding national debts and equities.  
            b. Calculated with the total outstanding national debts and equities divided by GDP.  
Source: MGI (2006: 13; 2011: 25). 
 
                                                 
20 They are mainly the Big Four. Some studies use the Big Five as they include the fifth, a rapid growing bank, 
the Bank of Communications (BoCom), in this group.   
Bank loans
Government debt
Corporate bonds
Stock market capitalization
72
19
46
27
5
8
15
China, 2004 United States,
     2004
China, 2010 United States,
    2010
12
35
34
10
10
35
16
32
26
100% = 222 403 280 462 (fiancial depth)
68 
 
Indeed, until the mid-1990s Chinese state-owned commercial banks used to serve as 
government financial intermediaries to make policy loans to government-approved projects. In 
1994 bank reforms, three policy banks were established to take over policy lending from state-
owned commercial banks.21  
 
However, studies find that state-owned commercial banks continue to show a strong bias 
toward lending to SOEs, including some unprofitable SOEs, in order to maintain high 
employment growth and thereby the social stability, as long as these SOEs offer plenty of jobs 
(see, e.g., Dobson and Kashyap 2006). It thus follows that state-owned commercial banks are 
less profit-oriented and less sensitive to changes in monetary policy, which might result in 
malfunction of the monetary transmission mechanism.  
 
Yet, this bias is found to be less harmful due to two recent developments. First, the Big Four 
went public in 2005, 2006 and 2010, respectively. As showed in interviews conducted by 
Dobson and Kashyap with bank managers, the banking management of the listed companies is 
thus under market pressure to improve efficiency and profitability (Dobson and Kashyap 
2006). Bank loans are more transparent and profit-oriented. Second, the market share of state-
owned commercial banks has steadily declined, for example, from 55 percent in 2003 to about 
46 percent in 2011, according to the data from China Banking Regulatory Commission. 
Meanwhile, the market share of non-state-owned banks, including joint-stock commercial 
banks and city commercial banks, which are profit-oriented and immune to the bias toward 
lending to SOEs, increased from 19 percent in 2003 to 25 percent in 2011. A rising share of 
private banks would thus improve efficiency of the banking system as a whole.  
 
On the other hand, with the rapidly growing private-owned sector, state-owned commercial 
banks are under less pressure to make loans to SOEs, as those private companies are at the 
moment the biggest job creators in China. Figure 4.3 shows developments of the private sector 
in China between 1998 and 2007. The number of private-owned firms increased dramatically, 
more people worked in the private-owned companies and produced more. By 2007, 73 percent 
of the employed worked in the private sector, contributing to 65 percent of GDP. However, 
                                                 
21 They are the China Development Bank, the Agricultural Development Bank of China, and the Export-Import 
Bank of China. Different from commercial banks, policy banks are less profit-oriented. They make policy lending 
to finance government-directed and state-invested projects.  
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SOEs still owned about half of the capital stock. They are large in size and have higher capital 
intensity.   
 
Figure 4.3: Fast developments of the private sector in China, 1998 and 2007a, b  
 
   
Notes: a. Calculated as a percentage share. b. State-owned enterprises include those both wholly and partly (for example, 
the state as the main share holder) owned by the state. Collective enterprises are owned by some community.  
Source: OECD (2010: 106). 
 
Those private-owned companies are mainly small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). 
Most of them have no access to capital market (bond and stock markets) for external financing 
and are thus more bank-dependent. When a contractionary monetary policy shock is 
accompanied with a fall of liquidity in the banking system, a decline of credit supply would 
squeeze many SMEs out of bank lending as these firms are less able to evidence high value of 
collaterals. Only a small part of them will be able to find other external financing sources, 
while others have to cut investments and employment.22 Hence we would expect to see a 
decline in economic activity in this sector. Since the private sector takes up a rising share in 
GDP, this will account for more fluctuations in aggregate output.  
  
With the progress in the banking system, including a rising share of private-owned banks and 
increased profit orientation of state-owned commercial banks, banks are more sensitive to 
changes in monetary policy. It thus contributes to improving the functioning of monetary 
                                                 
22 For example, the PBC 2011 monetary contraction resulted in substantial financing problems of many private-
owned small companies, which led to payment arrears and rising bankruptcy in southern China. It has already 
aroused wide attention in China.  
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policy transmission channels. On the other hand, with a rising share of the private sector in 
GDP, we would expect to see increasing fluctuations in GDP as a result of a monetary 
stimulus. All these factors would thus lead to more influences of monetary policy on the real 
economy in China.23  
 
4.3 The Identification Problem 
 
The movements of the PBC’s policy variables reflect more than policy changes. They 
incorporate large endogenous responses of monetary policy to current and expected economic 
developments. This section presents a simple framework to illustrate the identification 
problem inherent in the estimation of the effects of monetary policy. It further shows why 
estimates with conventional measures of monetary policy are likely to give rise to omitted 
variable bias.  
 
Suppose output is affected by the monetary policy variable ∆݉ (for example, conventional 
monetary policy measures such as a monetary aggregate, the money market rate, or other 
policy indicator) and some other factors:    
                                        ∆ ௧ܻ ൌ ߙ଴ ൅ ߙଵ∆݉௧ ൅ ߙଶܼ௧ ൅ ߙଷܧ௧ ൅ ߳௧,                                      (4.1) 
where ∆ ௧ܻ is the first difference of logarithm of real GDP. The vector, Z, summarizes many 
other factors that affect real growth, such as government spending, supply shocks and foreign 
demand shocks, while the vector, E, includes expectations about future developments. For 
simplicity, the lagged terms of variables are ignored.  
 
The PBC reacts to output and sets policy to achieve economic goals. When doing so, it 
watches a range of variables, including output growth and variables in the Z and E vector. Its 
policy reaction function can be written as:  
                                       ∆݉௧ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵ∆ ௧ܻ ൅ ߚଶܼ௧ ൅ ߚଷܧ௧ ൅ ߜ௧,                                      (4.2) 
 
  
                                                 
23 Some studies, using vector autoregressions, suggest that the transmission channels of monetary policy, similar 
to those found for advanced economies, exist in China. For example, Sun, Ford, and Dickinson (2010) trace 
effects of a monetary policy shock on variables of banks’ balance sheets and macroeconomic variables. They 
conclude that in China there exists the bank lending channel, the interest rate channel and the asset price channel. 
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Rewriting Equation 4.2 yields:  
                                     ∆ ௧ܻ ൌ ቀെ
ఉబ
ఉభ
ቁ ൅ ଵ
ఉభ
∆݉௧ െ
ఉమ
ఉభ
ܼ௧ െ
ఉయ
ఉభ
ܧ௧ െ
ଵ
ఉభ
ߜ௧,                             (4.3) 
 
The rearranged policy reaction function, Equation 4.3, appears to have the same list of right-
hand variables as Equation 4.1. We hence do not know what a simple regression of output on 
those variables tells us. Is it the effect of monetary policy on output, or the PBC’s reaction 
function? It is most likely the mixture of these two. This is known as the identification 
problem. Only exogenous shocks to the monetary policy variable – ߜ௧ in Equation 4.2, the 
monetary policy movements that are independent of output growth and other factors in the 
vector Z and E that affect output growth – can be used to identify the true effects of monetary 
policy on output.  
 
However, even in the most sophisticated model, it is impossible to proxy for all information 
about future output movements that policymakers have had. Suppose that the true 
relationships between ∆ܻ and ∆݉ are represented in the system of Equation 4.1 and 4.2. Yet, 
the PBC’s expectations about the future output movements are not observed. Thus, the vector 
E is left out of the system:   
                                                ∆ ௧ܻ ൌ ߛ଴ ൅ ߛଵ∆݉௧ ൅ ߛଶܼ௧ ൅ ߴ௧,                                           (4.4) 
                                                ∆݉௧ ൌ ߠ଴ ൅ ߠଵ∆ ௧ܻ ൅ ߠଶܼ௧ ൅ ߮௧,                                          (4.5) 
 
The error terms in Equation 4.4 and 4.5 are ߴ௧ ൌ ߙଷܧ௧ ൅ ߳௧ and ߮௧ ൌ ߚଷܧ௧ ൅ ߜ௧, respectively. 
They are correlated. Clearly, the proxy for exogenous monetary policy shocks with the error 
term ߮௧ will lead to biased estimates of monetary policy on output.  
 
Obviously, this omitted-variable bias can be narrowed to some limit by including more control 
variables. However, the analysis of the PBC’s operating procedure and history suggests that 
the PBC watches an enormous number of economic variables when setting policy. Many 
original macroeconomic data are not publicly available in China, neither are the PBC’s 
numerical forecasts of future economic developments. Thus, left-out variables are a serious 
problem in the estimates of the PBC’s monetary policy effects with simple regressions.  
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Another concern is that the PBC’s operating procedures have evolved over time. Thus, its 
monetary policy reaction function cannot be well described with time-invariant Equation 4.2. 
Rather, the coefficients in its reaction function should vary from episode to episode. This 
suggests that a simple inclusion of more control variables into the system is unlikely to 
eliminate the bias. 
 
Estimates of the effects of monetary policy with conventional measures rely crucially on the 
correct modeling of the interrelationship between economic variables and monetary policy 
measures. An alternative approach, the narrative approach, can be used to solve both the 
indicator and identification problems. This approach “involves using the historical record, 
such as the descriptions of the process and reasoning that led to decisions by the monetary 
authority and accounts of the sources of monetary disturbances” (Romer and Romer 1989: 
122). This information discloses the central bank’s intentions for each policy movement. Some 
of these intentions are neither linked directly to output nor indirectly to those factors that are 
likely to affect output growth. In this way, I can single out those policy movements that are 
exogenous to the current and future economic developments in the real side.  
 
Let us define the exogenous monetary policy movements as ∆݉௧௨ such that we have:  
                                                   ∆ ௧ܻ ൌ ߩ଴ ൅ ߩଵ∆݉௧௨ ൅ ߱௧,                                                  (4.6) 
where the error term, ߱௧ , includes the impact of all other factors on output growth. This 
regression appears to be simple. But it should yield an unbiased estimate of the impact of 
monetary policy on output given that with the narrative approach, ∆݉௧௨
ᇱݏ are identified as 
those monetary policy movements that are orthogonal to any other shocks in ߱௧ that might 
influence output growth. Hence, in the subsequent sections I will use this regression and some 
of its extension to estimate the effects of the PBC’s monetary policy on output. On the other 
hand, unbiased estimates with a simple regression as Equation 4.6 relies crucially on the 
validity of its underlying identifying assumption that the identified shocks, ∆݉௧௨
ᇱݏ , are 
uncorrelated with other determinants of output growth. I thus complement my empirical 
analysis with various robustness tests in the last section to check this identifying assumption.  
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4.4 Narrative Identification of Monetary Shocks 
 
In this section, I apply the narrative approach to identify monetary policy shocks. An 
exogenous shock is precisely defined as a monetary movement driven by inflation, rather than 
by the state of the real economy. In this way, only those contractionary anti-inflationary policy 
movements are considered. The reason for using this narrow definition of monetary shock is 
that the concern about inflation appears to be the only driving force that fulfils the premise of 
being independent of the current and future developments of real output. First, inflation is 
mainly due to past shocks. And second, trend inflation by itself does not cause large short-run 
fluctuations in real output. On the contrary, monetary expansions are largely associated with 
real economic developments (for example, weak economic growth) and thus we can barely 
isolate exogenous policy changes from those endogenous policy responses to the state of the 
economy.  
 
4.4.1 Identification of Monetary Shocks 
 
I use two sources of documents from the PBC – “Press Release” on quarterly meetings of the 
Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) and China Monetary Policy Report. The MPC was 
established in July 1997. According to the PBC’s Law, the Committee “shall play an 
important role in macroeconomic management and in the making and adjustment of monetary 
policy” (Article 12 of the PBC’s Law). At the moment, it is composed of 15 members.24 Since 
1999, it holds quarterly meetings to discuss current policy issues. After each meeting, the PBC 
discloses main contents of discussion by issuing a short press release. The press release covers 
the MPC’s reviews of current economic developments and challenges ahead, its assessments 
of current monetary policy and in particular, its suggestion for the future monetary policy is 
clearly stated and explained.25 Based on this information, I single out those policy shifts when 
the MPC held the view that policy should shift to contraction to rein in inflation for the 
forthcoming quarter. These releases are made online on the PBC’s homepage, though 
incomplete (only those from 2000 on are available). 
                                                 
24 They include the PBC’s Governor, two Deputy Governors; officials from government departments, such as the 
State Council, the State Development and Reform Commission, Finance Ministry; officials from banking, 
securities, and insurance regulatory authorities; and experts from the academia. 
25 More detailed notes of the MPC meeting are recorded in the form of “meeting minutes”. Yet, they are not made 
publicly available. 
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As a cross check, I control my findings from “Press Release” with a comparison to China 
Monetary Policy Report, which is an executive summary of monetary policy and published 
each quarter by the PBC since 2001. This Report covers analysis of the macroeconomic and 
financial situation and explains the monetary policy operations. One chapter addresses the 
PBC’s policy intentions for the next period and policy changes are well explained. Throughout 
the overlapping sample period of 2001-2011, I did not find contradictory statements between 
two sources. Altogether, I identify three exogenous shocks when the PBC shifted to an anti-
inflationary tightening. They are 2004 Q2; 2008 Q1-2008 Q3; and 2011 Q1-2011 Q4. 
 
The end of contraction is defined when the PBC stopped showing concerns about inflation and 
announced a shift back to normal.26 In this way, the duration of each shock is specified, which 
is new compared to Romer and Romer (1989). One criticism on narrative-based monetary 
policy shocks is that these shocks contain no information about the magnitude of contraction 
and they are treated homogenously. Certainly, identifying the duration of each shock weakens 
this critique as the length of the episode sheds light on the degree of contraction. The longer 
the episode, the more severe the contraction is. Thus, contractions can be evaluated on a 
heterogeneous basis.  
 
2004 Q2. The steadily rapid growth of money stock and bank lending in 2002 and 2003 made 
inflation a real risk in 2004. Inflation in the first quarter of 2004 grew at a rate of 3 percent, 
after being negative for years. At its meeting in March 2004, the MPC held the view that it 
was time to take actions to prevent inflation. “Money and credit growth should be properly 
controlled.… No negligence should be tolerated in preventing inflation and financial risks” 
(“Press Release” on the First Quarter 2004 MPC Meeting). For the next period, monetary 
policy should be “appropriately tight” and the PBC “will closely monitor the price changes” 
(China Monetary Policy Report 2004 Quarter I). 
 
The contractionary episode lasted only one quarter as at the end of the second quarter, “the 
strong growth momentum of money supply and loans had been reined in, and the macro 
                                                 
26 Quite often, the PBC describes its normal policy as “the prudent monetary policy” (it was originally translated 
as “sound monetary policy”, yet starting from 2009 the PBC translated it as “prudent monetary policy”). The 
“prudent” monetary policy is an activist policy with the PBC maintaining an appropriate money growth rate so as 
to support the sustainable, steady and healthy growth of GDP (China Monetary Policy Report, Quarter 4 2010).  
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financial control measures had produced expected result” (“Press Release” on the Second 
Quarter 2004 MPC Meeting). The MPC agreed that the prudent monetary policy should be 
adopted in the coming period. 
 
2008 Q1-2008 Q3. Starting from 2007, the PBC got concerned about the build-up of 
inflationary pressure on the grounds of the more-than-expected growth of money and bank 
lending. In the second half of 2007, prices grew at a rate of 6 - 8 percent, mainly due to rapid 
rises in food and oil prices. At two MPC meetings in the fourth quarter of 2007 and the first 
quarter of 2008, the Committee repeatedly emphasized that “efforts should be made to … 
prevent shifts … from structural price rise to full-scale inflation.” For the coming periods, “the 
Committee held the view that a tight monetary policy should be implemented” (“Press Release” 
on the Fourth Quarter 2007 and on the First Quarter 2008 MPC Meeting). By June 2008, the 
PBC still held the view that “the inflationary pressure was noticeable”; “curbing excessive 
price increase” and “containing inflation” should be taken as top priorities (“Press Release” on 
the Second Quarter 2008 MPC Meeting). 
 
From July 2008, inflation showed a decelerating trend: from 7 percent in June to 4.6 percent in 
September. In September 2008, Lehman Brothers went bankruptcy and the US subprime 
mortgage crisis spilled over to the real economy. At its September’s meeting, the MPC agreed 
to end the tightening. 
 
2011 Q1-2011 Q4. In 2010, inflation crept up from 1.5 percent to 5.1 percent. At its December 
2010 meeting, the MPC held the view that the PBC was facing tough tasks in controlling 
money, credit and liquidity growth. The MPC agreed that for the next year, monetary policy 
should “give more priority to stabilizing the general price level” and “efforts should be made 
to control liquidity and bring the monetary and credit conditions back to a normal state” 
(“Press Release” on the Fourth Quarter 2010 MPC Meeting). Inflation continued in 2011 and 
reached 6.5 percent in July. At its first three meetings in 2011, the MPC reemphasized that 
monetary policy should attach top priority to inflation control and various measures should be 
taken to effectively manage the liquidity and keep credit and money aggregates at reasonable 
levels.  
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Inflation started to slow down in August 2011 and reached 4.1 percent in December. At its 
December 2011 meeting, the MPC agreed that the Chinese economy faced complex domestic 
and external situation due to the European debt crisis and for the coming period, a prudent 
monetary policy should be taken.   
 
4.4.2 Were Shocks Predictable? 
 
Figure 4.4 plots the dynamic of inflation from 2000 to 2011, together with three identified 
episodes, which are marked in grey shaded areas. In each case, inflation went up gradually. 
All these contractionary shifts always happened around the local peaks of inflation. Yet, the 
PBC’s response to inflation does not appear to be deterministic. The “unacceptable” inflation 
rates varied largely across three identified episodes: they were 3 percent, 6.5 percent and 4.6 
percent, respectively, at the PBC’s decision for 2004 QII, 2008 QI and 2011 QI contraction.  
 
Figure 4.4: Inflation (in %, annualized), 2000-2011  
 
      
Notes: The inflation rate is calculated as a percentage change of the consumer price index (CPI).  Grey shaded areas are 
marked as identified contractionary episodes.  
Source: Monthly data from Datastream. 
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The exogeneity of policy shocks suggests that shocks are not predictable. Yet, Leeper (1997) 
found that in a logit model, the Romer and Romer (1989)’s dates were highly predicted by 
lagged economic variables.27 He concluded that these shocks were not exogenous. However, 
this finding should be interpreted with caution because the predictability was largely due to 
overfitting of the model, as pointed out by Romer and Romer (1997).28 Nevertheless, it sheds 
the light on the importance to examine the predictability of the narrative monetary policy 
shocks.   
 
I test the Leeper critique with my identified policy shocks in a logistic model, which is parallel 
to the Leeper’s specification, but more parsimonious. This logit model says that when the 
PBC’s tolerance of inflation exceeded a certain threshold, it stopped accommodative policy 
and shifted to monetary tightening. It is given as follows:  
  
                                                       ܧሺܦ௧௦|Ω௧ሻ ൌ ܨሺߙ, തܺሻ,                                                   (4.7) 
where E(.) is an expectation term; ܦ௧௦ is a policy shift dummy variable, which takes value of 1 
in the month, when the PBC decided to shift policy to anti-inflationary; and 0 otherwise; 29 Ω௧ 
stands for the PBC’s information set, which includes the most recent developments of two 
macroeconomic variables – output and inflation. 30  These two variables reflect costs and 
benefits that the PBC considers in determining whether to move to anti-inflationary policy. On 
the right-hand side of the equation, F(.) is a logistic function and ߙ is a constant term; തܺ ൌ
ሺ ҧ݃ூ௉, ߨതሻԢ is the list of macroeconomic variables in the information set, with ҧ݃ூ௉ ൌ
∑ ௚಺ು,೟ష೔
య
೔సభ
ଷ
 
standing for the average growth rate of industrial production for the previous three months and 
ߨത ൌ
∑ గ೟ష೔
య
೔సభ
ଷ
  for that average inflation rate. In doing so, I try to avoid overfitting by limiting 
                                                 
27 Shapiro (1994) made another test, finding that future inflation and unemployment did not highly predict the 
Romer and Romer dates.  
28 Overfitting arose as the Leeper’s logistic model was too complex with too many parameters (37 parameters 
altogether) relative to the limited variation in the dataset (a time series of the Romer and Romer dummy with 
only 7 observations equal to one).  
29 That is, ܦ௧௦  = 1, when t = April 2004, February 2008 and February 2011. Note that the 2008 and 2011 
contractionary shifts are defined in February because the January observations on industrial production growth 
are not available due to Spring Festival effects (more discussion about the data follows in the subsequent section).  
30 Four other variables in Leeper (1997) are not included in the information set: one is commodity prices and the 
other three are indicators of monetary policy. However, including those variables does not change the results. For 
example, including the producer price index leads to the same R2 of 0.13 and the largest implied probability of 
0.1 for 2008 policy shift; including one lag of the dummy leads to essentially the same results.   
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the number of coefficients that need to be estimated.31 On the other hand, I use the average 
values of the past three months to proxy for a possibly large information set of the PBC.  
 
The time series data of industrial production growth are available on a monthly basis, but 
discontinuous, with January data since 2005 missing. The reason for that is the unconventional 
method that the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics uses in solving the seasonality problem 
inherent in time series. The growth rate of industrial production is calculated by comparing 
industrial production over the same period last year.32 For example, the growth rate for 2011 
Mj is calculated as ݃ூ௉,ଶ଴ଵଵெೕ ൌ ቆ
ூ௉మబభభಾೕ
ூ௉మబభబಾೕ
െ 1ቇ כ 100 , with j = 1, 2, …, 12, giving a 
percentage change of industrial production in month Mj over year. In so doing, the time series 
of industrial production growth should not contain any seasonal variations.33 However, there 
are still abnormal fluctuations in the beginning of some years due to Chinese New Year effects.  
 
The Chinese New Year, the most important family festival in China, based on the Chinese 
lunar calendar, takes place either at the end of January or in February. Officially, it is a three-
day public holiday. Yet, many migrant workers from the rural area quit shortly before the 
Chinese New Year to travel home, or take a weeks-long holiday. Therefore, the holiday effects 
on the output level in the corresponding month could be even larger. This leads to large 
fluctuations in industrial production growth for the years that are adjacent, but have the 
Holiday in different months.34 In 2005, the Chinese authorities stopped publishing industrial 
production growth for January. Instead, industrial production in January and February was 
added up and the growth rate for such an aggregate was calculated. I correct the data before 
2005 in the same way to keep it consistent and eliminate Holiday effects. In this way, the time 
series of industrial production growth has only 11 observations for each year.  
 
                                                 
31 Rather than averages of three lags of industrial production growth and inflation, I examine two variants of 
Equation 4.7 by defining the PBC’s information set to either only one lag or three lags of IP growth and inflation, 
and obtain quite similar results. 
32 The original data are not publicly available. 
33 That is, March of this year, for example, typically has the same number of working days, weather, and other 
variables that might affect output as March of last year. 
34 For example, the industrial production growth rate was 2.3 percent in January and 19 percent in February 2001, 
respectively, as the Chinese New Year fell in January for the year 2001 but in February for the year 2000. 
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The data used in this chapter are mainly from Datastream, except those specifically indicated. 
The sample period hereafter is from January 2000 to December 2011. Yet, when industrial 
production is included in the estimates, I adjust other time series by dropping out January 
observations to accommodate the industrial production data. In those cases, the sample period 
starts with February 2000. 
 
Table 4.3 presents the estimation results of three variants of Equation 4.7, which differ in the 
regressands included.35 In all three specifications, the coefficients before the lagged inflation 
and the lagged industrial production growth both have the right sign as the theory predicts: 
higher inflation and higher output growth raise the probability of a policy shift to contraction. 
Yet, none of them is statistically significant. In the most general specification, 3.c, the joint 
null hypothesis that coefficients before both explanatory variables are zero cannot be rejected 
at the high significance level (19 percent). All three regressions have a low R2, indicating poor 
fit of the prediction equation.  
 
Table 4.3: Decision to shift to contraction: logistic estimatesa 
   
    3.a  3.b 3.c 
Constant -5.01* -8.09   -8.35 
(1.23) (4.44) (5.05) 
Inflation (ߨത) 0.37 0.33 
(0.23) (0.24) 
Output Growth ( ҧ݃ூ௉) 0.28 0.22 
(0.27) (0.31) 
Summary statistic 
McFadden (Pseudo) R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.12 
Probability(LR statistic)b   0.10  0.23   0.19 
 
Notes: a. The logistic estimates are based on Equation 4.7. For more details, see the text. b. Probability (LR test) is the p-
value of the LR test statistic, which tests the joint null hypothesis that all slope coefficients except the constant are zero. 
Month data are used. Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent 
level.  
Source: Author’s estimations. 
 
 
                                                 
35 Given the limited variation of the data, this logistic model is still on the borderline of overfitting despite all the 
efforts to model in a parsimonious way. In fact, using it to test the predictability of policy shifts tends to overstate 
the degree of endogeneity of policy movements.    
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The probability of an anti-inflationary policy shift implied by these logistic estimates is 
presented in Figure 4.5. Vertical green dotted lines mark the dates of the actual policy shift. A 
comparison of Panel A and Panel B suggests that inflation plays more important role in 
predicting a policy shift, though the fitted probability of the 2004 April contraction is mainly 
associated with the output variable. Throughout all three specifications, the predictability is 
low. For example, according to the most-generally-specified model, as shown in Panel C, the 
predicted probability of three contractions is 0.03, 0.09 and 0.02, respectively. Evidently, the 
PBC’s shift to contraction is not predictable, suggesting that my narrative-based shocks are 
exogenous. 
 
I extend this predictability test further by considering an alternative specification. Given that 
the exchange rate stability is one of the PBC’s policy objectives, I include the trade balance, 
which is likely to influence the exchange rate, into the logistic model. Accounting for the trade 
balance (as a ratio of GDP) does not change the results. The R2 is 0.19, slightly higher. The 
coefficient before the lagged trade balance is negative, as expected, but not statistically 
significant (neither are the other two coefficients). The predicted probability is eventually the 
same for the 2008 and 2011 contractions as that in Panel C of Figure 4.5. Yet, the predicted 
probability for 2004 contraction is increased to 0.16.  It suggests that the trade balance plays 
some limited role in predicting 2004 contraction only.   
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Figure 4.5: Implied probability of an anti-inflationary policy shift  
 
Panel A: Estimates with the lagged inflation only 
 
             
 
Panel B: Estimates with the lagged industrial production growth rate only 
 
 
 
Panel C: Estimates with both the lagged inflation and the industrial production growth rate 
 
 
   Notes: See notes of Table 4.3. Vertical green dotted lines mark identified actual policy shift dates.  
   Source: Author’s estimations. 
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4.4.3 Intensions versus Actions 
 
Three policy shock episodes are identified when the PBC made a clear statement that 
monetary policy should shift to contraction to rein in inflation. However, one can argue that 
intensions are not necessarily followed by actions. A quick check of the PBC’s policy actions 
indicates that after each anti-inflationary decision, the PBC indeed took various tightening 
measures in those episodes. Figure 4.1, presented in the previous section, shows the evolution 
of three selected policy tools, the required reserve ratio and two interest rates, together with 
the identified episodes, marked in grey shaded areas. In each episode, the PBC used all these 
three tools to lower inflation. In April 2004, the PBC raised both the interest rates and the 
required reserve ratio; in the first half of 2008, the PBC raised the required reserve ratio to 
17.5 percent in seven continuous adjustments, together with increases in the interest rates; 
again in 2011, the reserve ratio was hiked to 21.5 percent, a record-high level, and interest 
rates were increased as well.   
 
4.5 How Do Monetary Shocks Affect the Economy? 
 
To quantitatively estimate effects of monetary policy on the economy, I introduce a monetary 
contraction dummy variable that equals 1 in the episodes when monetary policy is identified to 
be anti-inflationary, and 0 otherwise. This time series for the monetary contraction dummy 
thus has Dt = 1 if t = 2004:4-2004:6, 2008:1-2008:9 and 2011:1-2011:12, and Dt = 0 otherwise.    
 
4.5.1 Baseline Results 
 
The impact on output. The contraction dummy series reflects changes in monetary policy 
exogenous to the real economic developments. With these exogenous shocks, I thus can use 
the simple specification for the basic estimation, similar to Equation 4.6, but including the 
lagged terms, which considers dynamics of output growth and at the same time allows 
monetary policy to affect output beyond the current period:   
                                   ݃ூ௉,௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ∑ ௝ܾ݃ூ௉,௧ି௝ଵଵ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ܿ௞ܦ௧ି௞ଵଵ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ݁௧,                            (4.8) 
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where ݃ூ௉ is growth of industrial production and D is the monetary contraction dummy. I 
include 11 lags of industrial production growth.36 This autoregression part accounts for some 
inherent boom-and-bust cyclical movements of output. The current and 11 lags of monetary 
policy measure are included,37 which captures the impact of monetary policy on output.  
 
With the regression results of Equation 4.8 (see Table B-4.1 in the appendix), the implied 
impact of exogenous monetary restrictions on output is computed. For example, following a 
one-unit rise in D, the estimated response of industrial production growth in the 
contemporaneous month is simply the coefficient on the contemporary term of D, c0; the 
estimated response after one month is c0 + (c1 + b1c0); and so on so forth (see Romer and 
Romer 2004). This response combines the direct effect of a monetary contraction on output 
and the feedback effect through lagged output.  
 
These responses are then cumulated.38 Figure 4.6 presents implied impact of a shift to a 
monetary contraction on industrial production growth, together with one-standard-error 
bands.39 This hump-shaped pattern of the impact is very similar to those estimates obtained in 
the literature for other countries (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999; Romer 
and Romer 2004; Sims 1992). After the PBC shifts to contraction, industrial production starts 
to fall with a two-month delay. Then it declines quickly after 6 months. The maximum impact 
is found after 15 months: the anti-inflationary shift reduces industrial production by about 5.9 
percent, compared to what it would otherwise be. After hitting the trough, industrial 
production rebounds slightly, but remains at a substantially negative level: about -4.8 percent 
after three years,40 although the precision of the estimation deteriorates with a rising horizon. 
Monetary policy has strong and persistent effects on output. 
 
                                                 
36 This is because the monthly data of industrial production growth contain only 11 observations.  
37 With an inclusion of the current term of the monetary contraction dummy, monetary disturbances are allowed 
to have contemporaneous effects on real output.  
38 This cumulative response provides an estimate of the total effect of a policy shock on output after some horizon.  
39 The asymptotic standard errors of the impulse response function are computed according to the formula 
specified by Poterba, Rotemberg and Summers (1986: 668).  
40 It remains at this level even after five years. 
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Figure 4.6: Estimated impact of monetary tightening on industrial production      
                   (baseline simple regression) 
    
Notes: The implied effects are computed cumulative responses of industrial production growth to a one-unit rise of the 
contraction dummy, based on the estimation of Equation 4.8 (see Table B-4.1 in the appendix). The dotted lines are one-
standard-error bands.  
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
 
The impact on inflation. The PBC shifted to contraction with the intention to control inflation. 
The natural question is thus whether this tightening has effects on the price level. The baseline 
regression is as follows:  
                                         ߨ௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ∑ ௝ܾߨ௧ି௝ଶସ௝ୀଵ ൅ ∑ ܿ௞ܦ௧ି௞ଶସ௞ୀ଴ ൅ ݁௧,                             (4.9) 
where ߨ is inflation rate, calculated as a percentage change of the consumer price index over 
years, similar to the method used in computing industrial production growth. Given that 
monetary policy is likely to affect rigid prices with larger delay, I include more lags, 
altogether 24.  
 
Table B-4.2 in the appendix summarizes the regression results of Equation 4.9. Its implied 
impact of a monetary contraction on inflation is reported in Figure 4.7, together with one-
standard-error bands. The point estimates suggest that following a tightening, prices do fall, 
though with a substantial delay. Prices first rise, small and insignificantly. Starting from the 
eighth month, they drop steadily. After one and a half year, the price level is about 5.9 percent 
lower than what it would otherwise have been.41 Afterwards, prices start to rise and the impact 
                                                 
41 The implied sacrifice ratio (the ratio of the total industrial production loss to the change in inflation) of the 
PBC’s disinflation policy is about 5.9 percent / 5.9 percent = 1 after one year and a half. 
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remains negative (-2.6 percent) after 36 months. Yet, statistical uncertainty about this result is 
large.  
 
Figure 4.7: Estimated impact of monetary tightening on the price level 
                (baseline simple regression) 
       
Notes: The impulse response is computed based on the estimation of Equation 4.9 (see Table B-4.2 in the appendix). For 
more explanations, see notes of Figure 4.6. 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
 
4.5.2 VAR Results 
 
I consider another specification by extending the baseline regressions to a bivariate vector 
autoregression (VAR) which allows for effects of both lagged output (inflation) and past 
policy changes on the monetary contraction dummy. This extension can be viewed as a 
robustness check. 42  My test of the exogeneity of identified policy shifts in Section 4.2 
indicated that the past developments of output and inflation do not have any significant effects 
on the policy shifts. Hence, we expect to get similar results from the VAR approach.  
 
To be consistent with the baseline regression, I allow monetary policy to affect the economy 
contemporaneously in the VAR. Thus, the equation for the monetary contraction dummy is 
ordered first and industrial production growth (inflation) second in the VAR system.  
                                                 
42 Leeper (1997) provides such a robustness test for the Romer and Romer (1989)’s results by contrasting the 
VAR results with the ones that the Romers obtained.  
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Two bivariate VARs are run. Figure 4.8 shows the results. Panel A presents the responses of 
industrial production growth to a contractionary monetary shift, together with one-standard-
error bands. Panel B shows the impact on inflation. The VAR results are compared with the 
implied impacts of monetary policy estimated from the baseline single-equation regression, 
which are repeated in both panels. The VAR estimation, allowing for the endogeneity of the 
monetary contraction dummy, does not change the main results.  
 
Again in the VAR estimates, the responses of industrial production to a monetary tightening 
follow the hump-shaped pattern, with a slightly larger delay. The estimated maximum decline 
of industrial production occurs at the end of 18 months and is actually slightly larger (-6.3 
percent compared to -5.9 percent). Yet, the VAR suggests that this decline is less severe with 
output rebounding more quickly. The negative impact falls to about -2 percent after 3 years.  
 
The VAR estimation for prices yields the same sluggish response pattern of prices to monetary 
tightening. Prices are first sticky and start to decline after the eighth month. Then, the two sets 
of estimates show a parallel co-movement at all horizons. Yet, the effects estimated in the 
VAR framework are in general 1.5 percent smaller than those from the simple regression. The 
VAR estimated maximum effect is a decline of prices of 4.4 percent. Yet, this estimate is not 
highly precise and the confidence interval is nevertheless substantial.    
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Figure 4.8: Estimated impact of monetary tightening (bivariate VAR) 
 
Panel A. Impact on industrial production 
    
Panel B. Impact on the price level  
       
Notes: The cumulated impulse responses of industrial growth (Panel A) and prices (Panel B) are estimated separately in 
two bivariate VARs with the monetary contraction dummy and industrial production growth (or inflation).   
Source: Author’s estimation. 
  
  
4.5.3 Comparison with Other Measures 
 
The motivation for this chapter to use the narrative approach is due to two concerns about how 
to measure Chinese monetary policy. First, the conventional measures that are widely used to 
measure monetary policy of other central banks may not be able to sufficiently reflect the 
PBC’s policy changes given that the PBC applies a wide range of policy instruments and does 
not necessarily change all of them simultaneously. The second one is that the conventional 
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measures contain reaction components of the central banks to the current and expected 
economic developments. As shown in Section 4.3, using these endogenous conventional 
measures to estimate the real effect of monetary policy may lead to an omitted-variable bias. It 
is therefore useful to compare my results based on the narrative exogenous measure with those 
using the conventional measures to see if this bias indeed exists.  
 
In this section, we consider four other measures. The first one is the Shu-Ng narrative index. 
As mentioned in the introduction, Shu and Ng (2010) read the PBC’s documents and build an 
index time series to indicate the stance of the PBC’s monetary policy. I consider their five-
value index, ranging from -2 (very easy) to 2 (very tight), available over the sample period 
from January 2001 to June 2009. Another two measures are the growth rate of the broad 
money stock (the year-over-year growth rate of M2) and the interest rate (I consider the prime 
lending rate with the maturity of one year or less), both of which are widely used to measure 
monetary policy of other central banks. The fourth measure that I consider is the required 
reserve ratio given the fact that the PBC has been extensively using this policy tool.  
 
Panel A of Figure 4.9 shows the implied impact of monetary tightening on industrial 
production estimated with the regressions (parallel to Equation 4.8) using these four measures 
as the policy indicator each in turn. Panel B shows the impact on the price level based on the 
regressions (parallel to Equation 4.9). For comparison, the results using my narrative 
exogenous policy measure are repeated in both panels.43 The comparison focuses mainly on 
the response patterns given that the impulses based on different measures are not comparable. 
Overall, the results suggest that the estimates based on other measures are either puzzling or 
biased with slow and transient responses.  
 
                                                 
43 The confidence intervals of all the estimates are not reported to keep the figures readable. 
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Figure 4.9: Estimated impact of monetary tightening using other measures 
 
Panel A. Impact on industrial production 
 
    
Panel B. Impact on the price level  
    
Notes: The figures present the implied impact of monetary tightening on industrial production (Panel A) and the price level 
(Panel B), based on the regression specification similar to Equation 4.8 and 4.9, respectively, but using different monetary 
policy measures each time.  
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
Surprisingly, the Shu-Ng index performs the worst. The results by using this index show that 
monetary tightening induces a rise in both output and the price level, which is inconsistent 
with what the theory predicts. It implies that although the Shu-Ng index precisely measures 
the policy stance of the PBC by summarizing all records information, it still contains many 
policy response components. Special efforts are required to search for a right model to 
disentangle those endogenous components if one attempts to use it in estimating the impact of 
monetary policy.  
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The estimates by using the interest rate show that after a rise in the interest rate, output falls, 
but after eight months. This output response is slower compared to the results using my 
narrative exogenous shocks. The maximum impact of a one-percentage-point rise in the 
interest rate on output is around -3 percent after about one and half years. However, the 
estimates predict that after a rise in the interest rate, prices increase. This result is puzzling 
(known as the price puzzle in the literature) as the theory suggests the opposite.  
 
The results based on the required reserve ratio suggest that output starts to decline with a 
larger delay. Then, this effect dies out quickly after about one and half years. Correspondingly, 
a rise in the reserve ratio has virtually null impact on inflation. Prices first rise moderately and 
fall to slightly negative after fifteen months. Thereafter, prices fluctuate around the zero line.  
 
The estimates by using the M2 growth rate show that following a monetary contraction with a 
one-percentage-point reduction of the money supply, both output and the price level fall 
immediately and remain moderately negative at all horizons. 
 
The results by using these four measures indicate that the endogeneity of these measures is a 
severe problem and using them is very likely to lead to puzzling or biased estimates of the 
policy impact. The puzzle and bias are not easily dealt with. My attempt to control for the 
endogeneity of these policy measures in a bivariate (VAR) with output (or inflation) and the 
policy measure ends in vein. The price puzzle still exists in the estimates based on the Shu-Ng 
index, the interest rate and the required reserve ratio. Neither is the prediction based on the 
Shu-Ng index for output corrected: industrial production increases following monetary 
tightening. Obviously, a simple VAR model cannot sufficiently disentangle exogenous policy 
changes from endogenous response components. This is a particular challenge for the study of 
China’s monetary policy as the PBC’s reaction cannot be simply described with a time-
invariant response function over the period when the PBC’s operation procedures experienced 
evolutionary changes.  
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4.5.4 Robustness 
 
So far, monetary policy appears to have strong and persistent impact on real output in China. 
In this section, I clarify several concerns about the robustness of these results. 
 
Was inflation different across episodes? Inflation was the main factor that explained the 
PBC’s contractionary policy shift. The first concern is hence whether the inflation that I 
identified was driven by some common factors. If it is the case, then these factors could 
account for fluctuations in real output that I found. Yet, my reading of the PBC’s analysis 
about inflation did not suggest that there was such a common driving force. Rather, inflation 
was different across episodes. In 2003/2004, it was the build-up of liquidity in the banking 
system that drove up prices. In 2007/2008, high inflation was triggered by rapid rises in food 
prices, including cereal, pork and poultry, and oil prices. In 2010/2011, several factors led to 
rises in prices: first, expansionary monetary policy in major industrialized countries has 
caused capital inflows into emerging markets, driving up asset prices there; second, the 
depreciation of the reference currency (the US dollar) contributed to rises in commodity prices; 
third, domestically, the unit production cost stepped up as a result of rising labor costs (see 
China Monetary Policy Report 2010 Quarter IV). In sum, inflation in three identified episodes 
was largely caused by past shocks, with the specific driving forces varying across episodes. 
 
Is a slowdown due to inflation? Given that inflation is clearly visible during all shock 
episodes, the concern arises whether the identified economic slowdown was due to inflation. 
In fact, there is neither theory nor evidence showing that inflation by itself (independent of 
supply shocks) has direct impact on real output. Nonetheless, I test whether controlling for 
inflation will change the results by including the current and 11 lags of inflation (based on the 
producer price index) into Equation 4.8.44 The regression results suggest that accounting for a 
direct effect of inflation on output has little impact on the timing and the persistence of the 
response of industrial production to a monetary shock. The maximum impact is found at the 
end of the first year, but somehow smaller (about -4 percent). This negative impact of 
monetary contraction on output is persistent and remains at the substantial level (around -3.7 
percent even after five years).    
                                                 
44 The data are adjusted with the January observations omitted.  
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Is a slowdown due to adverse supply shocks? I extend the robustness test further and ask 
whether adverse supply shocks around the times of the policy shifts were the true driving force 
of the economic slowdown.45 Energy price changes based on the purchasing price index for 
fuel and power, published by National Bureau of Statistics of China,46 are used as a proxy to 
measure adverse supply shocks. I include the current and 11 lags of energy price changes into 
Equation 4.8. Controlling for energy price shocks does not change the implied impact of 
monetary tightening on output. Industrial production declines with a small delay and after 
about one year, it is about 6 percent lower than what it would otherwise have been. Again, this 
substantial negative impact is perennial.  
 
Controlling for fiscal policy. Another concern is that the identified effects on output may not 
purely stem from anti-inflationary monetary policy. For example, the central government of 
China might implement all kinds of policies to fight inflation. I test this argument by 
controlling for fiscal policy in my simple regression. I extend Equation 4.8 by including the 
current and 11 lags of the ratio of budget surplus/deficit to nominal GDP.47 Accounting for 
fiscal policy does not mitigate the estimated effects of monetary policy on output. Industrial 
production falls quickly after a four-month delay. After about one year, the negative impact of 
monetary tightening on output is about -6 percent. Similar to my results using my narrative 
exogenous measure, this impact remains substantial and persistent. 
  
4.6 Conclusion  
 
As a fast growing emerging economy, China has attracted the world’s attention. Yet, its 
institutions and functioning framework remain distinctive from those in advanced economies. 
Studies are thus needed that dig into those institutional details and give some insight of the 
functioning of the Chinese economy. This chapter enriches the literature with a careful 
examination of China’s monetary policy by focusing on how and with what effects monetary 
policy is implemented in China.   
                                                 
45 Indeed, Hoover and Perez (1994) and Romer and Romer (1994a) argue on whether the estimated monetary 
policy impact on the output, found by Romer and Romer (1989), is due to oil shocks. 
46 The data are available only since January 2003. 
47 Alternatively, one can use government spending to measure fiscal policy, which is not possible given that the 
monthly data on Chinese government expenditures are available only over a shorter sample period (since June 
2007). Nonetheless, the high correlation between budget surplus/deficit and government spending over this 
sample period (-0.9) suggests that budget surplus/deficit can well proxy for fiscal policy.     
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At the moment, the PBC uses many policy instruments and none of them can be described as 
its principal tool. Its operational procedures still vary over time. Its reaction function can 
hardly be described with a time-invariant equation. All the PBC’s institutional specifics 
suggest that the conventional monetary policy measures can neither sufficiently reflect its 
policy changes nor can estimates using those conventional measures be free of bias. To 
overcome these measurement challenges, I use the narrative approach in this chapter to 
disentangle the PBC’s exogenous policy changes from its endogenous components. Based on 
the reading of the PBC’s documents for the period of 2000-2011, I identify three exogenous 
policy changes as those driven by inflationary pressure. These exogenous policy shocks are 
uncorrelated with developments on the real side of economy. Their impact on the economy 
gives an unbiased estimate of the effects of monetary policy.   
 
Estimates using the shocks that I have identified indicate that monetary policy in China has 
strong effects on output. My baseline regression suggests that a shift to fight inflation lowers 
industrial production by almost 6 percent. This is further confirmed by most of my robustness 
tests. Another important finding is that this suppression appears to be perennial with the 
negative impact remaining at a substantial level even after five years, though the estimates are 
becoming less precise with an increase in the time horizon. The persistence of the effects is 
robust to variations in control variables and specification. 
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Appendix A: Data Appendix 
 
A.1: Institutional background of the PBC from 1998 to 2011 
 
Targeted money growth rates for M1 and M2: Targets announced by the PBC on the annual 
basis, partly adopted from Geiger (2006) and partly the author’s compilation; 
Actual growth rates of M1 and M2: Annual growth rates calculated as yearly percentage 
changes of M1 and M2, Datastream; 
Minimum required reserve ratio: On the quarterly basis, the author’s compilation based on the 
“Chronology” of various issues of the PBC’s Annual Report; 
Discount rate: The interest rate at which the PBC lends to commercial banks with a maturity 
of 20 days, on the quarterly basis, IMF International Financial Statistics; 
Benchmark lending rate: The interest rate (with a maturity of one year or less) set by the PBC 
as a benchmark for commercial banks to follow, on the quarterly basis, IMF 
International Financial Statistics. 
 
A.2: Macroeconomic data  
All data series are monthly from January 2000 to December 2011 (except those specifically 
mentioned). 
     
D: The exogenous monetary contraction dummy, identified by the author through reading the 
PBC’s documents; 
݃ூ௉: The annualized growth rate of industrial production, Datastream; 
ߨ: The annualized inflation rate based on the consumer price index, Datastream; 
Trade balance: Its ratio to nominal GDP is used, Datastream; 
Shu-Ng narrative index: The index to indicate the PBC’s policy stance, Shu and Ng (2010);  
݃ெଶ: The annualized growth rate of M2 on the monthly basis, Datastream; 
Prime lending rate: The benchmark lending rate set by the PBC with the maturity of one year 
or less, Datastream; 
Energy price shocks: The changes in the purchasing price index for fuel and power, available 
only from January 2003 on, National Bureau of Statistics of China; 
Ratio of budget surplus/deficit to nominal GDP: Datastream.   
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Appendix B: Baseline Regression Results 
 
Table B-4.1: Baseline regression results for industrial production 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression is based on the estimation of Equation 4.8. The estimates of the constant term are not reported. * and 
** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
 
Lag Coefficient Standard error Lag Coefficient Standard error
0 0.35 0.68 1 0.77* 0.10
1 0.49 0.93 2 0.18 0.13
2 -2.12** 0.91 3 0.12 0.13
3 1.06 0.94 4 -0.14 0.13
4 0.02 0.93 5 -0.05 0.13
5 -0.20 0.92 6 -0.10 0.13
6 -1.21 0.92 7 0.12 0.13
7 0.65 0.93 8 0.11 0.13
8 -0.42 0.94 9 -0.13 0.13
9 0.39 0.94 10 -0.04 0.13
10 -0.23 0.94 11 0.04 0.10
11 0.61 0.75
Number of observations         121 after adjustement
Adj. R-squared 0.84
Standard error of regression 1.35
DW statistic 2.03
Montary policy shock Change in industrial production
Summary statistic
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Table B-4.2: Baseline regression results for inflation 
 
 
 
Notes: The regression is based on the estimation of Equation 4.9. The estimates of the constant term are not reported. * and 
** indicate that a null hypothesis of zero is rejected at the 1 percent and 5 percent level, respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
  
Lag Coefficient Standard error Lag Coefficient Standard error
0 -0.03 0.32 1 0.99* 0.12
1 0.59 0.44 2 0.04 0.17
2 -0.50 0.43 3 -0.05 0.17
3 -0.24 0.45 4 0.00 0.17
4 0.49 0.45 5 0.07 0.18
5 -0.51 0.45 6 -0.06 0.19
6 -0.21 0.46 7 0.13 0.19
7 -0.62 0.45 8 0.16 0.19
8 0.61 0.45 9 -0.27 0.19
9 -0.22 0.46 10 -0.06 0.19
10 0.29 0.48 11 0.16 0.19
11 -0.28 0.48 12 -0.57 0.17
12 0.13 0.53 13 0.39** 0.17
13 0.04 0.55 14 0.08 0.18
14 0.40 0.55 15 -0.16 0.18
15 0.14 0.54 16 -0.06 0.18
16 -0.33 0.52 17 0.04 0.18
17 0.20 0.52 18 0.09 0.18
18 0.39 0.51 19 0.04 0.18
19 -0.28 0.50 20 0.10 0.18
20 0.44 0.51 21 -0.12 0.17
21 -0.33 0.51 22 0.12 0.17
22 -0.49 0.50 23 -0.23 0.18
23 0.15 0.50 24 0.08 0.11
24 0.01 0.42
Number of observations         120 after adjustement
Adj. R-squared 0.96
Standard error of regression 0.51
DW statistic 2.08
Montary policy shock Change in CPI
Summary statistic
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5. Monetary Policy and European Unemployment1 
 
The analysis of European unemployment trends has been dominated by hypotheses claiming 
rising equilibrium unemployment (rising NAIRUs) caused by European labor market 
institutions, standing alone or in interaction with external shocks. If monetary policy is 
included in the analysis at all, it is used as a “control” or only as a short-run disturbance, very 
much in line with the neutrality of money hypothesis. Differences in welfare state 
arrangements between the US and Europe, together with stable unemployment in the US but 
an upward trend in unemployment in Europe, have been widely used as support for the 
diagnosis and the consequent proposal of the deregulation of European labor markets and 
reductions of welfare state programs in general. This diagnosis had been deduced from natural 
rate theory but the empirical evidence for the theory was weak. However, Europe’s 
unemployment trend (see Figures 5.1) is hardly consistent with one specific “natural rate of 
unemployment” since unemployment rose with every recession and remained at levels 
substantially above the pre-recession rates. “The only interpretation of this experience that is 
consistent with the accelerationist model (the Friedman/ Phelps model, RS/ RS) is that the 
neutral2 rate of unemployment must have gone from around three percent to something of 10 
percent in much of Europe, without doubt a bit higher in some countries and a bit lower in 
others. This rather remarkable hypothesis seems to have been accepted without a qualm” 
(Solow 1998: 9). Most remarkably, empirical evidence against the “consensus” (see Baker et 
al. 2004; Glyn, Howell, and Schmitt 2006) went largely unnoticed.  
                                                 
1 This chapter is a joint work with Ronald Schettkat. Earlier versions of this chapter have been discussed at the 
LoWER conference (Institutions, Markets and European Unemployment Revisited: What have we learned? in 
Amsterdam on April 18/19, 2008), seminars at the University of Hagen, University of Wuppertal and IAB, 
Nuremberg. We are indebted to Frank den Butter, Friedrich Kißmer, Joachim Möller, Robert Solow, Heinz-Peter 
Spahn, Helmut Wagner and an anonymous referee for their invaluable comments. Susanne Hochscherf provided 
excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours.  
This chapter was published in Oxford Review of Economic Policy (see Schettkat and Sun 2009). The long version 
of this chapter was published as Schumpeter Discussion Papers No. SDP 2008-002 (see Schettkat and Sun 2008). 
2 Solow refers to the “natural” rate of unemployment as the “neutral” rate of unemployment because “natural” is 
a misnomer since the level of unemployment, neutral to inflation, is influenced by institutions rather than 
naturally given. We use “natural”, “neutral”, “NAIRU” and “equilibrium rate of unemployment” as synonyms in 
this chapter.        
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Figure 5.1: Unemployment trends in Germany, Euro Area and the USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Source: Computations are based on OECD Economic Outlook database. 
 
 
Surprisingly little attention was given to macroeconomic institutions although substantial 
differences between the US and Europe exist here as well and could have been used to 
investigate differences in labor market performance. Also, the role of monetary policy 
changed substantially after 1973 when the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates was 
substituted by flexible exchange rates. The impact of flexible exchange rates on trade, raising 
the risk for international transactions, has been widely recognized, but very little attention has 
been given to the fundamentally different role that monetary policy has in a flexible exchange 
rate system compared to that in a fixed exchange rate system. 
 
With their “interaction of shocks and institutions hypothesis”, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) 
argue that changes in welfare state institutions cannot explain the jumps in European 
unemployment rates but that institutions slowed growth after the economy was hit by negative 
external shocks. This had the effect that the economy and employment could not fully recover 
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to their initial growth path. Thus, the economy remained with higher levels of unemployment. 
Surely this hypothesis fits the rise of European unemployment and the long-run decline in 
growth rates after 1970 and it is certainly more plausible than the hypothesis blaming welfare-
state institutions alone. However, this pattern is also consistent with an asymmetric monetary 
policy overemphasizing price stability and thus precautionarily dampening growth in the 
recovery period. 
 
According to the dominant and widely accepted view, monetary policy is neutral at least in the 
middle and long-run and does not affect real output or the growth path. “Output is a real 
magnitude, not a monetary magnitude” (Friedman 2006: 4). Thus, monetary policy is innocent: 
It does not affect growth and unemployment directly but only indirectly through its effects on 
expectations. In the words of Central Bankers: “Other than by maintaining price stability and 
thereby reaping its benefits in terms of economic performance there is no trade-off at longer 
horizons between inflation, on the one hand, and economic growth or employment, on the 
other hand, that can be exploited by monetary policy makers” (Issing 2000: 4). This led to a 
broad consensus that the only appropriate objective of monetary policy is the maintenance of 
price stability, full stop. “Potential oriented” monetary policy will reduce the fluctuations 
around the trend but not the trend itself (as illustrated by the straight lines around the linear 
trend in Figure 5.2), which was the message of the Bundesbank and the ECB. Hence, potential 
oriented policy contributes to the stability of expectations, from which the economy can only 
benefit. 
 
However, a whole battery of recent research suggests that monetary policy is not neutral to 
output, employment and unemployment but that it leaves scars identifiable in the data even 
after 5 and 10 years. Applying vector autoregressions (VARs), Bernanke and Gertler (1995) 
show that the effect of a rise of the funds rate on real GDP only dies out after 48 months. 
Using similar methodology (VAR), Bernanke and Mihov (1998a) find that the impulse 
response function does not dampen to zero even after 10 years.3 Alexius and Holmlund (2007) 
– also applying VARs – find that monetary shocks can have very long-run effects on 
                                                 
3 Mankiw (2001: C48) classifies the finding of non-neutrality by Bernanke and Mihov (1998a) “surprising”, 
because the “the paper purports to provide evidence for the opposite conclusion – long-run monetary 
neutrality. … But if one does not approach the data with a prior view favouring long-run neutrality, ... (t)he data’s 
best guess is that monetary shocks leave permanent scars on the economy.”  
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unemployment in Sweden. Taylor (1980) argues that contracts lasting for some period predict 
a tradeoff between output and price stability. Hysteresis theories of unemployment, of course, 
predict long lasting effects even of otherwise short run impacts of monetary policy (see Ball 
1997). Romer and Romer (1994b) conclude in their empirical analysis of every US business 
cycle since 1950 that monetary policies acted early can counter recessions. Blinder and Reis 
(2005) give monetary policy credit for the long US growth period in the 1990s. Theoretically, 
due to short-run wage or price rigidities, changes in the money supply might induce a short-
run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. Alternatively, some economists explore 
another approach – real rigidities-  to explain the non-neutralities of money (see Solow 1985; 
Ball and Romer 1990). 
 
Figure 5.2: Business cycles and long-run growth trends 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In their meta analysis of 86 studies, de Grauwe and Costa Storti (2008) find that monetary 
policy affects real economic variables even after 5 years. They argue that studies using 
structural VARs often impose the restriction that the long-run output effect of monetary policy 
is zero, but this restriction is based on the neutrality of money assumption. “Put differently, in 
those econometric studies that do not impose long-run neutrality, the long-run neutrality of 
money is rejected” (de Grauwe and Costa Storti 2008: 75). 
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How do we evaluate price stability if monetary policy is not neutral? Once one accepts real 
effects of monetary policy, as many recent studies suggest, a restrictive monetary policy will 
reduce growth and will not allow the economy to return to its initial growth path. This is 
especially true if it is asymmetric, i.e., overly concerned with price stability and fears that 
expansionary periods create price pressure. If, in addition, investment depends on expected 
growth as many studies have shown (Carpenter, Fazzari, and Petersen 1994; Solow 2008), an 
asymmetric monetary policy will also reduce investment and thus potential output. Hysteresis 
in labor markets may cause similar effects with respect to labor inputs. 
 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the impact of slow growth in upswings either caused by welfare state 
institutions (Blanchard and Wolfers 2000) or asymmetric monetary policy. The most popular 
view of tight monetary policy under the (long-run) neutrality of money hypothesis is that the 
volatility is reduced but that the growth path is unaffected. However, with asymmetric 
monetary policy the recoveries are slowed and recessions are not fully counteracted. We 
define asymmetric monetary policy as not (not fully) accommodating upswings and only 
reluctantly reacting to downswings. Asymmetric monetary policy in interaction with negative 
external shocks may be working in the following way:  
1) A negative external shock pushes the economy into a recession which is not (fully) 
counteracted by monetary policy;  
2) The upswing is not fully accommodated because the central bank fears inflationary 
pressure; 
3) As a result the economy will not swing back to the initial growth path but remains 
below; 
4) With the next downswing the process will be reiterated; 
5) In consequence asymmetric monetary policy will lower the long-run growth trend. 
All the ingredients needed to establish such a scenario are negative demand shocks and 
asymmetric policy reaction functions of central banks. 
 
This chapter first analyzes the yardsticks for policy evaluations, potential output (growth) and 
“NAIRUs” in Section 1. We then investigate the asymmetry of the monetary policy of the 
Bundesbank in Section 2. The last section concludes. 
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5.1 Neutral Output and NAIRUs 
 
Whatever the wording - “natural employment”, “full employment”, “natural unemployment”, 
“equilibrium unemployment”, “neutral unemployment”, “NAIRU”, “equilibrium output” 
“potential output”, “natural growth” - it seems to be generally accepted among economists that 
productive resources may be overused and that this may create inflationary pressure 4 . 
However, since the “potential” (to use a shortcut for the different wordings) cannot be 
observed directly but needs to be estimated, the measurement (in a theoretical sense as well as 
with respect to econometric methods) is under debate. When do economies depart from the 
natural rate of unemployment (from full employment)? 
 
The late James Tobin (1995: 33) emphasizes that for Friedman and Lucas the departure from 
“full employment” describes an equilibrium (market clearing) which thus can be changed only 
through adjustments of the institutional framework. Reducing unemployment requires a shift 
of the equilibrium. For Keynes and Keynesians, unemployment (deviations from full 
employment) is not the result of market clearing but on the contrary a non-clearing or a slow 
adjustment phenomenon. Take the extreme assumption that “markets are always cleared”. 
Under this assumption the economy always operates at full employment and the “potential” 
can actually be observed because it is always equal to actual output. Introducing some 
stochastic disturbances but quick adjustments preserves the core of the story, however, once 
slow adjustments are allowed for, it is less clear what “full employment” or “potential output” 
actually is. For sure, it is not always the observed output or employment, but more often 
economies will deviate from full employment and thus the estimation procedure is crucial.  
 
The pioneer of estimating potentials, Arthur Okun, used a simple linear trend between two 
peaks to estimate potential output (see Okun 1970). The simplicity of the method is an obvious 
advantage, but it requires the peaks to result from policies allowing the potential to develop. A 
bit more complicated but still very modest with respect to data requirements are so called filter 
techniques, such as the widely used Hodrick-Prescott filter or the Kalman filter. All that is 
needed is the data series itself. Filter techniques, of course, assume that actual values fluctuate 
                                                 
4 In the economic policy debate, usually NAIRUs (or natural rates) and/or potential output are used as proxies. 
Which one is used is largely a matter of taste because both are close relatives although not identical twins. 
Blinder and Reis (2005), for example, analyze the Greenspan legend in terms of NAIRUs. 
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around the potential (or that actual unemployment fluctuates around “neutral” unemployment). 
The method, however, does not allow for prolonged periods of capacity underutilization 
(which may be due to underused labor or capital). That distinguishes smoothing methods from 
structural estimates using aggregate or disaggregated production functions. Therefore, the 
difference between methods is fundamental: Smoothing of time series – filtering – assumes 
more or less quick adjustments if the economy deviates from the equilibrium whereas 
structural models are potentially immune against such a bias. Although theoretically preferable, 
structural models are facing data problems ranging from the availability of data to substantial 
measurement error and volatility of the data which often requires some smoothing of the 
underlying data series. Estimates of potential output influence monetary and fiscal policy as 
well as social, tax and labor market policies because they are at least one indicator which 
directs policy (see, e.g., Hargreaves Heap 1980). An underestimated potential output may, for 
example, lead to a budget deficit identified as structural although it may in fact be not. It may 
lead to overly restrictive monetary policy because an underestimated potential feeds the fear of 
price pressure. Thus, being cautious against potential output (or NAIRU) estimations may turn 
out to be very “beneficial as the Greenspan legend” suggests (Blinder and Reis 2005).  
 
The Bundesbank published a paper which propagates new Bundesbank estimates and provides 
an impression of differences in the estimated output gap for different estimation methods, 
which are astonishingly big (Deutsche Bundesbank 2003). The difference in the output gap 
between potentials estimated with different methods can be as big as six percentage points. 
For example, in the mid 1980s some methods would suggest over-utilization of capacity 
whereas others predicted severe under-utilization, i.e., the upper bound estimates would make 
Central Bankers already nervous, whereas the lower estimates would probably keep them 
more relaxed.  
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Figure 5.3: Output gap for Germany according to the Bundesbank (2003) 
 
   
 
  Source: Deutsche Bundesbank (2003). 
 
Astonishingly enough, the Bundesbank’s estimates with the new (but also with the former) 
method suggest that the German economy was underutilizing its capacity over long periods. If 
the Bundesbank’s re-estimation of the German production potential is close to the true 
potential, the recent economic history of Germany is characterized by an almost continuous 
underutilization of capacity (see Figure 5.3). In 16 out of 30 years shown in Figure 5.3 the 
underutilization was at least 1 percent or more of the potential output, and in only 7 years the 
economy was operating above its potential. At the same time actual inflation declined 
substantially from 5.6 percent in 1975 to less than 1 percent in 1998, very much in line with 
targeted inflation. 
 
Also, the NAIRU estimations are suffering from great insecurity. Analyzing US NAIRUs, 
Staiger et al. (1997) conclude: “However, the most striking feature of these estimates is their 
lack of precision. For example, the 95 percent confidence interval for the current value of the 
NAIRU based on the GDP deflator is 4.3 percent to 7.3 percent. In fact, our 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the NAIRU are commonly so wide that the unemployment rate has 
only been below them for a few brief periods over the last 20 years.” (Staiger et al. 1997: 34).5 
The data for Germany from Richardson et al. (2000: 16), who carefully analyzed different 
                                                 
5 Staiger et al. (1997: 40), however, mention that the slope of the Phillips curve (the Phillips coefficient) seems to 
be quite stable but that the intercept with the x-axis is imprecisely estimated. 
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NAIRU estimates for OECD countries, show substantial deviations between NAIRUs 
estimated with Kalman and HP filters and both differ substantially from NAWRUs (Non-
Accelerating Wage Rates of Unemployment), originally favored by the OECD. OECD’s 
NAWRUs followed actual unemployment closely, i.e. they suggested a high degree of 
structural unemployment in Germany. The “Kalman NAIRU”, however, suggests severe 
underutilization of resources in most years 6  implying that actual unemployment was 
substantially above structural unemployment. Thus, NAWRUs seem to have severely 
overestimated structural unemployment in Germany or in other words, these estimates may 
have caused an unnecessarily cautious monetary policy. 
 
In the 1990s almost all US economists believed that the US NAIRU was about 6.5 percent and 
thus a fall of actual unemployment below the NAIRU should have alarmed central bankers. 
However, as we know now, the US unemployment rate could fall as far as 4 percent without 
accelerating inflation. We only know this because the FED allowed the unemployment rate to 
fall below the level which so many believed would lead to accelerating inflation. Greenspan, 
however, concluded that US productivity must have risen and his NAIRU estimates must have 
been substantially lower than the commonly believed 6.5 percent. Blinder and Reis (2005) 
argue that sophisticated econometricians (Blinder and Reis refer to Staiger et al. 2001) were 
only years after the event able to trace the downward NAIRU-path Alan Greenspan must have 
identified in the mid 1990s. Therefore, we should probably be very cautious before applying 
restrictive policies, which are extremely costly. “I want to argue that there can be an 
economically meaningful margin of uncertainty of the whereabouts of the neutral rate at any 
particular time, and, even further, that it may not be the sort of stable parameter that the 
underlying theory needs it to be” (Solow 1998: 8). 
  
                                                 
6 In addition, the confidence-band around the Kalman filtered NAIRU is according to OECD (Richardson et al. 
2000: 67) about 0.7 percentage points in both directions (one standard error), i.e., the unemployment gap could be 
around 5 percentage points or two thirds of the actual unemployment rate in 1982. Using the Okun gap formula 
(The Okun Gap describes the difference between the actual and the “neutral” unemployment rate as a difference 
in unemployment rates as a function of GDP growth rates.) We estimate that 
- 1 percent difference in the unemployment rate results in about 2.5 percent loss in GDP in Germany 
before 1989; 
- 1 percent difference in the unemployment rate results in about 2.0 percent loss in GDP in the US before 
1989. 
This translates into a 10 – 12.5 percent loss in GDP. No peanuts! 
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5.2 Asymmetric Monetary Policy 
 
The Deutsche Bundesbank enjoyed high independence as mandated by the Bundesbank Act of 
1957. However, fixed exchange rates under the Bretton Woods system were limiting the 
Bank’s room for manoeuvre substantially (see Mundell 1963) until 1973 when fixed exchange 
rates gave way to flexible exchange rates. This increased the degree of freedom for monetary 
policy and the Bundesbank used the new option to target price stability (see Baltensperger 
1998; von Hagen 1998). The Bundesbank became de facto Europe’s central bank in about 
three decades before the setup of the European Central Bank because some countries pegged 
their currencies directly to the DM and others were influenced by Bundesbank policies 
through the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM). For the Bundesbank (and later, the 
ECB) price stability became priority and other considerations should only be pursued 
conditional on the achievement of price stability!7 This is in contrast to the principles of the 
Federal Reserve System (Fed). The Fed has a “dual mandate” and is required to use monetary 
policy to achieve price stability, but also to promote maximum employment (see the Federal 
Reserve Act).  
 
In the post-Bretton-Woods era, the Bundesbank adopted a policy of targeting monetary 
aggregates. Each year since 1975, the Bundesbank announced targets for the increase in 
Central Bank Money (CBM), and later in M3 (from 1988). In practice, these targets had been 
quite flexible: they were often missed, especially when hitting monetary targets might conflict 
with the control of inflation (see Bernanke and Mihov 1997; von Hagen 1995). This practice 
made the Bundesbank’s monetary targeting differ from a strictly monetarist doctrine. Instead, 
the Bundesbank viewed its monetary targets as a nominal anchor for the coordination of price 
expectations. With the monetary targets as an intermediate goal, the Bundesbank, like the Fed 
relied on short-term interest rates as a monetary instrument (see Clarida and Gertler 1997). We 
apply an interest rate monetary response function8 to analyze the Bundesbank’s monetary 
                                                 
7 It could be evidenced by the citation of the former president of the Bundesbank, Otmar Emminger, “price 
stability is not everything, but without price stability everything is nothing” (Deutsche Bundesbank 2008). 
8 Such a monetary response function is a simple interest rate rule proposed by John Taylor (1993), which states 
that the central bank should set the short-term interest rate considering the variability of inflation and output. 
Taylor (1993) specifies a monetary response function that fits the US data pretty well for the period from 1987 to 
1992:  
i = 5 + 1.5(π-2)+ 0.5(y-y*), 
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policy for the post-Bretton-Woods era. We do not, however, intend to argue that the 
Bundesbank applied an inflation-target rule in the strict sense, but we rather use it as an 
empirical instrument to detect possible asymmetries in monetary policy. Clearly, the 
Bundesbank argued that it followed a median or long term strategy of price stability. 
 
Table 5.1: The Bundesbank’s money growth and implicit inflation targets for 1975-1998 
 
  
 
  Note: From 1975-1985，the inflation targets are announced “unavoidable rate of price increase”, and since 1986, are 
announced the rate of being consistent with “price stability”. 
  Source: Bernanke and Mihov (1997), Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report (1997, 1998). 
 
 
Using quarterly data9, we run OLS-regression of the overnight money market interest rates on 
the variation of inflation and output, while allowing for interest rate smoothing by introducing 
two lags interest rate terms in the specification10, and get the following monetary response 
function for the Bundesbank for the period 1975:1 to 1998:4: 
 
    * * 1 2(0.11)[5.36 1.09( ) 0.09( )] 1.41 0.52t t t t t t t ti y y i iπ π ε− −= + − + − + − +               (5.1) 
where the adjusted R-squared is 0.94, S.E. = 0.56, and DW = 2.21. 
 
The constant 5.36 can be interpreted as the equilibrium nominal interest rate, close to the 
sample mean: 5.79. The coefficient before the Taylor rule reaction function (the part in 
                                                                                                                                                         
where the inflation target is assumed to be 2 percent, i is the federal funds rate, π is inflation rate and (y-y*) is the 
percentage deviation of the real output from its target. 
9 The data sources are Bundesbank’s Statistics and OECD Economic Outlook: West German data for 1975-1990 
and German data for 1991-1998. Inflation, π, is calculated based on CPI.  The implicit inflation targets by the 
Bundesbank are used as π*, as shown in Table 5.1. The real GDP trend is created with the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
(with λ equal 1600). Then (y-y*) is calculated as percentage deviation of real GDP from its trend. 
10 Introducing two lags is sufficient to reduce the serial correlation in the residuals of an OLS regression and it 
reflects the fact that central banks care about financial market stability and thus hesitate to make overly abrupt 
changes in interest rates. 
Year Target Actual Implicit target Actual
1975 8 10.1 4.5 5.6
1980 5 - 8 4.9 4.0 5.3
1985 3 - 5 4.5 2.5 1.6
1990 4 - 6 5.6 2.0 2.7
1995 4 - 6 2.1 2.0 1.8
1998 3 - 6 4.9 1.5 – 2.0 0.9
Money Growth Inflation
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brackets), is 0.11 = 1 – (1.41 – 0.52), which captures the impact of the current variables on 
interest setting. The response function shows that on average the Bundesbank followed a 
gradual adjustment strategy, while taking the inflation deviation from its targets into account. 
Nevertheless, the Bundesbank barely responded to output gaps. However, output itself is an 
important factor in determining inflation. An upward deviation of output from its potential 
could raise inflationary pressure, which might have triggered the Bundesbank’s inflation 
expectations, while a downward output deviation might have been simply ignored by the 
Bundesbank. That is, the Bundesbank might have reacted asymmetrically to output 
fluctuations: ignoring underutilization of potential capacity but fearing the price pressure from 
the overutilization of the potential. 
 
To investigate asymmetry in the Bundesbank’s monetary policy, we split the sample into two 
periods: Underutilization period, in which actual output is below potential output, and 
overutilization period, in which actual output is above potential output. We thus estimate the 
monetary reaction function to allow the response to differ according to the state of the 
economy. We get:  
for ( *) 0ty y− >  (overutilization): 
                   * * 1 2(0.13)[4.46 1.08( ) 0.46( )] 1.31 0.44t t t t t t t ti y y i iπ π ε− −= + − + − + − +            (5.2a)  
 
for ( *) 0ty y− <  (underutilization): 
                 * * 1 2(0.13)[4.46 0.23( ) 0.38( )] 1.31 0.44t t t t t t t ti y y i iπ π ε− −= + − − − + − +            (5.2b) 
where the adjusted R-squared is 0.95, S.E. = 0.55, and DW = 2.12. 
 
Indeed, when the actual was above potential output, the Bundesbank raised the interest rate as 
a precautionary measure, and thus deviated from the long orientation. When actual output was 
below potential output, the Bundesbank kept the long-run orientation and did not lower the 
interest rate.11 The regression results support our hypothesis that the Bundesbank responded to 
                                                 
11 The negative coefficient for (y-y*) is not significant. Otherwise it would indicate a pro-cyclical monetary 
policy, i.e., rising interest rates when the production potential is underused. We find this coefficient to be 
significant when we use generalized method of moments (GMM) rather than OLS. Other considerations (such as 
exchange-rate stabilization, or an underestimation of the potential (see the discussion in Section 5.1)) may 
rationalize that result. Adverse supply shocks may be another explanation for the negative coefficient but, in all 
three recessions analyzed, both inflation and output declined, although inflation rates were – especially in the 
1970s and 1980s – above their (implicit) targets.  
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output gaps asymmetrically.12 Positive output gaps enhance the fear of higher inflation and the 
Bundesbank reacted by raising the interest rate, as evidenced by the larger coefficients for 
both inflation deviation and output gap. Thus, the Bundesbank slowed economic expansions. 
In contrast, when the output gap is negative, the Bundesbank does not reduce the interest rate 
significantly, i.e., it does not counter recessions. 
 
To investigate the impact of asymmetric monetary policy on the real economy, we display the 
cumulative growth rates of GDP and its components – investment, private and public 
consumption – for recoveries for Germany and the US in Table 5.2. The data show roughly 
similar cumulative GDP growth rates for the 1975 recession in both countries but in the 
following cycles, cumulative GDP growth rates for Germany were substantially lower than the 
US rates, which is probably most severe in the recovery of the early 1990s (this recession was 
later in Germany than in the US), i.e., in a situation where growth was most needed, just after 
German unification. For investment as well as consumption growth was always much stronger 
in the US than in Germany. The biggest difference occurs in investment, where the differential 
after 12 quarters was as high as 24.5 percentage points in the 1982 recovery. Also private 
consumption grew at substantially higher rates in the US. However, with public consumption 
the picture was mixed. Investment is the classical textbook case for the illustration of 
monetary policy effects but a non-accommodating monetary policy may also dampen 
investment through the expected lower demand growth. 
                                                 
12 Wald-test under the null hypothesis of equality of the coefficients for (i) inflation deviations and (ii) output 
gaps in Equation 5.2a and 5.2b:  
 
           
 
Test Statistic Value  df    Probability
(i) F-statistic 1.26 (1, 89)  0.265
Chi-square 1.26 1 0.262
(ii) F-statistic 6.04 (1, 89)  0.016
Chi-square 6.04 1 0.014
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Table 5.2: Three recoveries in Germany and the USA (cumulative growth rates of GDP, 
investment and consumption, and differences between GDP and TFP growth rates 
for ….. quarters after the trough*) 
 
 
  Note:* A trough is defined as at least two consecutive quarters with negative growth in GDP. 
  Source: Calculations are based on OECD Economic Outlook Database. 
 
The comparison of GDP growth rates in the first three columns of Table 5.2 underestimates 
the restrictiveness of the Bundesbank policy because Germany operated at substantially higher 
productivity growth rates than the US until the mid 1990s, i.e., higher productivity growth in 
Germany should have allowed for higher GDP growth in Germany without creating 
inflationary pressure. To return to the initial growth path and initial employment levels, GDP 
growth needs to be higher than productivity growth. The cumulative differences of GPD 
growth rates and productivity growth rates are shown in the fourth column of Table 5.2 for the 
3 recoveries in Germany and the US. In every recovery, the values for the US were clearly 
higher than those for Germany and reached substantial levels, which enabled the employment 
expansion in the US. In contrast, the cumulative differences of GDP growth rates minus the 
productivity growth rates in Germany hardly moved above zero: it was -1.0 percent even for 
12 quarters after the trough for the 1992 recovery in Germany. This is in stark contrast to the 
US values, which were 9.7 percent for the 1975 recovery, 8.1 percent for the 1982 recovery 
and 3.5 percent for the 1991 recovery. 
 
  
after…quarters after…quarters after…quarters after…quarters after…quarters after…quarters
Trough 4 8 12 4 8 12 4 8 12 4 8 12 4 8 12 4 8 12
1975 II 5.4 8.7 11.2 7.1 10.3 14.2 4.0 8.8 11.4 2.3 3.2 7.6 8.3 14.0 14.7 - - -
1982 III 2.0 5.8 8.3 4.2 5.9 6.3 1.8 4.9 7.1 -0.3 1.0 2.4 0.7 11.8 18.8 0.9 1.9 2.8
1992 III -0.2 2.4 4.5 -2.6 1.6 2.1 1.9 3.8 6.4 -1.0 1.7 4.5 4.3 12.7 17.7 0.2 0.3 0.3
1975 I 5.9 9.1 13.1 7.2 14.4 21.3 6.0 10.5 14.0 0.8 1.9 4.2 0.1 3.4 5.9 - - -
1982 III 5.5 12.1 16.3 11.4 25.3 30.8 6.5 11.1 16.9 3.9 4.6 10.8 -1.3 7.4 7.6 3.3 7.9 11.7
1991 I 2.6 5.8 9.1 2.1 7.9 14.9 2.9 5.9 9.9 -0.7 0.0 -0.4 3.5 13.5 16.3 3.1 3.7 6.9
Germany
USA
Export (% ) TFP growthInvestmentGDP private public
Consumption GDP growth minus 
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5.3 Conclusions 
 
This chapter establishes evidence that the German economy was, with the exception of a few 
years, operating continuously below its potential since the early 1970s, and furthermore, that 
growth in expansionary periods was too low. This is in stark contrast to the US economy, 
where the growth rates were clearly higher after recessions, both in absolute terms and relative 
to the growth of the potential. We emphasized the measurement problems related to the 
estimation of potential output but the patterns seem to be very stable and different methods 
applied show consistent results: Germany could have been more prosperous if the potential 
had been fully used.  
 
Is the relative underperformance of the German economy related to monetary policy or did 
other variables cause the underperformance?  We show that the Bundesbank applied an 
asymmetric interest reaction function, i.e., the bank emphasized price stability and thus reacted 
strongly to rising inflation – which is the basis of the widely celebrated Bundesbank legend - 
and raised interest when potential output was reached or passed. But the Bundesbank did not 
react when actual output was falling short of potential output. It is sufficient that monetary 
policy affects the real economy in the short run to establish the link between asymmetric 
monetary policy reaction and the growth path of the economy. If economic growth after a 
recession is dampened, the economy cannot return to the initial growth path and this way, the 
long-run growth trend will be reduced as well.  
 
Could the Bundesbank have done better? Was it the over-commitment to price stability in the 
bank’s objective function or was the information at the time when decisions had to be made, 
just not sufficient to draw different conclusions? This issue is discussed in the “real time” 
literature, where it is argued, for example, that the US inflation of the 1970s was the result of 
an overestimated potential because the productivity slowdown was not recognized at that time 
(Orphanides 2001). Clearly, if the estimates of the potential are biased, policies based on these 
estimates may be biased as well. But the bias can go in both directions and although inflation 
may be harming the economy, so do underused capacity and unemployment. If one assumes 
neutrality of monetary policy, the decision is easily made: pushing for high price stability is a 
free good. If, however, monetary policy has short-run or long-run effects – as endogenous 
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investments or hysteresis processes suggest - overly emphasizing price stability is extremely 
costly for society, as Okun’s law suggests.  
 
Monetary policy is not the only macro policy and the Bundesbank may not be responsible for 
the entire underperformance of the German economy. Aside from monetary policy, fiscal 
policy is surely important as well – with the ECB, fiscal policy should have gained importance 
if it were not restricted by the “Maastricht criteria” (see Allsopp and Vines 2005). Dolado et al. 
(2003) argue that rigid European labor markets did not allow the central banks in Europe to 
follow a more “flexible inflation targeting” as the Fed did because wage rigidities in Europe 
would have caused inflationary pressure in expansionary periods. However, as the OECD 
(2004) states, microeconometric studies comparing the US with European economies fail to 
establish evidence for the wage-rigidity hypothesis. And wage flexibility also has two sides 
and coordinated market economies seem to create stronger wage restraint in expansionary 
periods than “liberal market economies”. Empirical evidence for Germany in comparison to 
the US does not seem to support the labor market rigidity hypothesis (see Carlin and Soskice 
2008; Schettkat 1992).   
 
True, unemployment turned into long-term unemployment and became more and more 
concentrated among the low skilled. But what caused this structuring of unemployment? Once 
path-dependence is allowed for (through sorting, skill depreciation and other mechanisms) 
unemployment may be difficult to reduce after high unemployment has persisted for a certain 
period. This process, however, is not an argument against a more expansionary policy but it is 
in favor of it because inactivity will cause high, long-lasting costs. A monetary policy less 
constraining economic growth in recoveries could have brought German unemployment rates 
back to pre-recession levels and prevented the structuring of unemployment.     
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